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This thesis explores the relationships between the natural environment, urbanisation, 
and the market economy, in the context of water supply and drainage in eighteenth-century 
London. It argues that, as a result of the expansion of the built-up area, the institutions that 
managed London’s water became increasingly vital as the main mediators of the growing 
distance between the city’s inhabitants and water. In particular, it focuses on the growth of 
a commercial water supply, and analyses how the allocation of a natural resource became 
increasingly refracted through the market. As such, the thesis addresses the emergence of a 
political economy of water and its social and economic ramifications.  
The thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach, integrating social and environmental 
history, and it argues that geography should be incorporated in the analysis of the 
institutions that controlled water. It considers London’s drainage system and its water 
supply together, as changes in the drainage of surface water played a crucial role in creating 
the conditions for the privatisation of London’s water supply. The expansion of the supply 
network, in turn, depended heavily on London’s social geography as well as its topography, 
as the difference in elevation between a water company’s intake and its customer base 
proved influential for its failure or success.  
The increased role of commercial water supply had important consequences as to how 
eighteenth-century Londoners accessed water. A new analysis of the water companies' level 
of market penetration adds context to contemporary debates surrounding the way the 
water market was structured. Finally, an investigation of the provision of free water in 
emergencies explores the role of private companies in the provision of public goods. The 
thesis adds to our knowledge about the growing role for institutions in an expanding city. 
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Style and abbreviations 
• In accordance with general academic use, the style ‘city’ is used to indicate the whole 
metropolitan area of London, including Westminster, Southwark as well as the 
outparishes. In contrast, ‘City’ is used to specify the administrative unit of the City of 
London.  
• Before Britain switched to the Gregorian calendar in 1752, the year officially started in 
April. In some sources, therefore, Jan.-March 1731 came after Dec. 1731. These cases 
are referenced as Jan.-March 1731/2. For sources where this did not occur, as well as 
in the main text, these dates are styled Jan.-March 1732. 
• The commissioners of sewers are styled ‘commissioners of sewers’ as a generic term, 
and ‘Commissioners of Sewers’ when a specific commission is indicated, e.g. ‘Surrey 
and Kent Commissioners of Sewers’. Sewer commission is used to indicate both the 
area and the administration, e.g. ‘the Surrey and Kent sewer commission’.  
• Similarly, the water companies are styled ‘waterworks’ as a generic term, and 
‘Waterworks’ if a specific company is indicated, e.g. ‘Lambeth Waterworks’.  
• Eighteenth-century contracts for water supply were structured as leases, with the 
buyer as ‘tenant’ and the charge as ‘rent’. Throughout the thesis, the word tenant is 
used interchangeably with customer. However, the tenant was not always the actual 
user of the water they bought, as some tenants sold on their water to others.  
• The pound (£) was divided in 20 shillings (s). Each shilling contained 12 pennies (d). 
• London Metropolitan Archives is abbreviated to LMA. 
• The National Archives is abbreviated to TNA. 
• The British Library is abbreviated to BL. 
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Chapter 1. London‘s waterscape. 
 
Encountering water — flowing, standing and stagnant — was a common experience in 
eighteenth-century London. Contemporary maps show open sewers, ponds, canals, docks, 
basins, mill ponds, pools of water, and of course rivers.
1
 In addition, there were fountains, 
conduits, as well as water pipes and underground sewers. This abundance of water in the 
city reflects the fact that its proximity is a biological necessity, and that organising, 
controlling, and mastering its circulation and flow was, and to some extent still is, the basis 
upon which urban growth is predicated.
2
 Protection from flooding, the provision of water 
for daily activities such as washing, cooking, and industrial use, and the availability of ready 
supplies for fire fighting were all essential aspects of London’s expansion during the 
eighteenth century. Creating the institutional frameworks and technological capacity to 
provide water and protect against fire and flood both underpinned this growth.
3
 It is the 
configuration, expansion, and management of these institutional frameworks and 
technological systems, and their impact on eighteenth-century London, that comprise the 
core of this research. 
Water within cities has both a natural as well as a social history, and as such has a hybrid 
character. The study of this water landscape, or waterscape, includes both these aspects.
4
 
The physical configuration of the urban waterscape is influenced by geological and 
                                                           
1
 An example is the 1746 Rocque map. Rocque, J., A Plan of the Cities of London and Westminster, and Borough 
of Southwark; with the Contiguous Buildings; From an actual Survey, taken by John Rocque, Land Surveyor, and 
Engraved by John Pine, Bluemantle Pursuivant of Arms, and Chief Engraver of Seals, &c To His Majesty 
(London, 1746). 
2
 Swyngedouw, E., Social power and the urbanization of water (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 30. 
3
 Tarr, J.A. and Stine, J., ‘At the intersection of histories: technology and the environment’, Technology and 
culture, 39 (1998), pp. 601-640, p. 613. 
4
 Whiston Spirn, A., The granite garden: urban nature and human design (New York, Basic Books, 1984); 
Swyngedouw, E., ‘The political economy and political ecology of the hydro-social cycle’, Journal of 
contemporary water research and education, 142 (2009), pp. 56-60. 
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topographical factors, as well as institutional structures, such as economic conditions, 
legislation, and historical contingencies, many of which are culturally determined.
5
 But 
much as a system emerges as a result of both human and physical interactions, it also forms 
a constraining, and in some cases, a determining factor in the configuration of access to 
resources in itself: through the construction of technological systems of distribution and 
drainage, power relations regarding access to water and affordability are refracted.
6
 A study 
of a city’s waterscape, therefore, asks questions that transcend the physical constraints of 
the environment and necessarily takes into consideration the social, economic, political and 
cultural processes that underpin all human interventions in the natural world. As 
geographer Alex Loftus has stated, the study of water networks provides “a wonderfully 
powerful lens through which the workings of different societies might be explored”.
7
    
London’s waterscape has been the subject of recent research, but much has been 
focused either on the Middle Ages and early modern period, or on the nineteenth century.
8
 
                                                           
5
 Hughes, T.P., Networks of power: electrification in western society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), p. 462. 
6
 Swyngedouw, Social power, pp. 30, 36. Key works on this topic include Wittfogel, K.A., Oriental despotism: a 
comparative study of total power (New York, Random House, 1957); Worster, D., Rivers of empire: water, 
aridity, and the growth of the American West (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985). For London Jenner, 
M.S.R., 'From conduit community to commercial network? Water in London, 1500-1725', in P. Griffiths and 
M.S.R. Jenner, eds., Londinopolis: essays in the cultural and social history of early modern London (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 250-72; Kaika, M., City of flows: modernity, nature, and the city 
(London, Routledge, 2005). 
7
 Loftus, A., ‘Thinking relationally about water: review based on Linton’s What is water’, Geographical Journal, 
177 (2011), pp. 186-188, p. 186. 
8
 E.g. Graham-Leigh, J., London's water wars: the competition for London's water supply in the nineteenth 
century (London, Francis Boutle, 2000); Jenner, 'Water in London’; Magnusson, R.J., Water technology in the 
Middle Ages, monasteries and waterworks after the Roman Empire (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2001); Jefferson-Smith, P., 'Before Bazalgette: the Surrey and Kent Commission of Sewers, 1800-1847', 
Transactions of the Newcomen Society, 74 (2004), pp. 131-46; Lewis, D., ‘”For the poor to drink and the rich to 
dress their meat”: the first London water conduit’, Transactions of the London and Middlesex Archaeological 
Society, 55 (2004), pp. 39-68; Kaika, City of flows; Trentmann, F. and Taylor, V., ‘From users to consumers — 
water politics in nineteenth century London’, in F. Trentmann, ed., The making of the consumer: knowledge, 
power and identity in the modern world (Oxford, Berg Publishers, 2005), pp. 53-79; Hanley, J.G., 'The 
Metropolitan Commissioners of Sewers and the law, 1812-1847', Urban History, 33 (2006), pp. 350-68; Hillier, 
J., ‘The rise of constant water in nineteenth-century London’, The London Journal, 36 (2011), pp. 37-53; Taylor, 
V. and Trentmann, F., ‘Liquid politics: water and the politics of everyday life in the modern city’, Past and  
Present, 211 (2011), pp. 199-241. 
 13
The eighteenth century has often been ignored in this literature, or treated as a period 
when existing arrangements expanded but when little new was achieved.  However, this 
apparent period of stability, or indeed, stasis, is illusory: the very fact of the city’s expansion 
posed particular challenges for the ways in which water and drainage were provided.  
Population growth as well as expansion of the built-up area meant that households became 
increasingly distant from sources of water which, in turn, led to a greater dependence on 
the institutions responsible for constructing and managing the networks that bridged this 
spatial divide. At the same time, the risks of flooding similarly increased as city streets 
covered what was once open land, and as drainage of the urban area came to rely less on 
natural infiltration but increasingly on networks of gulleys, sewers, and sluices. The 
difficulties faced by the institutions responsible for the provision of water and drainage 
during this period, and the consequences of their increasing power in shaping London’s 
waterscape, are the subject of this thesis. 
London has been chosen as a case study through which these issues can be explored 
because of its size and rate of expansion. The city had long escaped from its administrative 
borders and by 1724 Daniel Defoe wrote that “when I speak of London, now in the modern 
acceptation, you expect I shall take in all that vast mass of buildings, reaching from Black-
Wall in the east, to Tot-Hill Fields in the west (...) to Islington north”.
9
 During the eighteenth 
century it grew to be the largest city in Europe: estimations show that London as a whole 
had 575,000 people in 1700, 750,000 people in 1750, and around 900,000 people at the 
time of the 1801 census.
10
 In addition to this growth in population, it has been said that 
eighteenth-century London grew faster in ‘bricks and mortar’ than in population, and by the 
                                                           
9
 Quoted in Rudé, G., Hanoverian London, 1714-1808 (London, Secker and Warburg, 1971), pp. 1-2. 
10
 Gray, R., A history of London (New York, Taplinger, 1978), p. 201; White, J., London in the eighteenth century: 
a great and monstrous thing (London, the Bodley Head, 2012), p. 3. 
 14
end of the eighteenth century the built-up area covered more than twice as much land as at 
the beginning.
11
 Located in a tidal river basin, drainage was always an issue whilst 
population growth ensured that water supply became increasingly dependent on public and 
commercial, as opposed to private and individual, sources of supply. Exploring these issues 
over a long time period also allows for the fact that climatic variability, which imparted 
shocks to the systems for provision and drainage as a result of droughts or periods of 
exceptionally wet weather, can be included in the discussion of change.  
 
 
1.1. The study of cities, resources, and the natural environment. 
 
Exploring the relationships between urban places and the environment invites an 
interdisciplinary perspective, taking into account approaches from both history and 
geography. Environmental historians broadly examine the mutual relationships between the 
natural environment and society, noting how each affects the other.
12
 Initially, as a result of 
environmental history’s geographical origins in North America, scholars were predominantly 
concerned with issues of wilderness, exploration, and the impact of human activity on 
supposedly ‘natural’ environments.
13
 However, by the early 1990s, researchers began to 
turn their attention towards the relationships between cities and the environment.
14
 Urban 
environmental history, as it emerged at the end of the twentieth century, became the focus 
                                                           
11
 George, D.M., London life in the eighteenth century (Chicago, Academy Chicago, 1984), p. 15; Inwood, S., A 
history of London (Basingstoke, Papermac, 2000), p. 257. 
12
 Steinberg, T., Nature incorporated, industrialization and the waters of New England (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 11; Smout, T.C., Exploring environmental history, selected essays (Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 2. 
13
 Sörlin, S. and Warde, P., ‘The problem of the problem of environmental history: a re-reading of the field’, 
Environmental History, 12 (2007), pp. 107-130, p. 109.  
14
 See e.g. Melosi, M.V., 'The place of the city in environmental history', Environmental History Review, 17 
(1993), pp. 1-23. 
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of much activity both in North America and also in Europe. Scholars, such as William Cronon, 
began to explore the relationships between cities and their hinterland in terms of the 
impact of urban growth on surrounding resources, but subsequent work such as that by 
Martin Melosi, Christine Meisner Rosen, and Joel A. Tarr focused more on how to 
understand better the internal dynamics of urban environments, identifying the provision of 
water, air pollution, and responses to flooding as key topics for research.
15
 In the process of 
re-orienting urban environmental history, scholars have questioned the view that cities 
were solely parasitic entities that fed on their local environment, sucking resources into 
their space and denuding the countryside of its food, water, and natural resources. Martin 
Melosi, for example, suggested that due to their concentration of people and activities, 
cities present opportunities for using resources more efficiently and organising services 
better than would be possible with more dispersed populations.
16
 Indeed, this thinking 
underpins much of the current debates about sustainability and compact cities.
17
 Dieter 
Schott similarly argued that cities should not just be seen as the locality in which problems 
such as pollution occur, but should be viewed as ‘collective social actors’ that engage in the 
acquisition, use, and organisation of their resources.
18
  
While the re-orientation of urban environmental history challenges our views of the city, 
it is nevertheless true that much of the research has been concerned with urban solutions to 
                                                           
15
 Cronon, W., Nature’s metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York, Norton and Co, 1991); Rosen, C. M. 
and Tarr, J.A., eds., The environment and the city: a special issue of the Journal of Urban History, 20 (1994); 
Luckin, B., ‘Pollution in the city’, in M. Daunton, ed., The Cambridge urban history of Britain, vol III, 1840-1950 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 207-228; Melosi, M.V., The sanitary city (Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000); Schott, D., 'Resources of the city: towards a European urban environmental 
history', in D. Schott, B. Luckin, and G. Massard-Guilbaud, eds., Resources of the city: contributions to an 
environmental history of modern Europe (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005), pp. 1-27, p. 3; Massard-Guilbaud, G. and 
Thorsheim, P., 'Cities, environment, and European history', Journal of Urban History, 33 (2007), pp. 691-701. 
16
 Melosi, Sanitary city, p. 4. 
17
 See e.g. Jenks, M., Burton, E., and Williams, K., eds., The compact city: a sustainable urban form? (London, 
Spon Press, 1996).  
18
 Schott, ‘Resources’, p. 9.  
 16
problems as insanitary conditions and pollution, and has mainly focused on the large-scale 
sanitation projects of the nineteenth century.
19
 This emphasis has often implicitly or 
explicitly adopted the metaphor of the ‘urban metabolism’, an organising motif or model in 
researching the relationships between resources and the city. This metaphor considers the 
city as a ‘social organism’, which needs certain ‘inputs’ (resources such as clean air, energy, 
clean water, and food) as well as having ‘outputs’ (such as waste, polluted water, but also 
finished products), and considers the flow of materials (the water, food, and air) within the 
city.
20
 The concept emerged alongside developments in scientific and biological knowledge 
in the nineteenth century, when it was used by the public health movement promoting the 
‘hygienist’ city, as well as for various other urban improvement schemes.
21
 As a model, the 
idea resurfaced again in the 1960s and 1970s when material or energy flow analysis became 
a field for ecologists and environmentalists, and it was subsequently taken up by scholars 
interested in understanding the urban environment.
22
  
However, the urban metabolism model has certain limitations, the most important of 
which is that it is difficult to incorporate the social, political, and economic institutions that 
determine how the resource is used, what sort of activities take place, and why these 
                                                           
19
 E.g. Porter, D.H., The Thames embankment: environment, technology, and society in Victorian London 
(Akron, University of Akron Press, 1998); Gandy, M., 'The Paris sewers and the rationalization of urban space', 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 24 (1999), pp. 23-44; Halliday, S., The great stink of 
London: Sir Joseph Bazalgette and the cleansing of the Victorian metropolis (Stroud, Sutton Publishing, 1999); 
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 The idea of a city as a form of ecological system implies that these institutions 
arise and processes take place naturally when, in fact, they are subject to a whole range of 
social factors, economic pressures, and political priorities. As such, the model’s limitations 
form part of a wider criticism regarding environmental history as a whole, namely that it 
does not pay sufficient attention to human actions and motivations, as several recent 
publications emphasising the need for a deeper engagement with social and political theory 
within the discipline have made clear.
24
 Geneviève Massard-Guilbaud and Stephen Mosley, 
for example, have argued that environmental historians often disregard the variety of 
different interests, desires, and experiences that motivate human actions.
25
 They argue 
convincingly that environmental history should incorporate the conflicts, power struggles, 
and everyday practices and consumption behaviours that have shaped human-environment 
relationships over time and space.
26
 
This human factor is more clearly represented in social science approaches to the 
organisation of space and distribution of resources. Much recent work in geography, for 
example, has emphasised how space is produced by the interaction of social relations, ideas, 
relations of production and consumption, everyday life, and technology.
27
 In this analysis, 
the process of urbanisation is seen as the transformation of nature and the social relations 
inscribed therein, which results in the conceptualisation of cities as a socio-physical 
construction of dense networks of interwoven socio-spatial processes which are 
                                                           
23
 Boyden, S., ‘Nature, society, history and social change’, Innovation, 14 (2001), pp. 103-16. 
24
 E.g. Smout, Exploring, p. 2; Massard-Guilbaud, G. and Mosley, S., ‘Breaking down borders: integrating the 
social and environmental in history’, in G. Massard-Guilbaud and S. Mosley, eds., Common ground: integrating 
the social and environmental in history (Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), pp. 1-15. 
25
 Massard-Guilbaud and Mosley, ‘Breaking down’, p. 4. 
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Based on Lefebvre, H., The production of space (Oxford, Wiley, 1992). There is a wide literature on this: 
recent work on water includes Swyngedouw, Social power; and Linton, J., What is water? The history of a 
modern abstraction (Vancouver, UBC press, 2010). 
 18
simultaneously human, material, natural, cultural, and organic.
28
 Emphasising a political-
ecological perspective in which environmental and social changes co-determine each other, 
geographers, such as Erik Swyngedouw, have suggested that there is a dialectical set of 
relationships involved in the transformation of both social as well as physical 
environments.
29
 The eighteenth-century urban waterscape, in this view, was shaped and 
transformed through the different processes that occurred over the course of this century.  
 
 
1.2. The eighteenth century: socio-economic transformations. 
 
The long eighteenth century — from Restoration to Regency — saw broad political, 
economic, social, and technological changes take place. In some ways these developments 
were connected, and in many ways changes in one sphere influenced those in others. 
Explaining the relationships between this set of interrelated developments has been the 
subject of much debate. Some historians have argued that these changes arose as a 
consequence of the emergence of the market or political economy during the eighteenth 
century.
30
 Others, Douglass North and Barry Weingast for example, have attributed 
economic changes to a shift in political and fiscal institutions emerging out of the Glorious 
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 More recently, Joel Mokyr has framed the myriad changes in terms of 
a basic shift in ideology as a result of the new philosophies of the Enlightenment.
32
 
Whatever the fundamental cause, the profound institutional changes that occurred over the 
eighteenth century deeply impacted on the social, economic, and political relations 
between people. 
A key aspect of these changes, as Roy Porter has argued, was the emancipation of human 
consciousness, and the introduction of a world view in which mankind was given a larger 
degree of independent agency.
33
 This meant a radical new approach to the world that 
emphasised rationality over divinity. Human societies, no less than the natural world, were 
seen as subjects that followed rational forms of explanation rather than those determined 
by religious authority or divine intervention. As such, the political and economic laws 
governing the interactions between the individual and society were subjects that could be 
studied through empirical means. A second key change was that once a rational 
understanding had been achieved, processes of change were seen as malleable and subject 
to improvement. The power of reason and knowledge were therefore applied to improve 
the human condition.
34




Alongside the intellectual changes associated with the Enlightenment, there were 
important political transformations that enhanced property rights and buttressed the 
enforcement of contracts. In England, the 1689 Bill of Rights that followed the Glorious 
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Revolution restricted the arbitrary power of the King and established a more powerful 
Parliament with much stronger powers over the country’s finances. In addition, it made 
provisions for the increased protection of private property rights and the enforcement of 
contracts.
36
 This fostered trust in the government, and over the following decades, as the 
state required more funds, individual lenders were able to invest confident that their loans 
were backed by the force of law. This constitutional change allowed for a ‘national’ debt, as 
opposed to a royal one, the (in)security of which rested in the fickleness of an absolute 
monarch.
37
 The Bank of England was established in 1694 to mediate the national debt, 
which marked the embodiment of the greater degree of separation between Crown and 
national finances.
38
 In practical terms, these shifts in fiscal arrangements signalled a clear 
commitment on the part of the state to enforce contractual arrangements — a necessary 
institutional change that, as Douglass North points out, underpinned investment in a wide 
range of activities, including, in this case, the supply of water.
39
  
Growing confidence in the legal enforcement of contractual obligations meant, in turn, 
that trust was easier to maintain even amongst individual borrowers and lenders who had 
no personal knowledge of each other. The new institutional arrangements therefore made it 
possible for investors to bridge the barriers of distance and lend to those who were in 
search of finance, even if they were unknown and at a considerable distance away.
40
 The 
growth of overseas trade expanded the economic base, and the import and re-export of 
goods, largely conducted through regulated or joint-stock companies such as the East India 
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Company (incorp. 1698), created an accumulation of mercantile wealth.
41
 The rise of private 
banks alongside the Bank of England provided a secure means of storing this wealth, as well 
as providing credit for more investment, which became the key to economic growth. The 
trust in a secure constitution and stable political system, the assurance of property rights, 
and guarantees in the system of banking allowed the circulation of capital.
42
 This set of 
political and financial institutions that emerged during the later decades of the seventeenth 
century has been called the ‘Financial Revolution’, and its impact was profound in the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
43
 For the purpose of this thesis, these developments 
were crucial for the financing of infrastructural projects that required a large initial capital 
outlay, such as those that supplied water to London.  
Related to this Financial Revolution was the rise of the market economy. The growth of 
trade and the greater circulation of money allowed for a rise in the consumption of goods.
44
 
But the rise of the market arguably had a deeper and more profound impact on society as 
well. While in a pre- or non-market economy societies embedded their economy into more 
significant social institutions, in a market economy most exchanges are ruled by the market 
itself. This shift, which Karl Polanyi has called ‘the Great Transformation’ and Joel Mokyr 
called ‘the mother of all institutional changes’, transformed society in fundamental ways.
45
 
Many goods, such as land, wood, grain, and also water, access to which had previously been 
embedded in other relations, became instead subject to market forces and were 
increasingly commodified, meaning that their distribution was determined largely, if not 
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entirely, through economic relations.
46
 Processes of commodification were uneven and, in 
certain places and specific periods, tightly contested, but nevertheless during the course of 
the eighteenth century became more widespread. 
These changes were apparent in the ideological transformation that took place as 
contemporaries discussed the meaning and implications of living in a commercial society.  
Ideas that contrasted the common good versus private gain were tempered by views that 
emphasised the essential unity of both.
47
 Whilst some, such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 
third earl of Shaftesbury, contrasted the benefits of trade with an aristocratic dislike of 
making money, others were less judgemental about the vulgarity of commerce.
48
 One of the 
first authors to analyse and advocate capitalist market relations was Bernard Mandeville, 
who wrote in the first few decades of the eighteenth century. In 1705 he published The 
Grumbling Hive, a pamphlet that was further explored in his 1714 Fable of the Bees, one of 
the earliest and most penetrating analyses of the emerging market economy.
49
 In this work, 
Mandeville proposed that the ‘vice’ of private interest could in fact be seen as a public 
virtue. The purchase of commodities, he argued, including luxury items, provided 
employment and income for those involved in their manufacture and distribution. Without 
this acquisitive behaviour, economic prosperity would wither.
50
 Profiting from the 
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production and sale of commodities, therefore, even though it was fuelled by private 
interest, contributed to the public good.
51
 
Mandeville’s work proved very influential, sparking intense debates about the validity of 
luxury consumption and its role in the progress of society, at the same time as it forced a 
reconsideration of the commercial basis of the market economy.
52
 Samuel Johnson, for 
instance, asserted that while he had thought Mandeville’s ideas dangerous, they had 
opened his eyes as well: while the Fable of the Bees laid bare the emerging institutions on 
which the modern world was founded, these still brushed against society’s predominant 
morality, even in the latter half of the century.
53
 Nevertheless, interest in understanding 
better the rational basis of market relations continued and during the course of the 
eighteenth century a body of literature emerged to probe how the market economy 
functioned, investigating both micro- and macro-economic aspects of this new system.
54
 
The Enlightenment values of studying the laws of nature were evident in the rational and 
empirical way in which conceptual and theoretical issues were investigated, including the 
price-value mechanism, the division of labour, public finance, the benefit of trade for the 
nation, and the role of money.
55
 Studies of economic relationships and the creation of 
wealth, which included Josiah Tucker’s Elements of Commerce (1755), James Steuart’s 
Principles of the Political Economy (1761), and Adam Ferguson’s History of Civil Society 
(1767), culminated in 1776 when Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations, the most 
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influential study of the workings of the political economy of the eighteenth century.
56
 Smith 
followed Mandeville’s ideas that only selfishness could promote economic activity: the 
baker, he argued, made bread for his own profit and not out of benevolence.
57
 But Smith 
went further: he introduced the concept of the ‘invisible hand’, that is, a self-regulating 
price mechanism by which the pursuit of private interests ultimately would result in the 
greatest benefit to society.
58
 Self-interest became a laudable goal and the regulation of the 
market could therefore be left to the market itself. 
This philosophical shift reflected fundamental changes relating to the expansion of the 
money economy and its growing intrusion into everyday life. New ideas about ownership, 
access to, and exchange of goods and services, which sometimes clashed with long 
established customs, were evident in a range of issues that emerged during the eighteenth 
century.
59
 Debates about access to land and to the purchase of grain illustrate how these 
new ideas were played out in practice. Before the rise of the market economy, the grain 
market had been regulated and controlled through the assize of bread, which set a fair 
allowance for the producers, controlled the rate of profit that middlemen could make, and 
resulted in a ‘just price’ for the buyers.
60
 As the price of grain became determined more by 
market sources than by regulation, and as producers and merchants sought to evade the 
restrictions imposed by these customary rules, popular protests emerged, particularly 
during times of shortage when millers and grain merchants were suspected of making 
surplus profits that deprived the poor of their rights to subsistence.
61
 Essential goods, 
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therefore, were subject to notions of a fair or just price, established through a set of 
customary expectations and forms of regulation that governed economic relations. Similar 
arguments could be made in relation to water, an issue around which many of the debates 
discussed later in the thesis revolved. 
Bread and grain riots were not the only way through which the friction between a 
regulated and a market economy could be expressed. In a less directly oppositional way, 
debates took place in what Jürgen Habermas has called the ‘public sphere’.
62
 Drawing on 
the intellectual space created by the decline in absolutist regimes, which made possible the 
discussion of issues that were previously the domain of state or religious discourse, and 
incorporating a growing group of educated and literary individuals, opportunities were 
created for a wider public debate about economic relationships.
63
 In this realm private 
individuals could meet as equals and engage in rational debate and open and critical 
discourse about areas of common concern.
64
 Economic discussions that were aired in the 
public sphere in turn helped to develop a body of critical knowledge through which 
individuals could become increasingly familiarised with the workings of the market.
65
 This 
knowledge, in combination with the rise of the public sphere, allowed people to discuss 
economic issues such as monopolies, commodification, and the benefits of the free market 
versus regulation. 
While the public sphere encompassed a myriad of spaces, such as coffeehouses, salons, 
public buildings, and the streets, there is very little record of the discussion that actually 
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took place in these spaces.
66
 Of the discussion that took place through the written records, 
including the press and printed pamphlets, we have a much clearer picture. Critical 
reasoning appeared in the printed media from the early eighteenth century onwards, when 
opinion pieces started to be published alongside the news and “the press was for the first 
time established as a genuinely critical organ of a public engaged in critical political 
debate”.
67
 Opinion pieces quickly gained in popularity and by the latter half of the 
eighteenth century the papers had become larger and had more space, with writers using 
the newspapers as a platform to discuss diverse economic subjects.
68
 As a result, the 
reading public became used to debates about economic topics, and thus became 
familiarised with the workings of the market.
69
 As such, newspapers and other forms of 




During periods of shortages, when customary expectations ran up against economic 
realities and the price-fixing mechanism, these debates raged, in relation to water no less 
than in relation to grain prices.
71
 While no ‘water riots’ have been recorded during the 
eighteenth century, letters in the public press and pamphlets discussed the way in which 
access to water was refracted through the market, and touched on issues such as 
regulation, free competition, and a fair price. These letters are discussed in chapter six of 
this thesis, and show a deep connection between the functioning of the water market, 
political ideology, and wider socio-economic concerns. 
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1.3. Administration and records. 
 
England’s development as a fiscal state in the late seventeenth century was accompanied 
by the rise of administration and bureaucracy.
72
 The Financial Revolution saw an increased 
volume of transactions, which in turn necessitated a better command of information, as 
well as control by rules and regulations.
73
 As ever larger numbers of people became 
connected by these streams of finances recording all transactions and decisions became 
more important.
74
 In addition, Enlightenment values fostered an increased interest in 
recording the natural world.
75
 Together, these trends resulted in a greater availability of 
data for the eighteenth century, including maps, weather records, as well as financial 
documents.    
The main institutions dealing with London’s water during the eighteenth century, namely 
the water supply companies and the sewer commissions, created a wealth of records as a 
testament to their administration. The commissioners of sewers were justices and thus part 
of a legal process, meaning that any meeting of at least six of them counted as a ‘court of 
record’, which made binding decisions.
76
 Since their decisions and byelaws carried on 
beyond the tenure of these commissioners, and were transferred to the next ones, there 
was a need to record these decisions. But even their day-to-day management needed to be 
written down: river banks, sewers, and other constructions often slowly deteriorated over 
long stretches of time, and later commissioners had to know what their predecessors had 
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decided. In addition, the commissioners needed to know how many people were living in 
their jurisdictions and how much they should be rated. Therefore, for much of the 
eighteenth century their actions were recorded, and these records have been preserved.  
The water companies had a similar need to record their dealings and decisions: they had 
to keep lists of their customers and keep track of their water-rents. As administrators of the 
capital invested in them, they also created a large bureaucracy around their investors: 
shares were transferred, passed on, and sold. Unfortunately, not many of the companies’ 
records have survived for the eighteenth century: both the records of the New River 
Company as well as those of London Bridge Waterworks were destroyed in fires that burnt 
down the headquarters of these companies in 1769 and 1779 respectively. Of the smaller 
companies, many records have not been left to posterity after they were taken over. 
Fortunately, much of the information relating to the Chelsea Waterworks has survived from 
the company’s inception in the 1720s onwards. Additional information has been gathered 
about the companies through newspapers, government administration documents, and the 




1.4. Understanding London’s waterscape. 
   
By the end of the eighteenth century, the institutions that managed the circulation of 
London’s water had acquired a certain level of prominence. There was a consciousness of 
the importance of especially the water supply companies, as letters appeared in the public 
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press regarding the need to protect their infrastructure during the 1780 Gordon riots.
77
 By 
this time the city mainly relied on the water companies to supply water for use in fire 
fighting, and their infrastructure became a focal point for London’s defence: during the 1798 
riots a list of recommendations to defend London was published in The Times, and included 
the protection of London’s waterworks and their pipes.
78
 Several of the main water 
companies were protected by guards during this period of unrest as it was thought that the 
crowd might attempt to cut the supply in order to let fires in the city burn.
79
 
Studying a city’s water supply and drainage requires attention to the physical as well as 
the social worlds within which they were embedded. As such it requires us to consider the 
geographical conditions and spatial arrangements, as well as the ideological context and 
economic conditions. The focus of this thesis is on the institutions that managed London’s 
water, and to provide a context for the circumstances in which they were able to become so 
important to the city. This context is that, as other sources of water were in decline, those in 
need of it were increasingly distanced from available sources of water. The institutions 
mediated this distance by means of their infrastructure, and as a result, their management 
of water through these networks increasingly became the way in which it was circulated.  
Both the city’s supply and drainage channels are considered as intricate systems with a 
physical outlay, which was determined by geological, topographical, economic, and social 
factors. This physical layout in turn influenced the way these systems were organised, 
necessary technological changes, as well as social interactions with the network. The 
motives of those in charge of the water supply and drainage networks, as well as those 
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using it, influenced where the water was channelled and how the networks were managed, 
and as a consequence, how water could be accessed. 
The thesis begins with an overview of the urban water system, and through a GIS analysis 
of eighteenth-century maps of London at three separate points in time it is shown how open 
water gradually disappeared. Increased demand for water resulted in a drop in the water 
table, while at the same time available water became more polluted by the waste products 
arising from a greater number of households and industries. As a result, not enough water 
was available within the densely populated city, while that which was present was of 
insufficient quality. In addition, the nuisance of polluted and stagnant water in combination 
with the increased need for building ground in the city, led to the covering of many open 
water courses.  
This set of changes meant that people and households became increasingly distanced 
from access to water, as fresh water had to be fetched from farther away, and excess water 
had to be drained through other built-up areas. The need to mediate this distance resulted 
in a greater role for the institutions that became responsible for this: water companies for 
the supply, and sewer commissions for the drainage. Both these institutions had to manage 
infrastructure to bridge ever-increasing distances, as well as to cater for an expanding 
population. The implications of this increase of scale on a physical as well as an operational 
level were evident in managerial, financial, infrastructural, and socio-economic changes. The 
institutions’ abilities to cope with the demands of an expanding city form the crux of this 
thesis, and the core chapters examine several aspects of the strategies adopted in response 
to the challenges they encountered. Chapter three investigates the history, tasks, and mode 
of administration of both the sewer commissions as well as the water companies, and 
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discusses how their managerial structures evolved in response to a greater workload and 
the need to increase their revenue.  
While both institutions faced similar issues — a growing population, an expanding 
infrastructure, and an increasing workload — they differed in one fundamental way: 
drainage continued to be managed by the public sewer commissions, while water supply 
was increasingly handled by commercial companies. This had important implications for the 
ways in which money could be raised, but also impacted on the manner in which 
management could be enforced. As it was impossible to prevent drain-water from entering 
the system, the commissioners of sewers were not able to exclude houses from their 
network. This, in turn, forced the commissioners to regulate people’s usage of the networks, 
and control their behaviour around sewers. Chapter four focuses on the measures the 
commissioners undertook to prevent filth building up and blocking flows through the 
system. The commissions had to face other challenges, too, such as their limited powers to 
construct new sewers. This problem was solved with the help of private builders and 
developers who constructed private sewers, which then came under the control of the 
public commissions. The result was an exceptionally complex hybrid drainage network.  
The greater infrastructural requirements of the expanding supply system are addressed 
in chapter five. This chapter analyses the challenges faced by the water companies, as their 
networks grew to cover ever-increasing distances between sources and expanding customer 
bases, and the companies’ reactions to such challenges. The most important constraint was 
the geographical configuration of the companies’ points of intake vis-a-vis the locations of 
their customers, with certain companies having to overcome larger vertical and horizontal 
distances to supply water. Fluctuations in rainfall, urban growth, technological innovations, 
 32
and directors’ knowledge thereof, were all important elements in the success or failure of a 
company’s expansion.    
Chapter six draws on shifting power relations as a result of the increasing role of private 
companies in the allocation of water. An analysis of the level of market penetration and the 
price charged for water demonstrates the increasing reliance of Londoners on a commercial 
water supply over the course of the eighteenth century. As the companies needed to 
protect the fixed capital invested in their infrastructure they colluded to keep the price of 
water artificially high, thus maintaining a steady source of income. The greater importance 
of the water companies over the course of the eighteenth century and their power to set 
the price led to public discussions about the market structure and the companies’ level of 
control. As with the grain market, letters and pamphlets were published that discussed the 
best way of organising the water market, with commentators criticising its monopolistic 
tendencies while favouring a larger role for free market forces. 
Chapter seven returns to the importance of the water companies in times of riot and 
war. As London came to mainly rely on the water companies for its supply, this meant that 
the city’s emergency supply was in their hands as well. The companies, therefore, had the 
power to allocate water in times of severe frost and, most importantly, for the purpose of 
fire fighting. Contrary to their business of selling water, in these instances the companies 
provided a free supply. Chapter seven discusses the companies’ involvement in the 
provision of the public service, and examines the motivations of the companies’ directors as 
why to supply water for free, touching on the complicated social and economic factors 
which were involved in creating these arrangements.   
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Chapter 2. Mapping London’s waterscape.  
 
Changes to London’s hydrological landscape during the eighteenth century played a 
formative role in determining how the city’s water management developed, and therefore a 
better understanding of the physical processes and features that constituted this 
waterscape is important. The presence of water at any particular locality was subject to and 
part of an interplay of larger biophysical, cultural, and historical processes. Site-specific 
factors such as ground-type and patterns of urbanisation also influenced how water 
features were made or altered. Changes over time in any of these processes had 
implications for the geography of surface water as well as the way it was managed. For 
these reasons, this chapter examines the impact of the built environment on London’s 
water features over time as well as over space, and draws out the ramifications for the city’s 
waterscape during the eighteenth century. 
In order to understand the changes in the physical waterscape, this chapter not only 
maps out the geography of water features in eighteenth-century London, but also looks in 
detail at why and how these features were created and altered. In order to do so, it firstly 
examines the main forces that shaped London’s waterscape, namely its surface topography 
and the expansion of the built environment. Through two case studies it shows how the 
interaction between topography and urbanisation influenced the spatial arrangements of 
water features. Secondly, the chapter examines the geography of water over the century by 
means of an analysis of contemporary cartographic evidence. While there are several 
limitations to these sources, they allow an assessment of changes in the city’s waterscape 
over time. The results of this exercise show the disappearance of surface water over time, 
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which resulted in an increasing distance between available water supplies and households. 
The reasons why this distancing occurred were directly related to the expansion of the city, 
and the effects of this distance had repercussions for understanding the ways in which 
people interacted with and managed access to water.  
 
 
2.1. Shaping London’s waterscape: topography and urbanisation. 
 
Geology was a significant factor determining the presence or absence of surface water in 
eighteenth-century London. The city is located in the Thames Basin, formed by a major 
syncline that extends from the Chiltern Hills to the North Downs, on which lay subsequent 
strata of chalk, sand, and clay. This underlying bedrock supports the superficial river 
deposits: mainly brickearth, gravel, and alluvium.
1
 These last two deposits in particular 
played an important part in shaping the geography of London’s water features, and their 
respective locations are shown in figure 2.1, together with the area’s ‘natural drainage’: the 
original tributaries of the Thames. The extent of the city in 1800 is also shown on this map. 
The figure shows that most of London north of the Thames was built on gravel deposits, 
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Figure 2. 1. London's surface topography in the eighteenth century. 
 
Based on: Geological survey. ‘Other’ includes sand and brickearth. 
 
The alluvium, which is made up of sands and clay, is poorly drained and much was 
originally marshland. The gravels and higher sands, on the other hand, allowed surface 
water to percolate between them, and thus provided a more solid base to build on. London 
owes its location partly to the fact that the gravels reached close to the river on both sides, 
whereas downstream the alluvium extended more broadly.
2 
This resulted in the Thames 
being both narrower and deeper at this location, allowing for a crossing place while 
remaining open to navigation. Subsequently, the city expanded along the banks of the 
Thames and was built mainly on gravel. It was only in the nineteenth century that patches of 
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Another advantage of the superior drainage of the gravels was that rain would percolate 
through it until it reached the layer of impermeable London Clay beneath, where it would 
form aquifers. Water in these aquifers could either be accessed through a shallow well, or, 
at locations where the junction between the gravel and clay was exposed near the surface, 
it emerged as springs.
4
 As a result, the parts of London built on gravel originally had a ready 
supply of fresh water. There are several reasons why, as the city grew, these reservoirs 
eventually became insufficient. In the first place, as a result of the expanding population, 
demand for water exceeded the capacity of the reservoirs, and this, in turn, caused the 
groundwater level to drop.
5
 As a consequence, wells had to be deepened or enlarged: the 
well at Clerkenwell, for instance, was enlarged several times in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.
6
 Moreover, as the number of private wells multiplied, competition for 
water increased and it was not unknown for wells to run dry when new ones were sunk in 
close proximity.
7
   
Secondly, population growth resulted in increased water pollution. The substandard 
quality of the water drawn from London’s wells had already been noted in the late Middle 
Ages.
8
 However, as the city grew, more people meant more latrines, but also more animals, 
and the waste from both could trickle down into the groundwater. It also meant more 
industries and noxious activities, each of which came with their own polluting agents. 
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Finally, as more land was built over, less rainwater was able to penetrate to the gravel whilst 
at the same time sewers channelled it straight to the river.
9
 In certain places, where the 
gravel extended to a depth below the level of the Thames, brackish river water flowed 
against its natural drainage and replaced rain water, turning wells near the river 
impotable.
10
 The expansion of the built-up area of the city therefore had an important 
impact on fresh groundwater; surface water on the other hand was subject to a more subtle 
interaction of topography and social geography. 
Over the eighteenth century, the social differentiation of certain areas of London became 
more apparent, and this, too, had an impact on the city’s waterscape.
11
 By the mid-
eighteenth century, the City of London chiefly housed the buildings of financial institutions 
such as the banks, exchanges, and the great joint stock companies, as well as small 
tradesmen, their wholesale establishments, and markets. The area surrounding the City had 
a more industrial character: small, twisting lanes and alleys housed artisans that specialised 
in different trades, depending on the area. The metal trades, clock making, and jewellery 
making were located north of the City, in Clerkenwell. To the east was the silkweaving 
district of Spitalfields, while the riverside housed a myriad of industries that relied in one 
way or another on the Thames. These included trades related to the shipping industry, such 
as rope-making, boat-builders, and docks, but also included activities that needed access to 
a waterway, either to use the water as a raw material, or for the disposal of their waste. 
These industries included sugar refineries, as well as oil-, colour-, and soap-works. A similar 
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district emerged on the south side of the Thames in Rotherhithe, while in Southwark the 
main industry was tanning, with its associated trades of fell-mongering and wool-stapling.
12
 
The area west of the City, meanwhile, had a very different character. The West End 
became a fashionable area after the City’s destruction in the Great Fire of 1666 and the 
restoration of the monarchy, which attracted many aristocrats and moneyed gentlemen to 
take part in Court life or deal in government, and firmly consolidated its position as the 
residential district of London’s social elite during the eighteenth century. Its streets were 
more spacious and light, and as the area was mainly upriver and upwind from the noxious 
trades surrounding the City, the living environment was better. In addition, the London 
season of entertainment and social pleasures that flourished during the eighteenth century 
was mainly situated in the western part of town and attracted many people of high social 
standing to the capital.
13
  
The increased demand for fashionable residences fuelled a spectacular growth in the 
number of houses in the West End. The expansion of London between 1700 and 1800 can 
be seen in figure 2.2. The West End stands out as a large, continuous development, whereas 
many of the newer neighbourhoods to the east and south of the capital were built more 
piecemeal in a pattern of ribbon development. This distinction was mainly a reflection of 
landownership. The land to the west of London was owned by fewer large estates which 
were planned and developed in a continuous and uniform manner by their owners, whereas 
landownership elsewhere was more fragmented and buildings were erected unplanned 
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 The open spaces between the buildings were used to spread out drying 
clothes and tans, as well as for market gardening. 
 
Figure 2. 2. The physical expansion of London during the eighteenth century.    
 
 
The impact of both ground and land-use on the geography of London’s waterscape can 
be shown by examining the water features of two contrasting localities. The first, 
Southwark, is built on alluvium and has an industrial character. Figure 2.3 shows a section of 
the Christchurch parish in south London as depicted on the 1746 Rocque map of London.
15
 
Open water is evident in this area: in the centre below is a marshy piece of land, indicative 
of the poor drainage of the alluvium. Open sewers along the streets point to the same issue. 
Several features depicted on this map indicate the presence of tanners: the tentergrounds 
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to the north and south of the marshland were used to pen out their hides, while the 
surrounding ponds where the leather was soaked and treated are depicted as well. To the 
north, in the top centre of the image, is a garden with visible water courses. Other industries 
are also evident in this area: a skin market and a vinegar yard are depicted as well as a 
whitening ground and a brewhouse. The natural presence of water here catered for trades 
that needed the water. However, the noise and pollution these industries created — 
tanneries made use of ingredients such as lime, urine, dung, and fermenting rye — gave 




Figure 2. 3. Christchurch on the 1746 Rocque map with water features highlighted.  
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The waterscape in the west of town looks profoundly different from that of Southwark. 
Figure 2.4 is based on the same Rocque map of 1746, and depicts the edge of the West End. 
In contrast to Southwark, there are no water features visible between the built-up area. 
Instead, the only water in this image was located in the fields around the city. In addition, 
the water features here were of a very different nature to those in Southwark, and reflected 
the different function of the area: that of grand houses rather than industry.  
 
Figure 2. 4. West End water features as depicted on the 1746 Rocque map. 
 
 
The largest water feature on figure 2.4 is the reservoir of Chelsea Waterworks (CWW). 
This was a company supplying piped water to the inhabitants of Westminster and the West 
End, which also owned several other reservoirs closer to the built-up area, as indicated on 
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the map. The presence of this water company here can be explained by several factors. As 
there was no open water present near households, and as the demand from the increase in 
population had exceeded the capacity to draw water from wells sunk into the ground, 
inhabitants had to obtain their supply from elsewhere. The Chelsea company provided a 
convenient way of having it laid into people’s houses and the residents of this area were 
wealthy enough to pay for this service. The infrastructure used by the company also had an 
aesthetic function: originally the smaller reservoirs in the park had been ornamental ponds, 
and the company had been allowed to make use of them as long as they were kept in an 
attractive style.
17
 Other ornamental features in this area included the royal canals and the 
Serpentine, which was created from the Westbourne, a natural tributary of the Thames. The 
company’s ponds, which had previously been used to attract ducks and deer for the 
personal pleasure of the King, became part of the landscape that the West End residents 
used for fashionable promenading as the parks opened for the public. 
The case studies of Southwark and the West End show how water features reflected the 
surface topography as well as specific land-use patterns of each area. The features were 
hybrid mixes of naturally occurring material and man-made constructions that changed 
according to alterations in their environment. Shifts in land-use, for example through the 
process of urbanisation, therefore impacted on the way water was used, and water features 
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2.2. Mapping London’s water features. 
 
In order to assess the nature of London’s waterscape, several sources of evidence can be 
considered. Two main conditions have been taken into account: the sources should be as 
precise, and as complete as possible. While images and descriptions can be useful in 
providing detail, they are often localised and therefore too limited to provide an overview of 
London as a whole. For this reason, the analyses in this chapter rely on cartographic 
evidence from which it is possible to reconstruct the spatial patterns of water courses and 
drainage channels on a larger scale. In order to arrive at any meaningful results, however, it 
is necessary to understand the mapping techniques and conventions of the time. While 
eighteenth-century maps were not yet based on triangulation, they nevertheless improved 
in accuracy from the pictorial maps of earlier periods.
18
 From this time, therefore, despite 
the inaccuracies that still existed, it becomes possible to explore more precisely the 
geography of London’s waterscapes. 
London’s rapid expansion during the eighteenth century offered the incentive to create 
new maps at regular intervals which can provide a basis on which to assess changes that 
took place over time. However, map surveying was a time-consuming and expensive 
business, and most maps produced in the first half of the eighteenth century were updated 
versions of earlier maps.
19
 The accuracy of the updates varied widely: newly engraved maps 
were often based on earlier surveys, and even a relatively reliable cartographer such as John 
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Cary would rather update his old maps than make a new survey. This process would often 
consist of making additions to the original map rather than a complete review, and for this 
reason it is important to only examine first editions of newly surveyed maps, so that the 
highest degree of accuracy can be achieved.
20
 James Howgego’s seminal survey of London 
maps included over 400 separate maps for the period 1553 to 1850, but only a few of these 




Three maps depicting London between about 1680 and 1800 have been selected based 
on these criteria and can be used to explore changes in London’s waterscape: the 1682 
Morgan map, the 1746 Rocque map and the 1792-9 Horwood map.
22
 This last map was 
chosen over another original survey, the 1787 Cary map, for several reasons. Firstly, 
Horwood map’s scale was more detailed; secondly, it was surveyed closer to the end of the 
century, before the early 1800s’ alterations in the waterscape by the canals and docks; and 




The 1682 Morgan map is considered to be the first truly modern map of London. It was 
conceived as a ground plan, although it does include some pictorial representations of 
important buildings, such as churches. It was based on earlier separate surveys of the City of 
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London, Westminster, and Southwark in the 1670s, which were supposed to be published 
each in their own right. However, William Morgan realised that as the poorer Southwark 
residents could not afford to buy their map, he could not make a profit selling them 
separately, and as a result he decided to combine them into one map. Although this large 
map was based on the earlier surveys, it seems clear that some additional work was carried 
out. The map shows streets that were not named until 1681, and the ostriches gifted to King 
Charles II in January 1682 were depicted in St James Park.
24
 
The next complete survey was undertaken during the early 1740s by John Rocque, which 
resulted in his 1746 map of London. Rocque was trained as a dessinateur de jardins, 
someone who measured and drew estates for landowners. His background is evident in the 
precise way in which he depicted parks and fields around the capital, often differentiating 
land-uses.
25
 Rocque had indicated that the neighbouring country should be drawn in detail 
on the map, rather than be filled up with ornaments and dedications, as was the case on 
Morgan’s map.
26
 The map is completely ichnographical: the only things drawn pictorially 
were trees in fields and ships on the river.
27
 A 1740 proposal for the map indicated that the 
survey was begun in 1738.
28
 By 1746 a draft was completed and people were invited to 
come and check its accuracy. In addition, Rocque sent out men, each with a portion of the 
map, to check whether it still matched the survey.
29
 The map that was published based on 
these quality checks was therefore as accurate a representation of London in 1746 as 
possible. In the same way as the Morgan map had been updated for the previous 60 years, 
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the Rocque map became the base which later mapmakers would update during the second 
half of the eighteenth century. However, London expanded greatly over the next decades, 
and by the end of the century the need for a new survey arose. 
Two main cartographers produced new surveys towards the end of the century: John 
Cary and Richard Horwood. Cary’s map was first published in 1787 and was a different sort 
of map than the ones published before that date: it was a map to be used rather than to be 
displayed.
30
 Richard Horwood’s 1792-9 map was the largest and most ambitious London 
map made up to that date. It consisted of 32 sheets, each one of which was published 
individually over the course of eight years.
31
 Horwood had been working for the Phoenix 
Fire Insurance Company as a surveyor before he started the project, and as a result he 
perceived the need for a map with a high degree of accuracy. The aim was to show every 
house in London individually, a goal which Horwood eventually achieved.
32
 Howgego has 
described this map as the “most important London map of the eighteenth century” and it 
remained the most accurate map of London until that made by the Ordnance Survey 50 
years later.
33
   
All three maps discussed above depict the built-up area of London at the time, which 
included the City of London, the City of Westminster, and the borough of Southwark, as well 
as new developments on the outskirts. Whereas it could be argued that local, larger scale 
maps of particular areas provide more detailed information about water features, maps that 
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cover London and its environs were chosen with the aim of depicting the city’s total 
waterscape. Although using maps in this way might result in a loss of spatial resolution, 
nevertheless, assuming consistency within each one, they provide a uniform basis for 
comparison across the entire built-up area. 
While maps are graphic representations of some aspects of the real world, even modern 
cartography is by no means a wholly factual science, and it cannot be assumed that what is 
depicted on the map is necessarily or unproblematically a true reflection of a geographic 
reality. Maps, like all historical documents, should be evaluated in the context of their 
creation, taking into account issues of power and purpose together with existing 
cartographic knowledge and practice.
34
 Mapmaking was an expensive business, and the 
creators of these large maps had to look for funding throughout the surveying and 
publishing process. Their main sponsor often influenced whether and in which shape the 
map was eventually published. Morgan filled up most of the space around the built-up area 
on his map with dedications to the King, Lord Mayor and various livery companies that 
sponsored him, all of which were honoured by being shown in pictorial form. Rocque had a 
specific agenda in making his map: to prove that London was as large as Paris, and just as 
beautiful. His map shows the new squares of the West End in clean, straight lines, 
broadcasting its modernity, while it shows the area around Covent Garden, which was in 
fact deteriorating into a slum by then, in much the same way.
35
 Horwood had applied for 
public funding but failed to obtain it, and was supported by the Phoenix Fire Insurance 
Company instead. This company had an interest in the project as a precise map would make 
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it easier to identify the exact location of their clients.
36
 Each map, therefore, needs to be 
understood in its specific context rather than treated as an isolated example that reflects a 
geographical reality at the time of its making.  
The cartographers’ backgrounds and experience also influenced what would be included 
on the map, which has several consequences for the ways in which natural features, and in 
the case of this study, water, was represented. Rocque, the former landscaper, showed the 
most detail: trees, streams, and animals are all meticulously displayed. As he included the 
fields around London in his survey, water features such as rivers, marshes, and pools were 
also incorporated. Several scholars have noted the presence of water on Rocque’s map, 
among them Philippa Glanville, and Felix Barker and Peter Jackson.
37
 Morgan showed 
natural elements in detail as well, such as the animals in St James Park, and displayed water 
in fields and sewers alongside roads. However, as he focused on the built-up area, most of 
the surrounding space was taken up by dedications and plates, ignoring the natural spaces 
that undoubtedly existed at the time.  
Horwood showed the fewest and least detailed natural features. His focus was primarily 
on streets and houses, and natural features were depicted according to their function rather 
than their form. For example, he chose to depict the Fleet River, which functioned as a 
parish boundary, only as a border and not as a water feature, even through the New River 
was drawn as a river on the same map sheet. By omission, the Horwood map focused more 
on the human than on the natural world. Cary’s 1787 map did not include much detail on 
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 Cary had previously made road-maps and his London map 
reflected this: outside the built-up area it only showed some tracks and byways.
39
  
The exclusion of natural features poses a challenge when using the maps as a source for 
identifying water features. In order to mitigate this problem, corroborating evidence has 
been sought from the Stockdale map. This map, even though its scale was much smaller, 
depicted a far larger number of water features. Figure 2.5, for example, compares the 
Horwood and Stockdale maps for the section that shows part of Bermondsey, at the time of 
survey on the urban fringe. Unfortunately not much is known about the origin of the 
Stockdale map, and it is therefore difficult to ascertain whether it was based on an original 
survey. In order to check its accuracy, the map has been carefully compared with Horwood’s 
map in relation to features which appear on both maps. In addition, two maps from the 
British Library’s Crace collection, showing the countryside around Marylebone and St 
Pancras in the 1790s, have been examined for water features as well.
40
 It was found that 
they depicted a similar amount of water-filled gravel pits as the Stockdale map shows for 
this area, whereas Horwood showed none. Having ascertained that the Stockdale map 
accurately represents London at the end of the eighteenth century, water features only 
present on the Stockdale map have been included in the analysis. In addition, while the 
Horwood map is considered to be one of the most accurate maps in terms of housing and 
street development, and used as a source for the analysis of these aspects, it has to be 
recognised that it has its limitations in regard to natural features.  
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Figure 2. 5. Comparison of Bermondsey area on Horwood (left) and Stockdale (right) maps. 
 
 
In addition, there were several practical issues regarding the depiction of water on a 
map. Contrasting definitions of water played a role in explaining the differences in its 
depiction. For example, at what point does a ditch which has a seasonal flow of water stop 
being identified as a ditch and start being depicted as a small stream? The seasonality of 
surveying also played a role: summer levels of water in ditches and sewers would have been 
different from winter levels, and depending on the season in which a part of the survey was 
undertaken, this could be reflected on the map.
41
 When a watercourse was depicted, the 
issue of ‘fuzzy boundaries’ could also arise. The Thames was tidal with sloping banks and it 
was therefore up to the mapmaker to decide where to draw the boundaries of the river.
42
  
                                                           
41
 Gurnell, A.M., Peiry, J.-L., and Petts, G.E., 'Using historical data in fluvial geomorphology', in M. Kondolf and 
H. Piégay, eds., Tools in geomorphology (London, Wiley, 2003), pp. 77-103, p. 94. 
42
 Ibid., p. 93. 
51 
 
These variations mean that none of the maps can be taken at face-value for the purposes 
of comparison. However, used with caution, the maps outlined above include some of the 
best cartographic resources available for the study of eighteenth-century London, and in 
terms of accuracy and scale they are unrivalled. In order to examine London’s water 
features they provide the best possible overview and provide enough consistency to 
establish the characteristics of the waterscape at a given time. 
 
 
2.3. London’s changing waterscape. 
 
For the analysis of London’s waterscape all water features on digitised versions of the 
three maps were traced as separate layers, which are presented in figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8. 
For the various reasons discussed above, it is not possible to directly compare these figures 
to each other. However, by looking at the waterscape at three points in time it is possible to 
draw some tentative conclusions about changes that took place over the course of more 
than a hundred years. The most obvious change the comparison of the three images shows 
is the growth of the built-up area. While in 1682 the built-up area was still confined to areas 
near the Thames, by the late eighteenth century new developments had spread west and 
north, and filled up previously open spaces. The second change is that the later maps show 
a diminishing amount of linear water features, especially south of the Thames. This is 
particularly noticeable between the Rocque and the Horwood/Stockdale maps. These 
features were mainly structures that were part of London’s drainage system, and their 





Figure 2. 6. Water features on the 1682 Morgan map.  





  Figure 2. 7. Water features on the 1746 Rocque map. 





Figure 2. 8. Water features on the 1792-99 Horwood map combined with the 1797 Stockdale map. Extent based on Horwood. 
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The process of urbanisation involves both a reduction in ground infiltration as a result of 
built-up surfaces as well as larger quantities of runoff, due to the levelling of the surface. In 
addition, the urban environment brings the construction of a man-made drainage system 
with it, which implies new routes for the water at increased speeds.
43
 The drainage 
structure in eighteenth-century London started with ‘kennels’, gutter-like open channels in 
the streets that led to the sewers. Figure 2.9 is a contemporary engraving showing a single 
kennel running down the centre of Fenchurch Street in the mid-eighteenth century. Other 
streets had double kennels, one on each side of the road. As the water drained from the 
kennels into the sewers it was filtered through grates, leaving any solid waste to be 
collected.  
 
Figure 2. 9. View of Ironmongers' Hall, c. 1753. 
 
Anonymous. Source: © Trustees of the British Museum. 
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It is an important distinction that in the eighteenth century a sewer mainly implied a 
‘drainage channel’ rather than the later definition of a wastewater removal channel. A 1732 
treatise on The Laws of Sewers defined a sewer as “a fresh Water Trench, or little River, 
encompass’d with Banks on both sides”, which was distinguished from a ditch by having a 
constant current in it.
44
 Sewers were meant only to channel excess rainwater, and as the 
1732 definition ‘little river’ implies, they were not very different from the natural streams 
that drained London in ancient times. In fact, the urbanised parts of the Thames’ tributaries 
were treated as sewers; the river Fleet, for example, was labelled “Fleet sewer” on the 
Stockdale map. 
The sewer network was managed by the sewer commissions, of which there were 
several, each one governing a particular area. Residents who wanted to make changes to 
the sewers had to apply to their local commission, which would generally allow them to 
make an alteration. Their consent was based on certain conditions, usually related to the 
size and material used, as well as impact on other residents. If one were to make alterations 
without informing the local commission, and this was discovered, the commissioners fined 
the offender and ordered the sewer to be restored to its previous state. However, if the 
changes in the network actually would have been allowed under the aforementioned 
conditions, and a subsequent application was made requesting permission for the 
alterations to remain, most commissions tended to allow the changes to stand, and waived 
the fine. From the commissions’ records, therefore, it is possible to gain an understanding of 
how changes in the network took place, and why, as they include both alterations that were 
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made through the official institutions as well as alterations that were ‘illegally’ made, and 
found out. 
The area where most change took place, as shown in figures 2.6 to 2.8, was under the 
jurisdiction of the Surrey and Kent Commissioners of Sewers. They administered a 
particularly marshy area: on all three maps, most surface water was located south of the 
Thames and approximately 83% of surface water can be found south of a line that bisects 
the Tower of London.
45
 As discussed above, much of southern London was built on a layer of 
alluvium, which did not drain surface water away easily, and thus, many sewers had to be 
created to channel the water. Southwark was also an area that underwent intense 
urbanisation in the eighteenth century, especially after the completion of Westminster and 
Blackfriars Bridges in 1750 and 1769 respectively, which improved access to Westminster 
and the West End. Through the records of the Surrey and Kent Commissioners of Sewers it is 
possible to see how the growth of housing and population impacted on the area’s 
waterways. 
Figure 2.10 shows the number of applications to cover a sewer found in a sample of the 
meetings of the Surrey and Kent Commissioners of Sewers between 1702 and 1797.
46
 These 
were applications to either stop up a sewer by filling it in, in which case sometimes 
alternative drainage had to be found, or to arch over a sewer, in which case the commission 
stipulated the space that the water had to be allowed. The data in figure 2.10 include 
sewers that were found to have been (illegally) covered and were allowed to be kept that 
way in the sampled year, but does not include those that were ordered to be restored to 
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their original state. The length of sewer applied to be covered could vary from just a few 
yards to the whole length of a street.  
 
Figure 2. 10. Applications to cover sewers in the Surrey and Kent commission’s territory.  
 
Source: Minutes of the Surrey and Kent Commissioners of Sewers, LMA/SKCS/42-56. 
 
It becomes obvious from this figure that the covering of sewers was a regular occurrence, 
which picked up between the 1750s and 1770s, when many new roads and developments 
were laid out as a result of the increased access to the south bank. The Surrey and Kent 
commission was not a permanently standing committee, and the number of meetings in 






















































































































a period in which the commission only met to be sworn in and discuss financial issues, and 
did not record any other activity, while in other years they met every month and a full 
record of the meetings is available. It is therefore likely that more sewers were covered in 
the years for which there are no full records, as it was noted that people were fined, but not 
whether it was for covering a sewer or something else. While the records do not mention 
the exact location of each covering application, most of the ones that are known fall into the 
area shown on the Rocque and Horwood maps. 
The reasons why the sewers were covered were complex, but ultimately a result of the 
increase in urbanisation. Mainly people wanted to cover the water because it was overused. 
Until 1815 it was illegal to dump any household waste or effluent into the sewers, although 
this practice happened fairly regularly. Solid waste, theoretically at least, was to be collected 
in cesspools and laystalls. Solids mixed with the water in the streets were supposed to be 
filtered out by the grates, and so would not be able to block up the flow in the sewers. In 
practice, however, the sewers had many different functions, ranging from domestic and 
industrial water supply, a source of power, washing, as well as waste disposal. In urban 
areas, the close proximity and concentration of people and different activities frequently led 
to uses of the sewer system that were incompatible with its drainage function. 
The various sewer commissions in London, including the Surrey and Kent commission, 
spent the majority of their time ensuring that sewers could flow freely and were not blocked 
by solid waste. Their records show that the keeping of animals often posed problems, 
especially pigs, which were described as a “common nuisance” in 1742.
47
 Most complaints 
were resolved by the accused animal-keeper proving he had a grate to filter out solid waste, 
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or promising to make one.
48
 People were accused of sweeping dirt into the sewers as well. 
In addition, all commissions tried to prevent people from connecting their toilets to the 
sewers, with varying degrees of success.
49
 Many industries were guilty of draining their 
wastewater into the sewers.
50
  
But while the commissioners generally concerned themselves with the issue of 
preventing solids entering the sewer network, the general public was also concerned with 
issues of foulness and stench that could arise from the open sewers. In 1757 there were 
several examples of the Surrey and Kent Commissioners of Sewers allowing people to fill up 
a sewer after they complained that their local sewers were very foul and caused a public 
nuisance.
51
 Across the capital there were cases of people applying for sewers that contained 
particularly offensive smelling water to be covered. For example, inhabitants of King Street, 
St Margaret Westminster, were greatly annoyed by a cook shop from which “cabbage water 
and other offensive water” drained into a kennel above ground. The inhabitants believed 
that this smell endangered their health, and requested that the water be diverted 
underground into a sewer.
52
 This was not an isolated case: markets, slaughterhouses, and 
other activities producing foul-smelling waste generated similar complaints.
53
  
In instances like these, where the problem could not be solved by filtering the water, the 
suggested solution was to cover the sewer and thus hide the water underground. It follows 
that the commissions were at this time unable to prevent people from using the sewers for 
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their wastewater if it was only liquid, and thus living near certain trades often meant being 
close to offensive smells. This was the matter on James Bannister’s mind when he appealed 
to his sewer commission in 1702 to prevent his neighbour William Pannett connecting to 
their local sewer in Kensington Square. Pannett was a butcher, and Bannister claimed he 
wanted to “prevent the smell of such filth for his neighbourhood”.
54 
The commissioners 
ruled that William Pannett had to construct a covered sewer along a different route. 
An extensive case study of a sewer being covered as a result of complaints about 
nuisance can be found in the example of the river Fleet. The Fleet was the once-navigable 
part of the largest tributary of the Thames in the central London area, the Holbourne River, 
which arose from springs at Hampstead and Highgate, and passed through Clerkenwell and 
Farringdon to join the Thames at the location of present-day Blackfriars Bridge. It had once 
been a major part of London’s natural drainage, and at the start of the eighteenth century it 
was still an open river, as can be seen on the Morgan map in figure 2.6. The Fleet had many 
competing functions: it drained the areas it passed through, turned the many waterwheels 
located along its course, as well as provided the opportunity for the illegal disposal of waste 
for many of the industries on its banks.  
In the minutes of the Holborn and Finsbury Commissioners of Sewers, which 
administered its course, the Fleet sewer was often mentioned as being full of industrial and 
domestic waste.
55
 Its foulness was legendary. In 1710 Jonathan Swift composed a poem 
describing the sort of filth that flowed through it, which included “Sweepings from Butchers 
Stalls, Dung, Guts, and Blood, Drown’d Puppies, stinking Sprats, all drench’d in Mud, Dead 
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Cats and Turnip-Tops”, many of which originated from the meatmarket at Smithfield.
56
 To 
minimise its nuisance to surrounding inhabitants the Fleet was covered over in 1733 up to 
Fleet Bridge, and fully covered over by 1766, turning it into an underground sewer.
57
 Figure 
2.11 shows the Fleet in its different stages of this process as depicted on the maps.  
 
Figure 2. 11. The changing Fleet.  
 
From left to right, the Fleet on the Morgan, the Rocque, and the Horwood-Stockdale maps. 
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The fate of the river Fleet exemplifies the wider process of covering waterways that 
changed the city’s waterscape during the eighteenth century. As the population increased, 
the nuisance of offensive open water intensified, resulting in pressure to have it covered 
over. The covering of open sewers occurred throughout London, and appeared to gather 
pace as the century progressed. By the end of the 1840s, all sewers in the City of London 








Urbanisation had profound effects on the relationships between people and water.  
Growing population density resulted in increased water usage and larger volumes of waste, 
which flowed into the open watercourses that characterised the early eighteenth-century 
city. At the same time, the expansion of trades and industries using water, either as a raw 
material in production or as a means of disposing of waste, further added to the pressures 
on these water courses. The result was that during the century, complaints about nuisances 
in relation to open water increased, and sewer commissions came under growing pressure 
to deal with the mounting problems. The outcome of their efforts was that much of 
London’s previously open water courses were covered over and disappeared below ground.  
The physical separation of people from water courses is reflected in the cartographic 
evidence which, despite the inherent difficulties of interpretation, nevertheless depict the 
                                                           
58
 Jefferson-Smith, P., 'Before Bazalgette: the Surrey and Kent Commission of Sewers, 1800-1847',Transactions 
of the Newcomen Society, 74 (2004), pp. 131-46, p. 139. 
 64 
 
disappearance of surface water in the city over the century. This disappearance effectively 
distanced people from supplies of water and the means by which drainage was achieved. It 
was no longer possible for individuals and firms alike to dispose of waste materials in open 
sewers.  Instead they had to connect to the common sewers directly through a network of 
drains. Nor was it possible for everyone to draw on existing supplies of water, either from 
the ground via private pumps and wells or from publically available conduits and fountains. 
Rather, individual households came to rely more on commercial provision of water. 
This physical separation therefore had important implications for the ways in which 
water was provided and by which wastewater was disposed. The greater reliance on water 
companies and the increased activity of the sewer commissions signified a gradual shift to 
an increasingly institutionalised way of managing the city’s water and drainage. As drainage 
and water supply became issues that required larger scale interventions, these institutions 
grew more important. In turn, they shaped the waterscape by constructing entirely new 
networks of reservoirs, pipes, and sewers that had to be managed and maintained. The next 
chapter turns its focus on these institutions, and analyses how they operated and 







Chapter 3. The institutional framework: water companies and sewer 
commissions. 
 
The institutional framework that regulated and administered London’s water 
infrastructure during the eighteenth century was complex. The key to understanding this 
complexity lies in two factors: firstly, London’s increasing population and, secondly, the 
distancing effect that urbanisation had on peoples’ relationship with water, as identified in 
chapter two. Each of these factors implied a larger scale of operation for the managing 
institutions, both on a physical level, as infrastructure had to expand geographically, as well 
as on a capacity level, as services had to be supplied to more people. 
The expansion of large infrastructure systems has several components. The speed and 
success of it depend, firstly, on the technological ability of the system to either sustain the 
expansion or incorporate innovations; secondly, on the economic climate and the cost of 
expansion; and thirdly, on the organisation’s own managerial decisions, institutional 
structures and legislative powers.
1
 These last aspects especially were shaped by 
contingencies from different stages in the institutions’ histories.
2
 While all institutions 
responsible for mediating the distance between water and their users already existed 
before the start of the eighteenth century, the growing scale of the city made their task 
considerably more complex. This chapter therefore addresses the backgrounds of the 
institutions that managed London’s water, and examines how they adapted to the increase 
in scale that their work involved. 
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The construction and management of a large utility system requires substantial capital. In 
order to raise this and allocate money to the appropriate part of a growing network, 
institutions require a larger ma
administration.
3
 As depicted in figure 3.1, the expansion of the water infrastructu
that connected more people and covered larger distances involves
of building and management, 
to collect and manage revenue or taxes necessitated larger managerial efforts and 
instigated institutional changes, which are discussed in this chapter.
 
Figure 3. 1. Increasing scale: consequences and adaptations.
 
 
While the institutions faced the same issues whether 
or those of drainage, there was one important difference which was essential to the way
they could raise their capital
follow different trajectories. Unlike the provision of water, drainage and flood prevention 
were never ‘marketable goods’ to be paid for privately, for the simple rea
impossible to exclude people who did not purchase the service 
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 As water follows gravity and would naturally end up in the sewer system, those 
who paid for drainage could not prevent others who did not pay for the service from 
deriving benefit. Free-riders thus had little incentive to pay for improved drainage. 
However, in contrast to private companies, public authorities had the power to enforce 
payment rather than leaving individuals to choose and were thus able to spread the cost of 
constructing and maintaining the drainage network over all those who benefitted. As a 
result of these underlying dynamics, drainage remained managed by public institutions, 
while supply, over time, came to be organised by private companies.  
This chapter will therefore be comprised of two parts. Firstly it discusses the emergence 
and subsequent expansion of the supply system, with a focus on the switch from public to 
private institutions, and secondly, it examines the background and developments of the 
sewer commissions. As historical contingencies influenced the way in which systems could 
expand, it is important to gain an understanding of the background of their managing 
institutions. Each part therefore starts with the emergence of the institutions that managed 
London’s water in the eighteenth century, and then turns to their expansion and 
organisational change during this period.   
 
 
3.1. The water companies: historical background. 
 
The history of London’s water supply can be broadly divided in four phases. At first, the 
city depended on traditional sources, to be joined in the Middle Ages by a public supply. 
From the late sixteenth century onwards, these were complemented by a commercial 
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supply, which over the course of the next few centuries gradually took over this function. In 
1902, a complete overhaul of water supply management took place, in which the remaining 
companies were bought up and supplanted by one managerial body: the Metropolitan 
Water Board (MWB). With the exception of this last change, earlier systems of supply did 
not immediately disappear as new ones emerged, and for much of London’s history several 
types of water supply would have been available.  
The traditional sources that Londoners relied on up until the Middle Ages included wells, 
rain, springs, and water from rivers such as the Thames, Fleet, and Walbrook. There is 
evidence that in Roman times wells were equipped with water-raising technologies 
including a chain of buckets, but it is not clear whether this was a private or a public supply.
5
 
By the mid-thirteenth century the city’s tributaries and groundwater were becoming 
increasingly polluted, and the City authorities had to look for fresh water sources beyond 
the limits of London. An infrastructure system was constructed connecting springs at Tyburn 
to a fountain at Cheapside, where people could freely collect fresh water.
6
 However, the 
amount of water that this first conduit supplied was insufficient to meet demand, and over 




Conduit water remained a scarce and contested good, however, and at times conflict 
arose around issues of wastage and fair amounts of usage, especially as a result of the larger 
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water users, such as brewers, cooks, and fishmongers.
8
 While there was no fixed 
arrangement to finance the maintenance of the conduits, evidence points to several 
schemes in which these larger consumers were charged for the water they used in their 
trades, the proceeds of which were to be applied to the costs of maintenance.
9
 However, 
not everyone was dependent on the conduit: private wells and other water systems were 
still in operation. Monasteries, palaces, and larger industries often organised their own 




During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it became clear that the conduits could not 
cope with the additional demands of the growing city, and although the system was 
expanded several times, water levels were reduced and the supply was slow by the end of 
the sixteenth century.
11
 Many of the fountains were destroyed in the Great Fire of 1666, 
and while most of their infrastructure was rebuilt, the role of the conduits seems to have 
diminished after this event.
12
 A possible contributory factor to their decline was that around 
1703 the rights to the springs at Paddington were bought by Richard Soame — who at the 
same time came into possession of London Bridge Waterworks, and thus had a financial 
incentive to persuade users to turn to commercially supplied water.
13
 Either way, by 1722 
the source of the conduit system at Marylebone was described as having “been for many 
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years intirely useless for the purposes intended (...) and is now in a most ruinous Condition”, 
while by 1740 the fountains in the City were “quite demolish’d, or intirely out of use”.
14
  
There was no clean break between the conduit system and the early emergence of the 
private water companies, and for at least a century they coexisted. Initially, the companies’ 
function was slightly different from that of the conduits, as they supplied water directly into 
people’s houses. Before this service, water had to be fetched from a common source, be it a 
conduit or river, and brought into the house. Much of the population performed this task 
themselves, although richer inhabitants bought the services of waterbearers to deliver 
water to their houses.
15
 Over time, water had to be transported from ever greater 
distances, as a result of pollution of central supplies and the expanding city, and fetching 
water took increasingly more time and resources. The service of bridging this distance by 
supplying water into people’s houses therefore became an economically viable enterprise.  
The first of the companies that provided this service was London Bridge Waterworks, also 
known as Thames Waterworks. The company, established in 1581, raised Thames water 
using a waterwheel under the first arch of London Bridge, and its developer, Peter Morris, 
impressed the City authorities when he demonstrated the power of his supply by projecting 
a jet over the steeple of the church of St Magnus Martyr.
16
 This public display of his ability to 
supply water enabled him to obtain a 500-year lease for the arch at only ten shillings a year, 
and also allowed him to gain the custom of several public buildings in the City, which 
amounted to a £100 annual contract.
17
 The company appeared to be successful as in 1584 
Morris leased the second arch of the bridge as well, allowing him to expand his supply. 
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Others followed Morris’ example of selling water, and in 1594 Broken Wharf Waterworks 
was established on the riverbank near St Paul, raising Thames water using horsepower. This 
venture only serviced the immediate locality and remained rather small, supplying about 
600 houses in the mid-seventeenth century.
18
   
The possibility of making money by selling water became obvious, and over the next ten 
years several proposals were made to establish a company to supply London from springs 
north of the city. Eventually in 1609 the City Corporation granted powers to Hugh 
Myddleton to construct a canal from springs at Chadwell and Amwell to London, and this 
venture became the New River Company.
19
 The almost 40 mile long canal was finished in 
1613 and the company commenced supplying what were then the northern parts of 
London. Over the next few centuries, the company expanded its reach to cover all of the 
City of London and extended towards the West End, eventually becoming the largest water 
supplier in London. As supply from the springs was inadequate to keep up with the increase 
in demand, from 1660 onwards the company’s water was supplemented by the river Lea.
20
  
These three companies supplied the City of London until the 1666 fire. After this event, 
the expansion of the capital in combination with the decline of the conduits accelerated the 
rise of a commercial water supply: between 1666 and the end of the seventeenth century a 
further six companies were added.
21
 While the earlier companies had mainly supplied the 
City of London, the new companies were active around the growth areas of Westminster 
and the West End, as well as in the expanding eastern suburbs. Most of these companies 
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continued to supply water during the eighteenth century and table 3.1 provides an overview 
of when they, and later eighteenth-century suppliers, were established.   
 
Table 3. 1. London’s private waterworks in the eighteenth century.  




London Bridge Waterworks† 1581 1822 (New River Company) 
Broken Wharf Waterworks 1594 1703 (London Bridge Ww) 




York Buildings Waterworks 1676 1818 (New River Company) 
Hampstead Waterworks 1692 1856 (New River Company) 
Marchant’s Waterworks 1695 After 1746 fate not clear 
The West End 
companies 
Hyde Park Waterworks 1670? 1731 (Chelsea Ww) 
Millbank Waterworks 1675 1727 (Chelsea Ww) 
Chelsea Waterworks 1723 1902 (MWB) 
The eastern 
companies 
Shadwell Waterworks 1668 1808 (East London Ww)§ 
West Ham Waterworks 1743 1808 (East London Ww) 
The southern 
companies 
Bank End/Thrale 1720 1771 (Borough Ww)  
Borough Waterworks  1771 1820 (Southwark Ww)§ 
London Bridge Waterworks† 1761 1822 (Southwark Ww) 
Lambeth Waterworks 1785 1902 (MWB) 
† London Bridge Waterworks started supplying south of the Thames in 1761. When the company was dissolved 
in 1822, its customers and infrastructure north of the Thames were taken over by the New River Company, 
those south of the river were taken over by the Southwark Waterworks. 
* The remaining companies were amalgamated in the Metropolitan Water Board (MWB) in 1902. 
§ East London Waterworks and Southwark Waterworks were established in the early nineteenth century. They, 
in turn, were taken over by the Metropolitan Water Board in 1902. 
Based on: Tynan (2002), pp. 346-7, 350-1. 
 
York Buildings Waterworks was established in 1676 and raised Thames water to supply 
Whitehall and St Martin-in-the-Fields. The company looked to supply the expanding West 
End as well, and for a while possessed a water reservoir in Marylebone with this intention, 
but it ventured into financial rough waters after the South Sea Bubble years and for most of 
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the eighteenth century York Buildings Waterworks was confined to the area around its point 
of intake near the Strand. Another small concern, Marchant’s Waterworks, was established 
nearby in 1695. It raised water via a waterwheel in the Hartshorne Lane sewer. The Rocque 
map depicts a water reservoir that is labelled as belonging to Marchant’s north of Oxford 
Street, which suggests that this company was active in Soho around 1746 and probably 
aimed to supply the West End market as well. The fate of Marchant’s company after this 
date is unknown, but evidently it ceased to exist within a few decades: by the late 1770s the 
Hartshorne Lane waterwheel was used as a cornmill and no longer raised water.
22
 
Other companies had their eye on the West End market as well. Hampstead Waterworks 
was established in 1692 and mainly supplied Hampstead and Highgate from the Hampstead 
ponds, but by the early eighteenth century also reached parts of St Giles around Tottenham 
Court Road.
23
 Several other small companies supplied more to the west: Hyde Park 
Waterworks supplied the St James area from springs in Hyde Park, and Millbank 
Waterworks supplied Westminster from the Thames. Not much is known about either of 
these concerns; they seem to have been active from the 1670s onwards, and both were 
taken over soon after the larger Chelsea Waterworks was established in the area.   
Chelsea Waterworks was founded in 1723 to supply the suburbs of Westminster and “the 
new buildings”.
24
 It stored water from the Thames in a series of canals and reservoirs at the 
present site of Victoria station, retaining the water at low tide with sluices.
25
 From there the 
water was pumped to higher reservoirs in Hyde Park and Green Park, from which it supplied 
most of the West End. The company was established on a larger scale than the earlier ones: 
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it had a starting capital of £40,000, which enabled it to purchase the infrastructure and take 
over the customers of the smaller companies that had supplied the area.
26
 By the 1730s, the 
West End was thus mainly supplied by Chelsea Waterworks and the New River Company, 
with smaller parts supplied by the Hampstead and York Buildings Waterworks.  
East London was initially supplied by Shadwell Waterworks, which was set up by Thomas 
Neale in 1668 and supplied Shadwell, Stepney, and Wapping with Thames water. As London 
expanded eastwards during the eighteenth century West Ham Waterworks was established 
in 1743 to supply Mile End, Stepney, and Stratford from the river Lea. These companies 
initially competed against each other, but reached an agreement in 1785 not to undercut 
each other on price.
27
 By 1800, however, the construction of the London Docks in Wapping 
posed significant problems to the two companies, both because the mains would have to be 
cut as a result of construction, and because many customers’ houses were demolished to 
make way for the new docks. As an outcome, the remaining water supply network was 
bought in 1808 by the East London Waterworks — a newly established company.
28
  
South of the river, the commercial supply of water had a slower start as a result of a 
smaller population and the greater abundance of surface water. The first company to start 
supplying Southwark was located on the banks of the Thames, and indicated on maps as 
Bank End. It was later known as Borough Waterworks, although it is also possible that this 
was a new company that took over Bank End.
29
 It is likely that this company grew out of the 
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private supply of the Thrale brewery, as these enterprises are often linked.
30
 London Bridge 
Waterworks also supplied this area from 1761 onwards, first via pipes over London Bridge, 
but eventually the company leased the southern-most arch of the bridge for this supply. The 
first large company to be established in the south was Lambeth Waterworks, which drew 
water from the Thames near the site of Waterloo Bridge.
31
 This company was only set up in 
1785, after the population south of the Thames had begun to expand rapidly following the 
completion of Westminster and Blackfriars Bridges. 
 
 
3.2. The water companies: enlarging scale and raising capital.  
 
While the total number of companies was the same in 1800 as it had been in 1700, new 
companies formed and old ones disappeared, and a larger area was supplied with water. 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the approximate areas covered by the companies at the start and 
end of the eighteenth century, layered over the expansion of London. From these figures 
the physical growth of the companies is clear: they had to keep up with supplying a growing 
number of customers as well as having to develop ways of dealing with the increasing 
distance that needed to be covered. New companies, such as West Ham and Lambeth 
Waterworks, were established in expanding areas where no company was active, while 
other companies increased in scale.  
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Figure 3. 2. The water companies in 1700.
            
        
 
 









New companies required major capital investment in order to construct the initial 
infrastructure before they could make any profit, but the increase of scale also put pressure 
on the longer-established companies, both in terms of expanding their own networks as 
well as making sure they could manage their organisation efficiently.  
In order to mobilise the large amount of capital needed to lay out their pipes and 
engines, commercial undertakings in early modern London had two options: partnerships or 
joint-stock companies. The main difference was the perpetual succession in joint-stock 
companies, whereas a partnership had to be sold or bequeathed at the demise of one of the 
partners.
32
 However, raising money was not the only hurdle: any new company required 
legislation, such as Letters Patent or a Private Act from Parliament, specifying the location, 
way of acquiring water, area of distribution, and the capital that could be raised.
33
 Some 
potential companies never materialised because of opposition in Parliament. For example, 
attempts to establish a company bringing water from the river Colne to London stalled on 
objections from, amongst others, millers that used the intended water source.
34
 Other plans 
failed as a result of opposition from existing companies. For a company to be successful, 
therefore, there was often the need for powerful alliances with the Crown, the City 
Corporation, or other vested interests.
35
 
The City Corporation had an interest in helping the early water companies. London Bridge 
Waterworks had been given the lease of a London Bridge arch for the relatively low price of 
ten shillings a year. In addition, this enterprise was supported by an alderman, who lent 
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money to its founder, Peter Morris.
36
 Broken Wharf Waterworks’ entrepreneur Bevis 
Bulmer was also loaned £3,000 by the City Corporation towards the cost of setting up his 
company, and a few years later, when this company was taken over by Thomas Paradine, he 
was again provided with a loan.
37
 By supporting the early water companies the City 
authorities ensured a water supply without needing to find a solution for the ailing 
condition of the public conduits. Indeed, in Paradine’s lease, he promised to supply a 
quarter of the water he raised to the conduits, as well as making the water freely available 
to the City in case of fire, or other calamity.
38
 The provision of free water in case of fire had 
also been an aspect of Morris’ first lease.
39
 The City thus gained a cheap solution for its 
water problems while all the risk and investment remained with the entrepreneurs.   
Peter Morris seems to have financed the London Bridge Waterworks mostly by himself, 
with the help of the aforementioned loans. By 1701 the company was still in the hands of 
his descendents, who sold it for £43,000 to Richard Soame, a man described as either a 
goldsmith or a merchant. Soame did not raise all this money by himself. In fact, £30,000 of it 
was raised by three other City goldsmiths.
40
 Around the same time, London Bridge took over 
Broken Wharf Waterworks, and Soame’s family members purchased the rights to the 
sources of the Marylebone conduit springs, although these were never exploited.
41
 It seems 
that they wanted to prevent the possibility of another water company gaining control over 
these springs, and so tried to eliminate competition and keep all custom for themselves.
42
 
As a result, Soame and his family were able to incorporate the company with a nominal 
                                                           
36
 Jenner, ‘Water in London’, p. 258. 
37
 Roberts, Chelsea to Cairo, p. 66. 
38
 Ward, New River, p. 18. This is discussed further in chapter 7. 
39
 LMA/ACC 2558/MW/C/15/222/2 London Bridge Waterworks’ lease for first arch of London Bridge, 1581. 
40
 Ward, New River, p. 111. 
41
 Ibid., p. 115. 
42
 Ibid., p. 119. 
 79 
 
capital of £150,000, which he initially tried to raise by dividing it in three hundred £500 
shares.
43
 These shares seem to have been too expensive, as by 1708 the company’s shares 
were sold as 1,500 £100 shares.
44
 By 1741, the company had 81 shareholders.
45
 
More is known about the investment needed to set up the New River Company. Hugh 
Myddleton, who was a City goldsmith as well, had initially intended to finance the project 
through a private partnership, but before the project was completed he had to apply to King 
James I for money. This was either because he was in genuine need of it or, as has been 
suggested, to get the interest of the Crown on board — firstly, to ward off competition from 
London Bridge Waterworks, and secondly, to force large landowners along the intended 
canal’s course to cooperate.
46
 The King agreed to fund half of the expenditure in return for 
half of the company’s profits, but the Crown sold its share back to Myddleton in 1633 in 
return for an annual rate of £500.
47
 Meanwhile, Myddleton’s half had been sold in 36 
shares, which cost £100 each, but during the construction of the New River canal a further 
£189 was called up, and thus each shareholder initially contributed £289 to the company.
48
  
Nine of the 36 shares were held by Hugh Myddleton or members of his family, which 
indicates that he must have had some capital himself. Other shareholders included the 
owner of the site of the New River Head, the company’s main reservoir in Islington, and 
several other members of City livery companies, who would have been wealthy London 
investors.
49
 The shares started making a small annual dividend from the 1630s onwards, but 
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real wealth arising from capital growth was only gained over time. In 1695 it was said to be 
the company with the third-largest capital in the country, after the East India Company and 
the Bank of England.
50
 By 1712, a century after its establishment, annual dividends were 
over £200 and a share was traded for £7,000.
51
 
Goldsmiths were involved in both the London Bridge Waterworks as well as the New 
River Company. While there is evidence to suggest that Myddleton initially trained as an 
actual goldsmith, seventeenth-century goldsmiths were often not active as such, but rather 
operated as investors. As members of London’s Goldsmiths’ Livery Company they could 
practise any trade they wanted, and many members had wider trading interests and were 
heavily involved in the emerging banking system.
52
 As part of the Financial Revolution taking 
place during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the accumulation of wealth 
generated by trade, industry, and agriculture provided a pool available for capital 
investments, and wealthy merchants were more willing to re-invest in new financial 
ventures than in land.
53
 Supported by the shift in the institutional framework, as identified 
in chapter one, an impersonal capital market developed, in which the financial property 
rights of creditors were enforced by a legal system that generated sufficient trust for people 
to part with their money. The accumulated wealth was coaxed into a circle of credit, which 
became the key to economic growth.
54
 A group, or class, of moneyed men emerged, the 
majority of whom were merchants and financiers, who were mostly based in London and 
invested in government securities, companies, and large-scale ventures.
55
  
                                                           
50
 Rudden, New River, p. 98. 
51
 Ibid., p. 63. 
52
 Roseveare, H., The Financial Revolution, 1660-1760 (London, Longman, 1991), p. 12.  
53
 Carruthers, City of capital, p. 116. 
54
 Roseveare, Financial Revolution, p. 4. 
55
 Glaisyer, N., The culture of commerce in England, 1660-1720 (London, Royal Historical Society, 2006), p. 3. 
 81 
 
By the end of seventeenth century the joint-stock company was a common way to move 
capital. Only a small number of shareholders held decision-making power (the governor, 
deputy, and directors), while most of the rest were mainly there as passive investors whose 
sole interest was to make money.
56
 The water companies attracted such investors, who saw 
them as potential sources of large incomes, possibly spurred on by the dividends generated 
by the New River shares. However, this could also play against the success of a company. 
York Buildings Waterworks’ investors seemed to have been mainly interested in the 
waterworks because of the several side-ventures that were attached to this company. In 
1719 the company was sold for £7,000 to Case Billingsley, who exploited the fact that its 
charter included the right of landownership, which he used to buy cheap property in 
Scotland after the 1715 Jacobite Rising. The new shareholders all seem to have been 
investors trying to make money, and were also involved in several other ventures, including 
the Royal Exchange Assurance Company.
57
 As the company’s capital was heavily tied up in 
these other ventures it ended up losing a lot of money during the Southsea Bubble crisis, 
and as a result had to leave the West End market. 
The London water supply companies all took a while to become profitable. As a result of 
the large investment needed to start up or to expand into a new area, it often took years 
before a dividend could be returned to the shareholders. The companies that were set up 
during the eighteenth century — Chelsea Waterworks, West Ham Waterworks, and 
Lambeth Waterworks — had different strategies to raise finance. Chelsea Waterworks was 
set up as a joint-stock company, and was able to raise £40,000 in 2,000 shares of £20 each. 
Most of these shares were held in batches of five or ten, making them investments of £100 
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to £200, on a level with the shares in other waterworks.
58
 This was found to be insufficient, 
however, and in 1733 a further £30,000 was authorised to be raised, although the company 
struggled to attract shareholders this time as there had not been any dividends by that date. 
In fact, it was not until the 1750s that the company made any regular profits.
59
  
West Ham and Lambeth Waterworks were set up on a smaller scale. West Ham was 
established as a partnership of Resta Patching, who had “contrived the scheme”, and 
Thomas Byrd, who was to finance it.
60
 Patching was given a salary of £50 as he would be 
doing all the practical work, and he would receive one-third of the profits. Byrd seems to 
have been the sole financier. More is known about the early financing of Lambeth 
Waterworks. The idea for a water company was conceived by a group of seven men who 
thought that supplying Lambeth from the Thames would not come at too great a cost as the 
elevation of the ground was lower than in the north. At their first meeting, they had 
estimated the number of households that were likely to take water, as well as the 
infrastructure required, including the pipes, an engine, and ground purchases.
61
 The initial 
expenses were estimated as costing £3,100, with annual outgoings of £380.
62
 They issued 32 
shares of £100 each in order to raise the initial investment, which were mostly divided 
amongst the men themselves.  
All companies had to employ a number of people to carry out the day-to-day tasks of 
running the system. The positions that needed to be filled from the beginning included an 
engineer, in charge of setting up or improving the physical infrastructure of the company, a 
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surveyor, who surveyed and mapped out the company’s works, and kept an eye on the 
infrastructure, and a clerk, who acted as the go-between linking the staff and the directors, 
and attended meetings.
63
 The engineer was often a professional who also did other work, 
and was hired by the companies on a consulting basis.
64
 For example, London Bridge 
Waterworks employed noted engineers such as George Sorocold and John Smeaton. Once 
the technology was installed, the surveyor often became responsible for keeping an eye on 
it, and millwrights or engine workers had to be hired on a permanent basis in order to run 
the engines.
65
 As they expanded their systems, the companies also employed pipe-borers 
and bricklayers, usually on a contract basis. 
The companies’ employees that the customers encountered as part of their contract 
were the collectors and the turncocks. The turncock was in charge of turning services on and 
off by directing water from the mains into service pipes according to their schedule. In case 
of fire, they were responsible for directing the water towards the area where it was needed. 
As a company expanded, more turncocks were required. The New River Company employed 
8 of them in 1700, but by 1756 their number had increased to 16.
66
  
The collectors dealt directly with the customers. They were mainly responsible for 
collecting the water-rent quarterly or twice a year in a pre-arranged tavern or public house, 
but also signed up new customers. The New River Company’s collectors were ordered to 
keep track of the water-users in their district. Especially in the case of stable yards, they had 
to keep an eye out on the number of houses, coach houses, or tap houses that used water, 
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as these were often rated higher.
67
 The collectors were a go-between linking the managers 
of the company and their customers, and often relayed complaints about supply. The 
remuneration of the New River Company’s collectors was that they could keep a shilling for 
each pound they collected, equivalent to a five per cent commission. Presumably, this 
commission would have encouraged them to chase up all the rents.
68
 As they handled large 




As a company increased in size, more collectors were needed as well. A 1797 report for 
Lambeth Waterworks’ directors stated that up until that point they had used only one 
collector, but as the company had grown so much an additional one would be required.
70
 
The New River Company had had eight collectors in 1684, a number that grew to 14 by 
1756.
71
 In 1769, when the company had 26,197 tenants, it still employed 14 collectors, 
which gave each collector’s district an average of 1,871 tenants.
72
 By 1804 the company had 
grown to 38,264 tenants in London, and its area had been divided into 15 districts, but each 
of those now averaged 2,551 tenants.
73
 This indicated an increase in work and income for 
the collectors: while in 1769 a district provided on average almost £2,700 per year, which 
would give the collectors a yearly salary of £134, by 1804 the collection per district had risen 
to over £4,200 on average, providing a collector with £212 a year.
74
 In addition, as the 
increase in customers was unequally distributed over the company’s territory, there was a 
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re-organisation of its collection districts which kept certain collections from growing too 
large, and a new collection was added to help with the growth of customers in the West 
End. Even so, the districts of Marylebone, Bloomsbury, as well as Islington, had grown to 
contain over 3,000 tenants.
75
 
Enlarging a company’s infrastructure was less capital intensive than establishing a new 
one, and so the larger companies spent much of the eighteenth century expanding their 
business. By doing this, they raised more money, and once the initial costs of expansion 
were paid off they could start sharing profits with their investors. This took time, and 
investment in water infrastructure should therefore be thought of as long-term 
investments. Chapter five will discuss the expansion of the water supply networks in more 
detail. For now, this chapter moves on to examine the trajectory of London’s drainage 
authorities, which fit into a wider history of local government. 
 
 
3.3. The commissioners of sewers: historical background. 
 
The management of eighteenth-century London’s drainage system encountered similar 
issues relating to an enlarged scale of operation. The increased area that drainage structures 
had to cover as a result of urban expansion resulted in the multiplication of the amount of 
work and repairs required. In order to manage this increased workload, London’s drainage 
authorities underwent a number of institutional changes that were typical of the wider 
changes in urban administration that took place over the eighteenth century. The 
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administrative framework by which London was governed at this time was little short of 
chaotic. There was no single municipal authority and while the City Corporation had 
jurisdiction within the City itself, the rest of the metropolitan area was governed by a mix of 
parish vestries, Justices of the Peace (JPs), and ad hoc committees. By 1800 there were at 
least 300 different bodies responsible for aspects of London’s governance.
76
 
At a county level, there were the JPs, who were appointed by the Crown and whose 
traditional duties involved maintaining the peace and holding petty sessions, but who were 
also responsible for certain countywide issues such as bridges and highways. Over time, new 
duties were added to their role, and for much of the eighteenth century JPs also exercised 
important functions associated with the regulation of wages and apprenticeships, as well as 
the operation of the poor laws. At the city level, the borough was an urban area which had 
received a charter with certain privileges from the Crown, and was able to establish its own 
administration, had ownership of its own corporate property, and which could also have its 
own bench of JPs.
77
 These kind of municipal corporations, which included the City of 
London, were exempted from the county’s government and had their own elected bodies 
which were, to greater or lesser extent, democratic.
78
  
Outside the City of London, the basic unit of local governance was the parish, which was 
essentially an ecclesiastical unit responsible for local law and order, provision for the poor, 
and providing common amenities. As an entity of government the parish also had important 
responsibilities relating to the regulation of the built environment, including the removal of 
nuisances, lighting, cleansing, and the supply of water through the parish pump. Eighteenth-
century parishes ranged widely in size, population, and the ways in which officials could be 
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appointed. How a vestry was selected, for example, could vary considerably even between 
neighbouring parishes.
79
 During the eighteenth century parish government came under 
increasing strain as a result of social and economic changes. Rapid urban growth and 
changing social geographies undermined the system of obligation that parish governance 
was based on, a system in which ratepayers were required to perform a range of civic 
duties, such as sitting on juries or taking up local government offices without 
remuneration.
80
 As long as the parish remained a knowable community within which a 
sense of personal obligation existed, these kinds of voluntary arrangements sufficed. The 
newly urbanising areas, in contrast, had no long-established economic and social relations 
that formed the basis of parish government, and the inhabitants of these places were often 
unknown to each other.
81
 Under these circumstances, ratepayers became increasingly 
reluctant to serve a parish office. As a result, parish offices began to be filled by professional 
staff paid a salary rather than local ratepayers performing those duties as part of their civic 
obligation to the community.
82
  
As the duties heaped on local government expanded, additional institutions were 
established. These bodies usually dealt with one specific issue, such as turnpikes, paving, or 
drainage, and would often administer an area comprised of several parishes. More 
significantly, most of these ad hoc bodies were authorised to raise taxes separately from 
national and local rates, in order to fund their specific activities. Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
called this type of institution ‘statutory authorities for special purposes’, and showed how 
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their number and activities greatly increased after 1700.
83
 When the local government 
system was reorganised in 1835, all such institutions together raised almost £3 million a 




Within these institutions, even more so than in parish or borough administration, 
developments in the manner of local governance occurred. Over time, duties that were 
previously performed without remuneration under the obligatory system, such as cleaning 
the streets and fixing the sewers, were contracted out to professional staff and paid for by 
taxes.
85
 The statutory authorities for special purposes developed a system of 
“administration by committees of representatives of the electorate of ratepayers, directing 
and controlling a staff of professional officers”, to deal with the problems that the parish 
system could not cope with.
86
  
The sewer commissions formed part of this system of statutory authorities. The defence 
of land from encroachment by the sea, which was the sewer commissions’ original purpose, 
had a history of being organised on an ad hoc basis, separately from the parish or county 
government. Since the failure of existing flood protection structures would endanger the 
general safety of the public, protecting them fell under the special prerogative of the Crown 
and trumped other property rights in these structures.
87
 Under these powers, special 
appointed justices had been sporadically in charge of this issue since at least the thirteenth 
century. However, they often lacked authority to force people to comply with their 
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measures. In order to solve this problem, the 1531 Bill of Sewers empowered the state to 
appoint sewer commissions wherever they were required, which in turn were authorised to 
make their own byelaws and raise money by taxing everyone who benefitted from repairs.
88
 
These commissions were originally mandated for several years, but over time, as their 
duties increased, they evolved into permanent institutions. 
Initially, these duties had mainly been the protection from flooding by sea, river or 
streams, but because each sewer commission was established under a local act they would 
often have slightly different powers, depending on their area of jurisdiction. Some of them 
had specific functions, such as the one for Glamorgan, whose orders included the 
prevention of deposits of sand from the sea.
89
 For the various sewer commissions that were 
set up to drain the fens in eastern England in the first half of the seventeenth century, the 
removal of surface water became an important secondary function.
90
 Around London, too, 
the need for drainage as well as protection from the Thames prompted the creation of 
various commissions. The first one was the commission for Surrey and Kent in 1554 which 
was, significantly, the area that suffered most from flooding.
91
 London’s need for drainage 
was reflected in a separate Sewer Act of 1605, which authorised the several sewer 
commissions in the metropolitan area with powers over all “Walls, Ditches, Banks, Gutters, 
Sewers, Gotes
92
, Causeys, Bridges, Streams and Watercourses, navigable or not, within the 
Limits of Two Miles, of and from the City of London, which Waters have their Course and 
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 A gote or goat is a machine that raises water. Hargrave, Laws of sewers, p. 25. 
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Fall into the River of Thames”.
93
 Under this Act the London sewer commissions were given 
jurisdiction over water courses and structures at a distance from the Thames banks, and 
they were evidently set up to facilitate the area’s drainage.
94
 The river itself, however, fell 




By the eighteenth century, the administration of the sewers in London was organised by 
eight commissions (see figure 3.4). Seven were appointed by the Crown: those of 
Westminster, Surrey and Kent, Holborn and Finsbury, Poplar, St Katharine, Tower Hamlets, 
and Greenwich (not shown on this map).
96
 The City Corporation appointed the City 
Commissioners of Sewers. The commissions’ areas were based on historical administrations 
rather than on natural drainage areas, although the boundaries between jurisdictions were 
not always clear.
97
 As a result of this problems could arise, particularly when properties 
drained through more than one jurisdiction.
98
 There were particular difficulties for 
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commissions that had no direct access to the Thames. The Holborn and Finsbury 
commission, for example, was in this situation and therefore had to channel its drainage 
through the City commission’s sewers.
 
Figure 3. 4. The London sewer commissions.
Based on: Jefferson-Smith (2004), p. 132.
 
The areas that the several London sewer commis
ranging from the most built-
places they had to administer sluices and embankments in uninhabited lowlands, in other
they had to deal with wastewater in densely populated urban districts.
commissions had to deal with flooding
mark, which meant that they could only discharge their sewage into the river for a few 
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hours a day — a problem that was not solved until Joseph Bazalgette’s intercepting sewage 
network was constructed in the mid-nineteenth century.
101
 They also had to deal with a 
variety of natural events ranging from sea storms to exceptionally high tides that 
periodically swept up the Thames. This diversity in topography, population, and impact of 
natural events, coupled with variations in the legal framework within which each individual 






3.4. The commissioners of sewers: administration and enlarging scale. 
 
The earliest sewer commissions had been constructed as judicial bodies. Commissioners 
met at a Court of Sewers in which cases of nuisances, disrepair, or other sewer related 
issues were presented and decided on by a jury.
103
 The actual commissioners, of which at 
least six were required to be present in court, were endorsed with the same powers as the 
JPs, namely to tax, charge, and punish people, and had the executive power to carry out the 
jury’s decisions.
104
 This jury, members of which were the same people as those who 
qualified as grand jury men at the county’s Quarter Sessions, did all the practical work: they 
inspected sewers, sluices, and river walls in the commission’s district, made ‘presentments’ 
about what needed repairing or cleaning up, and decided who would be held responsible for 
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the works to be done.
105
 The presentments could be either ‘private’ or ‘public’. Private 
presentments occurred when the obligation of repair was to be laid on the owners, and 
these owners were presented with a date by which the issue should be dealt with, or faced 
the prospect of paying a fine. Public presentments occurred when no landowner could by 
law be saddled with the costs and were paid by a rate levied on all the inhabitants 
benefitting from the repairs.
106
 This latter type of presentments usually occurred when the 
repairs exceeded the usual maintenance, or after larger calamities.
107
 Both the work of the 
jurors as well as that of the commissioners was unpaid, although they were allocated some 
monies from the taxes, to be used for refreshments during their court meetings.
108
  
This model of administration remained unchanged as long as the sewer commission’s 
area was still predominantly rural, as was the case for the Greenwich Commissioners of 
Sewers. When an area became more urbanised, the administration moved towards courts 
of sewers in which the commissioners themselves played a bigger role. This happened over 
time in the commissions of Westminster, and Holborn and Finsbury, and to lesser degrees in 
those of Tower Hamlets, and Surrey and Kent.
109
  
Over the course of the seventeenth century, as their area dealt with a surge of new 
building developments, the Westminster Commissioners of Sewers appointed salaried 
officers, including a clerk, a cryer, a bailiff, and several surveyors.
110
 While the 1531 Bill of 
Sewers had allowed for these functions to be carried out and paid for from the taxes, it had 
been hitherto been an ad hoc occupation. In addition, the Westminster Commissioners of 
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Sewers organised a permanent standing committee of accounts with a chairman, which 
took executive decisions. The role of the jury slowly disappeared over time, as they were 
not present at the meetings of the standing commissions, and by the eighteenth century the 
jury’s duties were rather insignificant. After 1776 the commission developed an even more 
executive style of management, with additional standing committees for rates and works.
111
 
These measures are indicative of a changing organisation as they dealt with an increase in 
work (specialised committees), as well as increasing sums of money to be raised (permanent 
salaried officers).  
These measures are also evident in other commissions, especially the Surrey and Kent, 
which at the start of the eighteenth century had administered one of London’s most rural 
areas, that by the later part of the century was rapidly urbanising. Table 3.2 shows the 
amount of tax that the commissioners raised here, as well as the number of collections they 
carried out per decade. As the century progressed, the commissioners had to raise money 
more often, an indicator of the increase in work. It also shows that the amount raised per 
collection increased over the century, which shows that the alterations they made were 
more extensive. The 1770s and 1780s, in particular, were busy as a result of rapid 
urbanisation in this area following the construction of Blackfriars Bridge. 
The larger amounts raised were, however, also a result of a change in the way that the 
commission could collect taxes. In 1771, increasing complaints of nuisance, especially in the 
Borough (which created a paving commission) led the Surrey and Kent Commissioners of 
Sewers to obtain powers to make a ‘general tax’ on the whole district.
112
 These rates were 
to be levied on levels, rather than just on those people that directly benefitted from the 
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repair of a particular sewer, in order to direct money towards general repairs around the 
level.
113
 As shown in table 3.2 this resulted in larger amounts of tax that the commission 
raised from each collection in the last three decades of the century, and from this point 
onwards the commission also gained an increasingly executive structure to manage the flow 
of money: a standing committee was established, with an expeditor general who was in 
charge of all income, and who also paid for all works.
114
 The Holborn and Finsbury sewer 
commission followed a similar trajectory: as its district became increasingly populous, a 
permanent salaried collector of taxes was appointed, a reflection of the greater sums that 
were raised from the rates. In addition, the commission’s contracts with workmen became 




Table 3. 2. Collections in the Surrey and Kent commission.  
SKCS Total raised (£) Number of collections £ per collection
1700-09 45.88 5 9.18
1710-19 99.33 9 11.04
1720-29 57.89 6 9.65
1730-39 31.46 4 7.87
1740-49 74.45 8 9.31
1750-59 185.68 14 13.26
1760-69 211.77 13 16.29
1770-79 769.57 15 51.30
1780-89 551.51 11 50.14
1790-99 701.17 17 41.25  
Source: Minutes of the Surrey and Kent Commissioners of Sewers, LMA/SKCS/42-56. 
 
The changes in these two commissions show that rather than increasing the duties of 
obligated parish members, salaried officers began to execute the necessary tasks and were 
                                                           
113
 A level was an area drained by a connected sewer system emptying in the Thames via a sluice. The levels of 
the Surrey and Kent commission varied in size. 
114
 Webb and Webb, English local government, p. 99. 
115
 Ibid., p. 78. 
 96 
 
paid for their efforts from the rates. In this model, individual householders were no longer 
required to make repairs themselves but instead had to pay tax for appointed workmen to 
maintain local sewer banks.
116
 The more an area urbanised, the more its sewer commission 
moved towards the ‘Westminster model’ of administration.
117
  
This was not, however, merely a movement towards greater efficiency: as the jury 
disappeared, so did the judicial process of the sewer administration. As the commissioners 
increasingly organised themselves in small executive committees, they became closed 
bodies, over which the jury exercised little or no control. Their actions became less 
transparent: tenders were no longer advertised but given to workmen that had connections 
with commissioners.
118
 Evidence of cases was no longer presented and heard in an open 
court.
119
 Indeed, for much of the eighteenth century, the Westminster sewer commission 
was administered by varying small groups taken from a pool of many eligible 
commissioners, and the people who attended to take decisions tended to be those whose 
interest was at stake.
120
 This led to favouritism towards those landowners and builders who 
had connections to commissioners, and so could get their estates connected to the drains 
much quicker.
121
 For example, in 1728 Lord Viscount Townshend and Sir Robert Walpole 
applied for a new sewer in Pall Mall, which the Westminster commission granted even 
though it had previously denied other people’s requests to do exactly the same.
122
 
Eventually, the corruption and inefficiency of the commissions became one of the factors 
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that led to them being considered as outdated institutional bodies by the 1830s, and gave 
the impetus to the amalgamation of all commissions (with the exception of the City 
commission) into the Metropolitan Commission of Sewers in 1848.
123
 
Finally, management of the Thames underwent similar changes. Its administration was 
similar to the rural sewer commissions: Thames Conservancy Courts met separately in Essex, 
Middlesex, Surrey, and Kent, where jurors made presentments of offences committed in 
each county. The main issues they dealt with were encroachments on the river (in the shape 
of platforms, embankments, or wharfs), obstruction to the navigation (such as floating 
timber, sunken boats, or any kind of rubbish thrown into the water), and offenses against 
fishing regulations.
124
 Over the course of the eighteenth century, the conservancy courts 
had to deal with an increasing amount of traffic on the Thames, especially in the Port of 
London. In response, they intensified their efforts to regulate London’s main waterway: 
while for much of the eighteenth century the courts met three or four times a year but 
made few, if any, presentments, by the mid-1780s the number of meetings slowed to twice 
a year, but the list of presentments became more extensive.
125
 In addition, there had been 
attempts to improve river governance and unify its management under a single 
administrative body: the Thames Navigation Commission was established in 1751, and 
consolidated by the 1770 Thames Act to manage the whole length of the Thames. As it was 
unclear, however, whether it had jurisdiction over the stretch of the river administered by 
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the City of London, this commission did not make any decisions regarding that part of the 







Because of a combination of economic necessity (the free-rider problem) and historical 
precedent, different parts of the water system were administered by different kinds of 
institutions: drainage remained a public service, while supply came to be dominated by 
private companies. Although eighteenth-century London’s networks of water were 
managed by very different institutions, they shared some important similarities. Both the 
companies that supplied the city with water as well as the commissioners that managed its 
drainage had to cope with an expansion of their work, stemming from the increase in the 
area that their networks had to cover, as well as the number of people that needed to be 
connected.  
The increase of scale provided both opportunities and challenges for these different 
institutions. For the companies, expansion allowed them to increase their revenue, which 
made it economically more attractive to make the investment needed to start a company. 
New companies therefore emerged whenever there was a sufficient number of people in 
need of supply to make it financially worthwhile to create a new infrastructure. The increase 
in size eventually allowed them to issue dividends to their shareholders. Challenges that 
came with the expansion of their networks referred to the practical issue of how to deliver 
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water to more people: more water needed to be raised, the network needed to be 
managed, and as the company expanded a larger workforce was required.       
Similarly, the commissioners of sewers had to deal with larger numbers of users 
connecting to the drainage network, which caused more work, but also allowed them to 
raise more tax. Over time, they changed their organisation in order to deal with the increase 
of money to be raised and work to be executed. The changes in administration observed in 
these commissions reflected a broader transformation in local government practices as they 
moved from parish-based participant governance to a modernised system of professional 
officials. This transformation was faster in the newly urbanising areas, and as such indicative 
of local government’s adaptation to the new issues brought about by increasing population 
density and the transformation of the metropolitan environment. 
Neither the water companies or the sewer commissions were new institutions, and the 
eighteenth century witnessed only part of their trajectory. However, it was the increase in 
scale that occurred during this century that encouraged them to change and expand in 
order to better manage London’s water. The next chapters deal with the implications of this 
increase in scale in terms of the expansion of the drainage and water supply networks.
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Chapter 4. Drainage, floods, and the expansion of the sewer network. 
 
The process of urbanisation involved major modifications to the physical environment 
that collectively resulted in higher rates of run-off water, meaning that drainage systems 
had to be extended.
1
 Failure to do so would result in flooding, which as a result of the 
growth in population affected more people and thus constituted a larger nuisance. As 
shown in the previous chapter, the sewer commissions, responsible for preventing flooding 
and facilitating drainage, experienced an increase in their workload over the course of the 
eighteenth century — an indication of the greater need for drainage management as the 
built-up area expanded. This management consisted of several key tasks. The physical 
network had to be extended as more houses required connection to a sewer, meaning that 
greater quantities of water had to be channelled over longer distances. In addition, the 
functionality of this network had to be maintained, ensuring sufficient flows of water and 
preventing blockages. Finally, there was the requirement to balance finances.  
The sewer commissions encountered several restrictions that curbed their power to 
manage eighteenth-century London’s drainage. As the providers of a public good, they could 
not exclude connection to their network, and as a result drainage management often had to 
be about managing patterns of behaviour regarding the sewers, in terms of use as well as 
contributions towards maintenance of the system. The main problem that the commissions 
encountered, however, was that under their original legislation they were only allowed to 
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maintain the sewers, but not to alter them or construct new ones. This posed particular 
problems in an expanding city, as it became necessary to turn to other agents in order to 
construct the network of sewers. The result was a hybrid system of both private and public 
drains. In turn, this complicated the issue of contribution to the network: both sewer 
commissions and owners of private sewers had to circumvent the free-rider problem, and 
ensure that everyone who benefitted from changes contributed to their costs.  
The study of London’s drainage management is also complicated by the variations in 
legislation, way of operating, and records kept by the different sewer commissions. In 
addition, across London the commissions dealt with different issues: some areas 
experienced a faster rate of urbanisation while others had swampier ground, and these 
differences affected the kind of work a sewer commission had to focus on. Nevertheless, 
several problems were encountered across the capital and constituted the main issues that 
sewer commissions had to address: small-scale flooding, expansion and maintenance of 
their network, and managing people’s contribution towards the works. This chapter 
explores how these issues were tackled in eighteenth-century London. 
 
 
4.1. Draining Pimlico. 
 
The interrelation between the tasks faced by the sewer commissions can be illustrated by 
the case of Belgrave Place in Westminster. This area saw expansion in the number of 
buildings as well as alterations in water structures made by a private landowner, Chelsea 
Waterworks. Moreover, this was a low-lying area prone to floods. In the early eighteenth 
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century the Pimlico area that was eventually to become Belgravia was still mainly 
unoccupied marshland. Over the course of the next 100 years, however, it was to undergo 
major changes. In the 1720s Chelsea Waterworks created a series of canals in the lower 
marshes of Pimlico, while the surrounding fields were either still used as farmland or 
landscaped into gardens such as those of Chelsea College or the Ranelagh pleasure gardens. 
The 1746 Rocque map, shown in figure 4.1, depicts this area as fields with trees, crossed by 
roads and streams, and shows the presence of standing pools of water. In the latter half of 
the eighteenth century, however, this started to change. The growth of the West End over 
this time meant that by the 1790s several streets with residential houses had been 
constructed south of Green Park and to the west of Chelsea Waterworks’ canals, as can be 
seen on the 1790s Horwood map in figure 4.1. Some of the first streets in this area were 
Belgrave Place and Belgrave Road, located directly to the west of Chelsea Waterworks’ 
canals. The presence of buildings in this area necessitated changes in drainage, and this was 
reflected in an increase of work for the Westminster Commissioners of Sewers, which 
administered drainage of these fields. While very few issues are on record for the first 60 
years of the eighteenth century for Pimlico, the number of cases the commission had to deal 




In the mid-1790s several builders that were developing Belgrave Road applied to Chelsea 
Waterworks to construct drains that would feed into a water course on the company’s 
property.
3
 They complained that as the common sewer, which had previously drained this 
area, had been partly filled up, the houses in Belgrave Place and along Belgrave Road were 
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affected by water from ‘land springs’ as well as ‘foul water from their kitchens’, and that 
their inhabitants experienced frequent flooding.
4
 The request to connect drains was made 
to Chelsea Waterworks as this company owned the land between the new buildings and the 
Thames, meaning that any drainage would have to pass across their property. In response, 
the company went back over its records to investigate how and why Belgrave Place was 
drained. Their investigation into the flooding and drainage of this area provides examples of 
the complications that arose when drainage structures changed, the problems inherent in 
the network, as well as the need to cooperate along the course of a drainage channel. 
 
Figure 4. 1. Belgrave Place on the Rocque and Horwood maps.  
 
The area on the 1746 Rocque map (left) and the 1790s Horwood map (right). A = the location 
of Belgrave Place, B = Chelsea Waterworks’ infrastructure. The probable location of the 
disputed drainage structure is indicated in red.  
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When Chelsea Waterworks had bought the ground in the mid-1720s, there were only 
three houses in the area. The company had noted that the land was marshy fields with a 
few drainage courses emptying in the Thames. There had been a ditch along the road 
adjoining the waterworks, which drained the area that was to become Belgrave Place as 
well as the road alongside the waterworks, but the fact that it was referred to as a ditch and 
not a sewer indicates that it probably did not have flowing water throughout the year. By 
1773 the company had realised that the ditch was difficult to clean as it had a very limited 
fall, again indicating stagnant water. In response, the directors ordered some alterations: 
the water was diverted into one of the canals made by the company, the ditch was filled up, 
and by 1785 formed part of a footpath.
5
 It was the stoppage of this ditch that was the cause 
of the poor drainage experienced by the inhabitants of Belgrave Place. The alteration also 
meant that all water in the ditch, from the houses and the road, flowed into the company’s 
canals and was eventually distributed to its customers.
6
  
Between the 1720s and the 1790s the company recorded that about 170 houses had 
been constructed in Chelsea and Belgrave Place, all of which except 36 used the ditch as a 
common sewer in the 1790s.
7
 The greater number of houses meant there was an increase in 
the amount of water that entered the company’s canals, and as there were expectations 
that more houses would be built between Chelsea Road and Five Field Walk, the company 
decided it was necessary to stop their drainage and wastewater from entering their supply.
8
 
As a result, it was decided that the inhabitants of Belgravia needed a new sewer and the 
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company, as well as some of the builders, applied to the Westminster Commissioners of 
Sewers that the filled ditch should be restored as an ancient waterway.
9
 
The case of Belgrave Place showcases most of the issues related to the drainage of the 
expanding city that the sewer commissions had to deal with, and highlights some of the 
complexities that plagued London’s drainage system in the eighteenth century. First of all, 
this example shows the need to adapt the natural drainage courses as a result of London’s 
expansion. Builders recognised the need to link new houses to the drainage system and 
applied to the commissioners to do this. Secondly, it shows the interconnectedness of the 
network. Chelsea Waterworks, as the landowners of a lower lying area between the West 
End and the Thames, had to deal with the drainage arising from land higher up than theirs. 
Thirdly, large sewer systems involve both private and public interests and between these 
two, tensions could arise. Changes had to be made which affected one landowner, but were 
mainly of benefit to those at higher elevation. As the city expanded ever greater numbers of 
people were connected to this network, and the sewer commissions needed to ensure that 
the collective good of the system was maintained so that those who benefitted from it 
contributed to those who had to make the changes. Finally, it shows the problems that 
could arise as result of a lack of proper drainage: because the old drainage ditch was 
covered up, houses could not drain away their wastewater and their inhabitants complained 
of flooding, while the company’s supplies were affected by wastewater. In effect, water was 
present in the wrong place, and the sewer commissions had to manage the flow in the 
watercourses in order to prevent or remedy this situation.  
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4.2. Expanding the network: private interest and public needs. 
 
As shown, the complex history of drainage in London involved both public and private 
elements of the network, which makes it important to understand the relationships 
between the two. Part of the drainage network had always been private: houses were 
connected to sewers in the street via a brick drain, which were called ‘private drains’, and 
which remained the responsibility of the owners of the house.
10
 The sewer commissions, 
meanwhile, were responsible for the ‘common sewer’ in the street. When a new house was 
being built, either its builder or the developer of the plot petitioned their local sewer 
commission to have the houses drain into the common sewer. When a larger area was being 
developed, builders and developers had to construct the sewers themselves. These were 
often worded as ‘private drains’ as well, even though they could connect anything from two 
or four houses, or even the property of someone like William Puttney, who applied to 
connect 166 houses in Brewer Street, Cambridge Street, and Broad Street St James at the 
same time.
11
 It was therefore effectively builders and developers that created new sewers, 
and, while the definitions that commissions used to differentiate between ‘drains’ and 
‘sewers’ was not quite clear-cut, a privately constructed drain that connected many houses 
to the network was often referred to as a ‘private sewer’, as opposed to the common or 
public sewer. 
The private sewers remained the property of their maker. However, as they were 
connected to the larger public network, they were subject to the jurisdiction of the sewer 
commissions, which had to regulate the amount of water that flowed through their 
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networks. New houses that connected to a private sewer had to obtain permission from 
both the owner of that sewer as well as the local sewer commission.
12
 Sewer owners were 
not allowed to connect houses without the consent of the commission as, firstly, the 
commission had to know the amount of water the sewer was processing and, secondly, the 
connected houses would have to contribute towards that sewer. In order to exert control 
over the sewers, the Tower Hamlets Commissioners of Sewers, for example, threatened to 
destroy any private drain into which the owners had allowed other houses to drain.
13
 
Conversely, when drains were connected illegally to someone’s private sewer, the owner 
could apply to the commission for help in their removal.
14
  
Over time, private sewers were built to drain large parts of London, and were particularly 
prominent in those areas in which the largest building expansion took place: Westminster, 
the City of London, and as the century wore on, the western parts of Tower Hamlets. By the 
mid-eighteenth century only a few of the large sewers in the City of London were public, 
namely the Walbrook, the Moorgate, and the Fleet sewer, while the rest of the network was 
private.
15
 On the other hand, the complexities of construction meant that the distinction 
between a private and common sewer was often blurred. Not all institutions kept clear 
records of land use as the Chelsea Waterworks had done, and the absence of records 
showing which sewers were built by whom could make it extremely difficult to trace who 
was ultimately responsible for maintenance, repair, and permission to connect. For that 
reason, unless an owner could be tracked down, the sewer was considered public. In some 
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cases the commissioners had to resort to individual memory rather than the written word: 
when in November 1702 William Pannett wanted to connect his house to the sewer in his 
street he was asked to provide proof that it was a common sewer. In the absence of any 
definitive documentation elderly residents in the locality were asked to confirm if the sewer 
had been there for a long time.
16
 As the years passed by and particular ownership of a 
sewer was forgotten, or the owners’ family had passed away, a private sewer could pass 
into public ownership.  
This situation presented challenges for those constructing the sewers. Builders not only 
had to ask permission from the sewer commission to connect to the network, but often had 
to negotiate with the landowners who owned property along their intended route as well.
17
 
This was the reason why the builders of Belgrave Place, who were constructing their own 
drainage for these houses, approached the Chelsea Waterworks for permission to connect 
to their waterways. In this case the waterworks were quite willing to cooperate with the 
builders, most likely because they themselves had an interest in the better drainage of these 
houses, but elsewhere, obtaining permission to connect private sewers was more complex. 
The problems were especially intense in the more densely populated areas, where there 
was less public space through which to run sewers, and where routes had to be negotiated 
with the multiple owners of private courts, yards, and houses.
18
 As a result, individuals could 
often frustrate the drainage efforts of others, especially if they did not receive any benefit 
from that particular drain themselves. For example, William Gore, a house owner in courts 
near Colchester Street, City of London, applied to the City Commissioners of Sewers to 
construct a private drain to remove spring and wastewater from his cellars and vaults. 
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Unfortunately, there were houses standing over and adjoining his intended route, the 
owners of which refused their permission.
19
 The inhabitants of these places appealed to the 
commission that they did not want this drain on the grounds that it would damage their 
tenements, and the commission decided that William Gore would have to construct his 
drain another way.
20
 Gore found a new route that also went through places which were not 
“Publick streets, lane or common passages”, but in this case it did not have to go through 
houses and he obtained permission to construct his sewer from these owners.
21
  
This, and similar cases, demonstrate some of the difficulties that those who needed to 
drain their houses encountered. The commissions had little power to force people to 
comply when it came to private sewers and it was up to the builder or owner to find and 
negotiate a route, with the commissions merely acting as facilitators. In regard to the public 
sewers, they could force people to pay a rate, enter their houses to see whether they 
drained into a sewer or not, or forcibly take their belongings if they refused to pay, but 
when a sewer was private they had no real power to make people comply. Fortunately, 
people more often appeared to cooperate in order to ensure better drainage for all 
concerned: when several developers applied to make drains for a piece of land between 
Warwick, Glasshouse, Swallow, and Leicester Streets for intended buildings, another 
developer heard about the plans and proposed to join them so the drain could cross his land 
between Vine Street and Glasshouse Street, and drain into the Piccadilly common sewer.
22
 
As a result, much of the drainage infrastructure in the expanding areas of eighteenth-
century London was constructed by private builders. 
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4.3. Floods and flood control. 
 
The main problem experienced by the inhabitants of Belgrave Place illustrates well the 
need for good drainage infrastructure. Their houses suffered from floods, which were 
caused both by the high water table in the Five Fields marshlands (the ‘land springs’) as well 
as by wastewater from their houses (the ‘foul water from their kitchens’). Small-scale 
flooding, which affected only a few houses or streets, was a common occurrence in 
eighteenth-century London.
23
 In the more built-up commissions it was not uncommon to 
come across at least ten mentions of flood nuisance a year.
24
 As the commissions only 
responded to floods about which complaints were made, it is likely that many more 
occurred unreported.
25
 While flooding is to a certain extent unavoidable — every drainage 
system has a limit beyond which it cannot cope — in many of the cases that resulted in 
complaints there was an identifiable issue with the sewers. Sometimes this was a defect of 
the network: for example, when houses in Lombard Street flooded in 1742 it came to light 
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that the sewer causing the problem was at a higher elevation than the cellars it was 
supposed to drain, which made it impossible for drainage to take place. Other problems 
arose when gullyholes in the street were too small to convey water to the sewers.
26
 In other 
cases the flooding was a result of conflicting uses of the sewer network: certain trades relied 
on water to power mills and factories, and built penstocks or even diverted sewers for their 
own use.
27
 These kinds of issues were resolved by the sewer commissions, which had the 
power to order blockages to be removed, and were able to take action to repair the sewer 
in order to ensure a better flow of water.   
In many other cases, however, the sewers were blocked as a result of an accumulation of 
mud or filth, itself usually the outcome of an inadequate fall in the network allowing solid 
particles to build up in the pipes, but an issue that was also amplified by the usage of the 
sewers for waste disposal. This created a complex set of problems. The commissioners had 
two types of strategies to deal with blocked sewers: they could scour and clean them, but 
also try to prevent solid material from entering the system in the first place. Much of their 
time was taken up by such measures: of the 63 cases which the Holborn and Finsbury 
Commissioners of Sewers dealt with in 1772, 37 were associated in one way or another with 
the prevention of solid matter entering the network, an indication of the difficulties of 
managing a drainage network that often also functioned as a receptacle of waste.
28
 
Although the disposal of solid waste into the sewers was illegal, it was nevertheless a 
widespread problem. Many local government bodies tried to legislate against these 
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practices, but usually in vain. Once a problem had arisen, it was notoriously difficult to 
establish responsibility, and to enforce penalties.
29
  
As is shown in chapter two, there were a good many sources of pollution that included 
animals, industries, as well as ordinary inhabitants. To deal with them, the commissions 
summonsed suspected miscreants to their courts to answer charges. For instance, the 
Surrey and Kent Commissioners of Sewers called up Ralph Thrale for stopping up the sewer 
with soil from his dog kennel.
30
 The Tower Hamlets Commissioners of Sewers summonsed 
Benjamin Truman, owner of one of the largest breweries in London situated in Brick Lane, to 
explain why hops and grain had been washed from his brewery into the public sewer in the 
street, causing the blockages that resulted in local flooding.
31
 The City of London 
Commissioners of Sewers had to cope with sugar bakers who frequently discharged toxic 
lime waste into the sewers.
32
 There were complaints of rakers, scavengers, and 
nightsoilmen leaving waste on the streets, and allowing it to enter the network.
33
 Finally, 
throughout all parts of London, private individuals swept rubbish into the sewers, and the 
Holborn and Finsbury commission noted in 1742 that it was “the poorer sort of inhabitants” 
that were particularly guilty of this.
34
 Preventing solid waste entering the sewer network 
was therefore an all-consuming task for the commissioners and much of their time was 
taken up by their efforts to regulate the problem.  
The sewer commissions aimed to separate solid waste from liquid drainage, although the 
latter still included some wastewater. To this end, the commissioners employed different 
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strategies, including physical changes to the network, as well as measures to regulate the 
behaviour of both private citizens and tradesmen.
35
 In terms of its physical structure, the 
network was adapted to filter out solids. The basic sewer system already included grates, 
which functioned to prevent sand and rubbish from entering the network, in cases where 
the sewers were located below street level. Ralph Thrale, who had been prosecuted by the 
Surrey and Kent Commissioners of Sewers, was acquitted because he could prove that he 
had a grate that prevented soil from the dog house entering the common sewer.
36
 Similarly, 
Truman was ordered by the Tower Hamlets Commissioners of Sewers to construct a grate in 
the gateway leading out of the brewery, which would filter the solid waste from the water 
that was then allowed on the street.
37
 Maintaining the flow of water by reducing the 
likelihood of blockages was, at least in theory, a relatively simple matter that entailed little 
more than some basic civil engineering. 
This alone, however, was not sufficient and some further deterrents were needed to 
dissuade people from blocking the sewers. In this respect, the commissioners sought to 
impose fines on frequent offenders, as well as encouraging the general public to report 
illegal uses of the sewage network. For instance, the City of London Commissioners of 
Sewers, who struggled with ongoing problems with sugar bakers and soap boilers disposing 
of clay and lime into the sewers, frequently issued fines. While the initial fine for a first 
offence was 40s, this went up to £5 and then £10 for repeat offenders.
38
 In addition, they 
offered financial incentives for witnesses to come forward at the Court of Sewers to give 
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 In 1732 a similar incentive was provided by the Tower Hamlets 
Commissioners of Sewers who ordered that any person giving evidence leading to a 
conviction of someone for emptying excrement, filth, or soil into the sewers, would be paid 
ten shillings.
40
 While this reward was not always necessary to persuade people to give 
evidence — in 1732 inhabitants of Bishopsgate complained to the City Commissioners of 
Sewers that they had seen Mr Wood pour soil from his house of easement into the sewer 
without being paid for this information — it could prove an incentive for some individuals to 
take the time to testify before the court.
41
   
 
 
4.4. Maintenance and costs. 
 
Preventing filth from entering the system through physical means or financial penalties 
was the favoured course of action, but once there, the sewers had to be cleaned. The 
maintenance of sewers had traditionally been the responsibility of the landowners.
42
 Over 
time, and especially in the more urbanised areas, landowners deferred to the sewer 
commissions to arrange and fund the maintenance of sewers on their land.
43
 As public 
authorities, the commissions had the ability to recoup the costs from everyone who 
benefitted from sewer maintenance, and could force people to contribute. This was 
executed in two ways: firstly, the commissions charged a fixed fee per new house 
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connected, whether to a private or a public sewer, as each connection entailed an increase 
in the amount of run-off entering the system, and thus on the possibility of filth entering the 
system.
44
 Secondly, they charged rates on the houses that benefitted from the repairs or 
cleaning of a particular sewer. These rates were determined by property value, and could 
range from three pence to four shillings in the pound, depending on the level of expenditure 
and the value of land, houses, and premises in an area.
45
 Where rates were charged, they 
were usually levied on inhabitants occupying houses on a particular level, which was 
essentially the line of a large leading sewer, and only the people living on that level would 
pay towards improvements to the local sewers.
46
 
The commissions had the power to tax all the inhabitants that benefited from specific 
works but this was not always a clear-cut issue.
47
 In 1762 the benefit rule was defined as 
anyone who “might receive benefit by the repair, or injury by the neglect” of a certain 
sewer.
48
 In practice, however, it was quite often difficult to determine who exactly 
benefited from repairs, particularly once sewers came to be seen not just as means to 
protect against flood, but increasingly as a way to drain away surface water. Most 
commissions operated on the understanding that not only the households connected to the 
sewers should pay rates, but that all householders in the vicinity of a sewer derived benefit 
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from drainage and should therefore be liable to pay the rates. The Tower Hamlets 
Commissioners of Sewers judged that all houses within one mile of a sewer were likely to 
benefit, although such a rule was not normally followed by the other commissions.
49
  
Determining which households benefitted and thus had to contribute towards cleaning 
or repair was far from straightforward. In built-up areas, drainage structures were not 
always obvious. For example, some houses drained half into one sewer and half into 
another, for which the usual solution was to charge them only half the normal rate if the 
repairs had been on one of those sewers only. In addition, precise knowledge of the system 
was rarely, if ever, easily available and this, in turn, created the opportunity for 
householders and businesses to challenge a demand for the rates, since only those 
benefitting from access to a sewer were obliged to pay. Generally, objectors had to attend 
the commission’s next session and make their case in court. If their claim was upheld, 
showing, for example, that their premises drained into another sewer, they could either be 
exempted or receive a reduction in the rate.
50
 Usually they had to provide physical evidence 
of where the water actually drained, which was by no means an easy task. In 1732, for 
instance, Elizabeth Romney refused to pay a rate on the Pall Mall sewer as she claimed she 
had her own private drain. The Westminster Commissioners of Sewers visited her house, 
but upon opening the drain found that it contained no water, thus suggesting that it flowed 
elsewhere, in this case into the Pall Mall sewer. As a result, her appeal was rejected and she 
was instructed to pay the rate: the fact that there was no water in her private drain proved 
she derived benefit from the common sewer.51  
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Identifying which individuals were linked to the sewer network was difficult in itself, but 
given that the sewers were part of a wider system connecting different parts of the city, 
establishing who was responsible for events that had repercussions elsewhere in the 
network could also be problematic. In 1782 several Battersea householders appealed 
against paying rates that had been levied by the Surrey and Kent Commissioners of Sewers 
for repairs on the Lambeth level. They failed in their request because, although at some 
distance, their houses nevertheless drained through the Lambeth network of pipes.
52
 
Similarly, in 1742, when fishmongers were charged for sewer repairs in the City of London 
they refused to pay on the grounds that the problem had been caused by an accumulation 
of mud in a connecting sewer.
53
 Determining the physical extent of the drainage network 
was therefore important in determining who precisely was required to contribute. In 
addition, these cases show that it was up to the commissioners to take a decision on how to 
balance spreading out the cost of repairs and cleaning across all those who benefitted, 
whilst at the same time seeking to punish those who polluted the sewer in the first place. 
In order to combat the problem of ‘free-riders’, the commissions had similar powers as 
Justices of Peace to force people to pay the rates. For example, householders in Tower 
Hamlets who refused to pay, but could not demonstrate a reason why they should be 
exempted, were liable to have their possessions confiscated.
54
 Both the City as well as the 
Westminster Commissioners of Sewers issued warrants of distress against defaulters and on 
occasion seized goods to recoup revenue.
55
 In the Surrey and Kent commission non-payers 
                                                           
52
 LMA/SKCS/55 Surrey and Kent Commissioners of Sewers, minutes, 13 March 1782. 
53
 LMA/CLA/6/AD/3/12 City of London Commissioners of Sewers, minutes, 10 Dec. 1742. 
54
 LMA/THCS/11 Tower Hamlets Commissioners of Sewers, minutes, 17 March 1731/2. 
55
 LMA/CLA/6/AD/3/12 City of London Commissioners of Sewers, minutes, 21 May 1742 and LMA/WCS/52 
Westminster Commissioners of Sewers, minutes, 5 Jan. 1731/2. 
 118 
 
were threatened with the Exchequer Court.
56
 Those who refused to pay rates could also be 
blacklisted: in 1722 the Westminster Commissioners of Sewers postponed fixing a burst 
sewer in St James Park as the Duchess of Buckingham had not paid her rates.
57
 In the same 
year, householders applying to connect houses near Glasshouse Street to the network were 
refused permission because the landowner had not paid for connecting his houses in nearby 
Brewer Street.
58
 Non-payment therefore had consequences for future drainage on one’s 
property. 
In the case of private sewers, the duty of cleaning and maintenance fell to the owners of 
the sewer, although under the jurisdiction of their local sewer commission they could be 
ordered to clean or repair them. In rapidly expanding urban areas it often happened that 
many houses benefitted from a private sewer, and at times owners of private sewers 
approached the sewer commissions to spread the costs. For example, when the northern 
stretch of a sewer on the westside of Kensington Square had to be cleaned in 1702, the 
Westminster Commissioners of Sewers ordered the owners of new houses that drained into 
this sewer to contribute to the cost incurred by the owner, Mr Kemp.
59
 Similarly, when the 
Long Alley sewer near Moorfields blocked up and caused flooding, local people appointed 
Mr Emerson, the local landowner, to arrange for the repair. As the costs were estimated to 
come to £600 he approached the Holborn and Finsbury sewer commission for money from 
the rates, or at least the means to collect the money “properly” via the commission.
60
 In 
either case, all those who would benefit by no longer being flooded were made to 
contribute towards Emerson’s work. The commissions therefore were able to enforce 
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collectivity if people felt they were paying for a public good and wanted it to be spread out 
over all those who received a benefit from this. 
While they could force people to contribute to the common sewers, the commissions did 
not have much power over the private sewers, which, again, could cause conflicts. When a 
private sewer that drained houses in White Alley near Coleman Street needed to be 
cleaned, its owner, Henry Lovell, required access to the house of William Timbrell, as the 
sewer passed through his cellar. However, Timbrell refused access as he believed that the 
drain had mainly been made to benefit the houses in White Alley, and that his house did not 
receive any benefit from it. As a result, he argued that the drain should not run through his 
cellar nor should anyone have the right to come into his house to clean it. Lovell took up the 
case with the City Commissioners of Sewers and claimed that Timbrell benefitted from the 
sewer, since it carried off spring waters and Timbrell’s cellar was the lowest of all houses.
61
 
While the commission could order the sewer to be cleaned, they could not force Timbrell’s 
cooperation, and in the end Henry Lovell asked and received permission from the 
commission to make a new drain as Timbrell made too much trouble.
62
 As in the case of 
William Gore, it was easier to construct a new sewer rather than having to deal with un-
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This chapter has shown how an institution, meant to deal with the status quo, struggled 
to cope with the changes to drainage inherent in the processes of urban growth. The sewer 
commissions were equipped to deal with the prevention of floods by cleaning and 
maintaining sewers, and were able to recoup the costs through the rates. However, in a 
situation where there were no existing sewers to clean, floods could only be remedied by 
the creation of new drains prior to development, and here the commissions reached the 
limits of their authority. The limitation of the sewer commissions’ power under their Tudor 
statutes prohibited them from building new sewers, necessitating the cooperation of private 
builders and developers. In the process of this expansion, a network of public and private 
drains and sewers was built up haphazardly over time, resulting in an exceedingly complex 
system that was both difficult to administer and almost impossible to know. 
While this solution was successful in the sense that new sewers were being constructed 
as the city expanded, the reality of a network in which parts were owned privately, and 
other parts were public, made its management exceptionally complex. As some of the 
examples show, builders and house owners had to negotiate their own sewers, and as the 
interest of private property remained paramount in eighteenth-century England, this was 
not always easy. The Belgrave Road inhabitants were fortunate: as their drainage created 
problems for Chelsea Waterworks in the long term, it benefitted the company as much as 
the inhabitants to cooperate and make a sewer. In other cases, it was generally easier to 
find a new route rather than forcing this cooperation to occur. 
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The commissioners of sewers operated in a context of increased scale — a growing 
network and the need to connect more people over a wider area — and had to balance this 
with the management of the physical infrastructure and the desire, if not the requirement, 
to maintain financial balance. The restrictions they encountered were part of their 
institutional limits as public authorities operating under outdated statutes. The other 
institutions managing London’s water, the water companies, suffered neither of these 
limitations, and were able to both construct their own infrastructure as well as exclude 
people from their service. The challenges they encountered in this and the impact this had 
on eighteenth-century London’s water management is the topic of the following chapters. 
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Chapter 5. Expanding the supply network: geography, technology, and water 
management. 
 
An expanding city and growing population presented enormous challenges as well as 
opportunities for the water companies, both in terms of having sufficient supplies available 
as well as distributing it to their customers. The companies reacted in specific ways, 
depending on the spatial configuration of their intake points and customer bases, their 
financial situation, threats from competitors as well as the demands for water itself. This 
chapter explores this set of issues, focusing on the structural problems affecting the 
availability of water and the quality of supply in the context of an expanding infrastructure 
network. These structural problems were exacerbated during periodic shortages arising 
from natural phenomena, such as drought, which often forced the companies to take action 
to maintain or enhance their supply.   
Expanding technological systems are often hit by a reverse salient: problems with a 
particular component in the system that hampers the whole enterprise.
1
 These constraints 
are often technological or material in nature, but can also emerge because of 
environmental, financial, or legal factors. The main reverse salient in the water supply 
system during the eighteenth century was the machinery and the associated costs of raising 
sufficient water, which affected the number of customers that could be reached, as well as 
the areas that individual companies could supply. As the geographical limits of the customer 
base extended farther away from the Thames, water had to be raised higher, and 
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University Press, 1993), p. 79. 
 123 
 
transported farther away. Innovation in water-raising technology therefore became 
increasingly important for many of the companies if they wanted to expand their business.  
This chapter explores the ways in which the companies managed expansion of their 
networks, with a particular focus on the geographical factors that determined the different 
strategies available to individual companies. Firstly, it examines the basic components of the 
water infrastructure, noting differences arising from geographical factors. Secondly, it 
explores how water was supplied to the emerging West End, an area where the 
geographical constraints were particularly evident but which, crucially, also had the pull-
factor of wealthy inhabitants with sufficient purchasing power to encourage the provision of 
a commercial water supply. Next, the chapter examines innovations in water-raising 
technology, which allowed the companies to overcome, to a certain extent, the main 
reverse salient in their supply network. New technologies were adopted by different 
companies at different times, depending on their needs, financial constraints, and 
managerial choices. The last section examines how companies regulated the water in their 




5.1. Water infrastructure. 
 
Broadly speaking, the general structure of the supply network was very similar for all 
water companies. Each had at least one water-tower or reservoir in which they collected 
and stored the water before it was discharged into wooden pipes and distributed using 
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gravity as the driving force. A sufficient volume of water in these reservoirs and towers was 
necessary in order to maintain pressure throughout the network, which could also be used 
to even out fluctuations in the supply. Whether a company used a tower or a reservoir 
depended on its location: companies that supplied from the city’s edges, such as the New 
River Company and Chelsea Waterworks, had sufficient space to construct reservoirs. By 
contrast, companies that were located within the built-up area, such as London Bridge and 
York Buildings Waterworks, shown in figure 5.1, were forced by reasons of cost and lack of 
space to use water-towers. 
 
Figure 5. 1. York Buildings Waterworks, c. 1755. 
 
Engraving by John Boydell. Source: © Trustees of the British Museum. 
 
The first challenge that the companies needed to overcome was filling their reservoirs 
with water. The New River Company supplied its reservoirs via a 40-mile canal from springs 
in Hertfordshire, but for all other companies it was a matter of raising water, a task they 
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accomplished using different technologies. London Bridge Waterworks raised water by 
means of a waterwheel that was turned by the currents forced through the narrow locks of 
Old London Bridge. By the early eighteenth century this engine had been replaced and a 
new main wheel had been constructed by the engineer George Sorocold. It raised Thames 
water into a cistern on the water-tower, which is pictured together with the wheel in figure 
5.2.
2
 Once built, this engine ran on waterpower alone and so was a relatively cost-effective 
means of raising water. 
 
Figure 5. 2. London Bridge Waterworks, c. 1749. 
 
Print by Samuel and Nathaniel Buck. Source: © Trustees of the British Museum. 
 
                                                           
2
 Dickinson, H. W., Water supply of Greater London (London, The Courier Press, 1954), p. 24. 
 126 
 
However, engines like these were only of use in places which had a strong flow of water, 
and had their drawbacks. London Bridge Waterworks was reliant on the Thames, with all the 
uncertainties that this brought. The company was unable to supply water for six out of 24 
hours and it also suffered during low neap tides as the section of the Thames from which it 
drew water ran dry.
3
 Chelsea Waterworks also partly relied on a tidal waterwheel, which 
was turned by water that had been drawn into its system of canals at high tide to be 
released at a lower tide, and faced similar issues: in the 1740s, for example, customers 
complained that they only received water at irregular and inconvenient hours.
4
  
Most of the other early companies that were not situated at a convenient location for a 
waterwheel, such as Shadwell and York Buildings Waterworks, were forced to use other 
means to raise water. Their technological solutions included horse engines as well as those 
powered by steam — mechanisms that were more costly to run. Unlike a waterwheel, 
horses needed to be fed, rested, and cared for, and a set of horses could only lift a limited 
amount of water. As a result, over the course of the eighteenth century most of the 
waterworks eventually moved to steam power (figure 5.1 shows the steam of York Buildings 
Waterworks’ engine). The steam engine’s development was from its birth closely related to 
raising water, and waterworks became, after mining, the main early users of steam 
technology.
5
 The point at which a particular company changed from horse to steam power 
depended on many factors, which are explored in more detail below.  
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From the water-towers and reservoirs the water was distributed through a network of 
wooden pipes. The most common form for these pipes was to connect eight-feet-long 
wooden trunks that had been bored through by hammering the pointed end of one trunk 
into the next one.
6
 As this technique meant that only one approximate size pipe was 
possible, groups of trunks were used where larger pipes were necessary, as shown in figure 
5.3. This image depicts the pipes on the surface, but pipes running along streets were sunk 
underground where they were protected from frost and damage by traffic. Nevertheless, 
one of the companies’ main costs involved replacement of the pipes, since the wood rotted 
after a certain number of years, ranging from four to 25 years depending on ground 




Figure 5. 3. Water infrastructure: New River Company’s main. 
 
Source: Islington Local History Centre.   
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The pipe network was made up of a system of mains and services. The mains, which 
generally consisted of several pipes grouped together, such as those in figure 5.3, were 
directly fed from the reservoirs and from there led into the neighbourhoods supplied by the 
companies. Attached to each main were several services, which distributed the water 
through a smaller area or single street. Services were generally smaller than mains, although 
they varied in size. Individual houses connected to these services, or occasionally directly to 




At the interconnection between each service and the main was a brass or iron turncock, 
which could be turned by a key. As there was insufficient pressure to fill the entire network 
at the same time, each service only contained water at certain days and times, according to 
a schedule. Early leases of the New River Company indicate that it promised to supply at 
least three days a week, and evidence suggests that during the eighteenth century it was 
still normal to be supplied every other day.
9
 When a service was scheduled to receive water, 
a company employee (also called a turncock) switched it on. Most houses did not have a 
stopcock at the end of their pipe, and thus the water would run constantly throughout the 
time that their service was switched on. For this purpose customers had cisterns in their 
premises, which were usually situated on a low level as the pressure in the pipes was 
insufficient to allow the supply to reach higher storeys.
10
 When the time was up, the 
turncock would switch off the service to redirect the water to the next set of pipes, which 
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would in turn be supplied for a specified period of time.
11
 The amount of water that 
customers received during this time therefore depended on several factors: the length of 
time that their service had been switched on, the pressure in the pipe, and the size of their 
own branch pipe. Adjustments to amounts of water that consumers received could be made 
by changing one or more of these factors, and they played an important role in the way that 
the water companies managed supply.  
 
 
5.2. Geographical and environmental constraints. 
 
While the distribution system was essentially the same for all companies, they each had 
particular problems to overcome as a result of different geographical conditions. Depending 
on the location of their intake points and the geographical spread of their customers, all 
companies had different constraints that hindered their supply. Figure 5.4 shows a digital 
elevation model with the locations of the companies’ intake and distribution points. From 
this evidence, some of the structural problems each company faced become clear. The 
majority of the companies used the Thames as their source, and so their intake points were 
located at its banks, well below the elevation of most of their customers. In these situations, 
companies had to pump their water uphill and their ability to do so depended on the 
pressure from their water-tower, which in turn determined the spatial reach of their 
distribution network.  
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Figure 5. 4. Intake and distribution points of the water companies.  
                







The only way to provide a supply to customers at higher elevations than this limit was to 
raise the water to a distribution reservoir that was at a similar level, and distribute from 
there. This was the solution adopted by Chelsea Waterworks, which pumped water into 
reservoirs in Hyde and Green Parks. Here it was raised again into water-towers so that 
sufficient pressure to supply throughout the West End could be achieved. For the Thames-
based companies, as the spatial reach of their customer base spread farther away from the 
river, both the distance and the height that needed to be bridged increased and water-
raising technology became increasingly important. Not surprisingly, it was these companies 
that experimented earliest with modern technology. 
By contrast, a few companies had their points of intake from springs and streams at a 
higher elevation, notably the New River Company and Hampstead Waterworks (located 
farther north than the data shown in figure 5.4).
12
 As many of the customers supplied were 
located at lower elevations, these companies were at a financial advantage since their water 
could be gravity-fed, and therefore they had less need to invest in expensive technology.  
Another way in which the location of reservoirs mattered was for the companies’ 
expansion strategies. Companies located at the edges of the city could find new customers 
by supplying the buildings on the expanding urban periphery, while those closer to the river 
that were hemmed in by adjoining rivals could not develop a new customer base without 
competing against other companies. Both York Buildings and Shadwell Waterworks found 
themselves in this position, forced to supply uphill from the Thames whilst becoming 
increasingly confined to a relatively small area as a result of being hemmed in from the 
north by the New River Company and West Ham Waterworks respectively. London Bridge 
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 There was also Hyde Park Waterworks, until it was taken over by Chelsea Waterworks in the early 1720s. 
West Ham Waterworks took its supply from the river Lea, but this was fairly level with its customer base and 
thus did not provide a geographical advantage. West Ham Waterworks used a horse engine. 
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Waterworks, which was in a similar position, eventually decided to focus on expansion to 
the south, over London Bridge, as it recognised that it could not compete against the New 
River Company for customers in the City.
13
 Geography was therefore a key factor that 
influenced which structural problems each company faced as they attempted to manage 
their expanding networks.  
Over and above these geographical determinants, another factor that needs to be taken 
into account in understanding how companies responded to fluctuations in demand and 
supply is London’s climate. The structural problems noted above were often exacerbated 
during times of scarcity brought about by drought, which not only heightened dependence 
on other sources, but also put pressure on the water suppliers to better manage their own 
stocks. Often, new forms of water storage and distribution were introduced at these times 
in order to maintain supply through the network in times of a shortage.  
There were several periods of drought during the eighteenth century which impacted on 
London’s water supply. While there are no consistent instrumental weather observations 
available before 1841, a few recorded precipitation series from various places in and around 
London have survived.
14
 These measurements were sporadic and not always comparable, 
although they improved for the second half of the eighteenth century as interest in the 
recording of natural events grew.
15
 B.G. Wales-Smith has developed logarithms to connect 
these records into a single comparative running series that can be used to compile an 
overview of rainfall over the century, which has been depicted in figure 5.5.
16
 This graph 
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shows that there were significant variations from year to year but also that there was a 
gradual trend towards wetter conditions over the century. There were several clusters of 
dry years between the 1710s and 1730s, after which a general pattern emerged during the 
1760s and 1770s with more precipitation but fewer extreme years.
17
 The last two decades 
of the century showed a more erratic pattern of rainfall, with very wet years followed by 
very dry ones. Figure 5.6 focuses on the drier periods based on the years which received less 
than 15 per cent of the centennial mean. While dry years occurred throughout the century, 
they were notably absent during the wetter period of the mid-1750s to the 1770s. Especially 
in the first half of the century several drought clusters can be observed, some of which had 
an important impact on London’s water market. 
 
Figure 5. 5. Annual precipitation in London, 1700-1799, with a 10 year moving average.   
 
Based on: Brazell (1968) and Wales-Smith (1971). 
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Figure 5. 6. Dry years in eighteenth-century London.   
 
Based on: Brazell (1968) and Wales-Smith (1971). 
 
The fluctuations in rainfall impacted more severely on the companies that drew their 
water from springs than on those that used the Thames, as the water-table beneath the 
chalk hills that surround the London basin was directly related to the level of precipitation. 
Wetter weather significantly raised this water-table and as a result during wetter periods an 
increase in land springs was noted.
18
 Wetter periods therefore especially benefitted the 
companies relying on springs to the north of London, which, inversely, suffered most during 
drier years. All companies were to some extent affected by droughts, however, mainly 
because the fall in the water-table encouraged more people to turn to them for supply, as 
wells and springs became less reliable. During the drought of the early 1730s Chelsea 
Waterworks had been forced to turn away people who applied for a commercial water 
supply, as it could not provide enough water for more customers.
19
 However, its directors 
also noted that “the several Water Companys whose Dependance is on the Rise of Springs 
will be greatly distressed for Water” as a result of the same dry weather, and decided that it 
would “be of great Advantage to the Company if they shall make timely Provision of Water 
for the next Summer, not only the better to supply their present Tenants but also to serve 
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 Fluctuations in weather patterns could therefore provide a competitive 
advantage, if the company managed to improve its supply.  
The interplay between geographical factors, climatic influences, and changes in the 
customer base was therefore complex. To understand these complexities better, the 
following section focuses on one area supplied by companies with both a river-based source 
and also spring-fed supplies: the emerging West End. 
 
 
5.3. Supplying the West End: canals versus engines. 
 
London’s expansion in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was especially 
evident in the north-western part of town. This area contained a relatively large proportion 
of wealthy inhabitants, many of whom wanted a piped water supply.
21
 However, there were 
some geographical constraints that limited supply, which were exacerbated as the city 
expanded farther towards the north-west. As can be seen in figure 5.4, the West End was 
already at a higher elevation compared to the rest of the city and expansion took place at 
even higher levels as well as farther away from the Thames. This meant that for the Thames-
based companies of the early eighteenth century, Marchant’s Waterworks and York 
Buildings Waterworks, both the height the water needed to be raised and the distance that 
it had to be transported grew.  
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Even the New River Company did not have the advantage here that it had in the City: in 
order to reach the West End from the New River Head, its pipes had to bridge the Fleet 
ditch (depicted as the green strip of land in the yellow higher areas of figure 5.4). This meant 
that the force of gravity from its main reservoir was inadequate to maintain sufficient 
pressure to transport water through the pipes to the western end of town — a problem that 
led the company to consult various engineers, including Sir Christopher Wren.
22
 Eventually, 
in 1708, the company constructed an additional reservoir situated at a higher elevation than 
the New River Head, which provided more gravitational force to transport the water farther 
away.
23
 The difference in height between these reservoirs is visible in figure 5.7, which 
shows the new reservoir in the foreground and the New River Head slightly below. 
 
Figure 5. 7. The New River Company’s reservoirs, 1752. 
 
A = New River Head. B = the new reservoir. Printed and published by John and Thames 
Bowles. Source: © Trustees of the British Museum. 
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One of the main rivals to the New River Company was Hampstead Waterworks, which 
was able to supply the West End north of Piccadilly at a relatively high pressure. However, 
because of its complete dependence on springs in Hampstead Heath, it only had limited 
supplies and was therefore unable to expand its market area.
24
 Similarly, Hyde Park 
Waterworks was only able to supply around 400 houses in the late seventeenth century as 
it, too, relied on springs.
25
 The West End’s structural shortage of sufficient water to satisfy 
its demand therefore created the economic conditions for either a new company to emerge, 
or for the existing companies to invest in additional infrastructure.  
The dry years of the late 1710s and early 1720s proved particularly difficult for spring-
based companies and this became the catalyst for several plans to improve supply to this 
area. The dry summer of 1716 had left many of Hampstead Waterworks’ customers without 
water, and forced its managers to seek a solution. They enlarged their ponds, which would 
enable the company to store more water and regulate the service better.
26
 Of greater 
significance, however, was the emerging problem of supplying the West End, which was also 
exacerbated by the dry conditions. In 1725, Sir John Vanbrugh noted that in the previous 
years the Hyde Park springs had failed as a result of the dry weather, thus leading to acute 
water shortages in the West End.
27
  
These conditions provided the impetus for plans to bring more water into London from 
the river Colne, which flowed to the west of the city passing by St Albans and Uxbridge to 
join the Thames near Staines. An enterprising gentleman named Thomas Acherley had 
noted the increase in demand for water during the 1716 dry summer, and made a survey of 
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the Colne in order to assess the feasibility of diverting part of it to London. He discovered it 
had both a sufficient fall and rapidity to provide water to the city, and petitioned Parliament 
in 1719 to adopt his plans. He linked the need for a new water company explicitly to the 
growth of the West End, and mentioned the success of Hugh Myddleton’s New River 
Company, established a century previously.
28
 Acherley claimed that the people who wanted 
water in the 1720s were as numerous as they had been a hundred years before, and that 
since London and Westminster had grown so much, “a plentiful stream at affordable rates 
will be necessary”.
29
 However, while his plans were a solution to the structural problems of 
London’s growth and the increasing demand for piped water, the catalyst had been a 
particularly dry summer.  
Perhaps mindful of the threat of a new competitor, the existing companies also tried to 
satisfy the demand for water in the West End. For York Buildings Waterworks, which had 
been supplying Westminster and St Martin-in-the-Fields since 1675, the newly developed 
areas were located in the company’s natural expansion area, directly beyond the buildings it 
already supplied. In order to be able to reach customers at this higher elevation, however, 
the company required better water-raising technologies. New machinery of this kind was 
mainly developed as a way of improving drainage in mines. One of the earliest available 
machines that did this was the Savery engine, nicknamed the Miner’s Friend, which was 
technically not yet a steam engine but a vacuum pump. Possibly as early as 1712 York 
Buildings Waterworks decided to build a Savery engine, which was definitely installed in 
1714.
30
 Unfortunately the engine was still experimental and proved inadequate and 
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unreliable, and as a result it was soon abandoned.
31
 In 1719 the company was taken over by 
a group of investors led by Case Billingsley, as discussed in chapter three. Billingsley, who 
showed an interest for scientific and technological challenges, saw the technical difficulties 
of his new company as an investment opportunity.
32
 He and the other investors also had 
interests in several mining companies, which provided them with the up-to-date 
technological knowledge of raising water as well as, crucially, a cheap supply of coal. They 
made plans to build a Newcomen-style engine in 1724.
33
 
Another of the new investors in the company, John Brydges, the Duke of Chandos, played 
an equally important role in York Buildings’ desire to supply the West End. Chandos owned 
land near Cavendish Square, and was instrumental in developing around 6,000 new houses 
during the early eighteenth century, which he planned to supply with water by constructing 
a reservoir on his property.
34
 For him, supplying this area promised a twofold return: 
additional profit arising from extra customers supplied by the York Buildings Waterworks, 
and the possibility of attracting new tenants for the properties on his estate. The elevated 
West End location as well as the potential for 6,000 new customers would be advantageous 
for any water company, and both the Colne instigators as well as the New River Company 
expressed their interest to Chandos about a Cavendish Square reservoir.
35
 However, while 
he considered their proposals, Chandos preferred to deal with York Buildings Waterworks, 
as he would benefit from a share in the profits.
36
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In order to draw a sufficient supply of Thames water for a reservoir near Cavendish 
Square a water-raising engine would be essential. Chandos employed the engineer John 
Theophilus Desaguliers to consult on the company’s steam engine.
37
 Using his designs an 
engine was raising water by 1726, defying public opinion on the improbability that ‘the York-
Buildings Dragons’ would work.
38
 Mechanically it was a success, and indeed allowed the 
company to supply the reservoir near Cavendish Square, 60 to 70 feet higher than its intake 
point.
39
 Unfortunately the ‘dragon’ proved very expensive to run. Even with the coal coming 
from company-affiliated mines, transport to London meant that it cost eight times as much 
as it did in the coal-mining areas where the steam engines had been developed, and as a 
result the engine did not provide any financial benefit to the company.
40
 For this reason the 
engine was shut down in 1731 and, as it could no longer raise water to the Cavendish 
Square area, York Buildings Waterworks was forced to give up its upper reservoir as well.
41
 
In 1733 it was announced in the Daily Journal that the New River Company would buy it — a 
victory for gravity-fed supply over that drawn from the Thames.
42
 
Meanwhile, after having been discussed during several sessions of Parliament between 
1719 and 1722, plans to supply the West End from the Colne also ran into difficulties.
43
 Rival 
plans competed for attention: Thomas Acherley’s original ideas were joined by another 
scheme proposed by a Mr Blackmore, but in the aftermath of the South Sea Bubble collapse 
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neither was able to raise sufficient funds to proceed.
44
 There were also objections that 
hindered the schemes’ passage through Parliament.
45
 Millers downstream from the 
intended intake were afraid that there would be less water left in the river for them to run 
their mills.
46
 In addition, there were concerns that if part of the Colne was diverted to 
London and would no longer discharge in the Thames at Staines, this would lower the 
water-level of the Thames itself. It was believed that there were several shallows in the river 
up to the place where the Colne joined the Thames and that the extra supply improved its 
navigation. Threats to this resulted in objections from barge-owners and landowners 
concerned about the navigation, who believed that the river was already too shallow, and if 
water was to be diverted navigation would even become more difficult, and as a result 
goods traded on the river would become more expensive.
47
 Despite evidence from several 
surveyors, including Desaguliers — who was of the opinion that the new buildings were in 
need of water — that this would not be the case, neither Acherley’s nor Blackmore’s plans 
were granted permission to go ahead.
48
  
While there was an increasing demand for commercial water in West London during this 
period, there were many obstructions to efforts to raise water to this elevation and distance 
from the Thames. The Colne plans were inhibited by concerns that taking water from here 
would disadvantage people at its source, while the improvements of York Buildings 
Waterworks were curtailed by the inadequate technology at the time which could not 
overcome the company’s geographical constraints. By the end of the 1720s, therefore, plans 
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to supply the West End either by the York Buildings Waterworks or by a new company using 
Colne water had come to nothing and it was the New River Company, which had a 
geographical advantage through its higher reservoir, that was able to expand throughout 
the northern parts of the West End.  
However, it did not succeed in cornering the entire West End market. A new rival, 
Chelsea Waterworks, emerged in the 1720s and was able to overcome both the legal as well 
as the technological constraints. Chelsea Waterworks ended up supplying much of 
Westminster and St George Hanover Square. Its promoters had obviously taken the 
objections to the Colne proposals into account, as they stressed in their proposal that they 
would not take water away from others. Their proposal, which came only six months after 
the defeat of the Colne proposals, emphasised they would take water from the Thames 
between Chelsea and the neat houses at Millbank, without damaging the navigation of the 
Thames.
49
 The Parliamentary committee that investigated the matter and eventually gave 
the company permission also emphasised this fact repeatedly.
50
  
How did Chelsea Waterworks manage to supply uphill to the West End where York 
Buildings had failed? First of all, its high reservoir was not as high as York Buildings’ (see 
figure 5.8). The Cavendish reservoir was at 88 ft above the Thames, while Chelsea’s Hyde 
Park reservoir was at 85 ft and the Green Park reservoir significantly lower at 50 ft. Evidence 
to suggest that this was a main contributing factor can be found in the fact that, eventually, 
raising water to the Hyde Park reservoir, the higher of the two, caused Chelsea Waterworks 
problems, while raising water to the lower Green Park reservoir seems to have gone more 
smoothly.  
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Figure 5. 8. Intake points and reservoirs in the West End.
         
                    







A second possible factor lies in the fact that Chelsea Waterworks had more capital, and 
wealthier investors, which allowed the company to run at a loss for a few decades. Indeed, 
it was not until the 1750s that the company could return a regular dividend.
51
 There is also a 
third possible factor, which is the advantage of water over horse and steam technology. As 
mentioned previously, Chelsea Waterworks relied partly on water power (it also had a horse 
engine), which was cheaper than either a horse-driven or steam engine. Marchant’s 
Waterworks, which raised water using waterwheels in the Hartshorne Lane sewer, seemed 
to have been able to reach a similar height as York Buildings Waterworks while solely relying 
on water power: the 1746 Rocque map shows a reservoir labelled ‘Marchant’s Waterworks’ 
next to the Cavendish Square reservoir. Unfortunately, not much is known about this 
company, but the reservoir at this location indicates that, more than ten years after York 
Buildings had had to give up this part of the market, Marchant’s was able to supply there 
using water power. At some point after the surveying of the Rocque map both these 
reservoirs were built over as new houses were developed, and the area’s water shortage 
continued in the second half of the century.    
As the West End continued to expand in the 1760s, and the distance and elevation of the 
customers from the existing waterworks grew accordingly, renewed efforts to bring water 
from the Colne emerged. In 1764, the instigator of these plans, W. Efford, published a 
pamphlet entitled ‘A Scheme For the Better Supplying this Metropolis With Sweet and 
Wholesome Water from the River Coln’, in which the reasons for this new company were set 
out for the consideration of Parliament and the inhabitants of the West End.
 
The main 
factors Efford put forward included “the apparent Want of Water at the West End of the 
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Town (...); the Increase of New Buildings” and the inability of the New River Company, 
Chelsea Waterworks, and York Buildings Waterworks “to supply the Town adequate to the 
Demand”.
52
 Part of this inability Efford blamed on the distance of the existing waterworks 
from this area. He especially singled out the New River Company, and wrote that even “if 
they could supply the Inhabitants with enough for necessary Uses (tho’ tis known they 
cannot) yet in Cases of Fires by Night their Water is generally an Hour and an Half, or two 
Hours before it can arrive at the Place wanted.”
53
 These events took place during a wetter 
period and the capital had not suffered from droughts for years, but still an insufficient 
water supply was most acutely felt in times of need such as, in this case, fire. As a result, 
some of the main supporters of the Colne plans at this time were the fire insurance 




Other people who petitioned Parliament in favour of a new Colne company included 
inhabitants of Marylebone and the Cavendish Square area north of Oxford Street, who 
advocated the plan for “all the Inhabitants of that Part of the Town, who, by their Distance 
from the Reservoirs from which they are at present supplied, are exploited to very great 
Inconveniences”.
55
 These people, who had previously been supplied from York Buildings and 
Marchant’s Waterworks’ upper reservoirs, had felt the loss the most. The Colne proposals 
included a distribution reservoir in Marylebone, which would be much nearer to this area 
than the reservoirs of either Chelsea Waterworks or the New River Company, and as a 
result, they supported the venture.  
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Evidence that there was a real need for water in the West End at this time, and not just 
petitions by people who might have had an interest in the company, can be found in the 
opinion of civil engineer Thomas Yeoman. His open letter was published in the London 
Evening Post on 22 November 1765, in which he praised the existing waterworks, but 
claimed that “by the vast increase of buildings within the liberties of Westminster, and other 
parts of this great metropolis, there is still a want of further supplies.”
56
 As an alternative to 
the “several methods [that] have been proposed to obtain this desirable end” — most 
probably the Colne plans — he suggested the option of instead increasing the water supply 
in the New River by redirecting part of the river Lea.
57
 Rather than displaying a partiality on 
the New River Company’s side by this proposal, it is more likely that he was actually 
concerned with improving water supply: in later years Yeoman worked for the Colne 
company by surveying the route of its intended canal, and answering the public’s questions 
on behalf of the company.
58
 The demand for more water in the north-western end of town 
therefore was likely to be a real concern shared by more Londoners, rather than invented by 
those who were mainly motivated by setting up the new company.  
However, as its proposal progressed through Parliament in 1766 and 1767 the same 
issues that had been raised in the early 1720s surfaced again.
59
 The opposition from the 
millers and riverside communities was again too strong for the Colne proposers to 
overcome, and in March 1767 it was announced that they had to postpone their application 
for an Act of Parliament to the next session in order to find a way around all objections.
60
 In 
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practice, this meant the end of the scheme, although rumours of attempts to start a new 
water company from the Colne were still circulating as late as 1789.
61
  
The West End, as a result of its affluent inhabitants, its distance from the water 
companies’ intake points, and the failure of local springs, had three times during the century 
been the focus of new companies trying to supply the area with water. While the Colne 
proposals had failed on two occasions, this had mainly been the result of factors outside of 
London: the objections were generated around the area where the water would be taken. 
The only proposal that had been successful was that of Chelsea Waterworks. As explored in 
the following section, this company soon ran into the same issue that had plagued York 
Buildings Waterworks in its efforts to supply this area: it had to raise its water.  
 
 
5.4. Raising water: technological solutions and improvement. 
 
In order to supply their customers at higher elevations in the West End, Chelsea 
Waterworks first had to raise its water from the level of the canals, which was equivalent to 
high water level in the Thames, to its reservoirs in the royal parks. It did this by waterwheels 
and a horse engine situated near the canals. As figure 5.8 has shown, the Hyde Park 
reservoir was about 85 ft above the Thames. Many of their customers in the West End lived 
even higher, so at the Hyde Park reservoir there was an additional horse-driven engine that 
raised the water into a cistern, which produced sufficient water pressure in the pipes to 
supply these houses. However, in 1735 it emerged that not enough water was being 
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pumped to the reservoir in Hyde Park to supply these higher lying services adequately.
62
 
Evidently, the main concern was the horse engine that raised the water from the canals as 
the company began experimenting with several new designs for this engine. While most of 
those designs were focused on the need to raise more water, cost and efficiency were 




In order to save water while the engineers sorted out the supply, as a temporary solution 
Chelsea’s directors instructed collectors to be stricter on those who wasted water in these 
years.
64
 By 1739, however, the company’s customers in Westminster were suffering from 
such a poor supply that they threatened to appeal to Parliament about this matter. Chelsea 
Waterworks’ response to the threat was to consider a new horse engine again.
65
 Just as 
York Buildings Waterworks previously, the company seems to have extended itself too high 
and far for the existing technology to raise an adequate amount of water.  
Already suffering from these circumstances, a dry spell that hit England between 1740 
and 1744 accentuated Chelsea’s problems.
66
 In October 1741, Mr Churchill, the company’s 
collector of water-rents in the Westminster area, reported to a general meeting that for the 
past six months, during the summer of 1741, no part of his collection area had had water 
more than once a week, while customers were still charged the normal price. It also 
appeared that many tenants had complained to their landlords and were threatening to 
leave their houses, which propelled the owners to group together in order to seek redress in 
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 The company’s directors were at a loss, and its engineers claimed that there 
was nothing they could do, unless there would be more rain. As they could not fix these 
environmental constraints, they turned their eye to their water-raising technology. It was 
the engineers’ opinion that they had exhausted the capabilities of horse engines, thus the 




It had been a decade since the last York Buildings’ steam engine had been in operation, 
and few people in the company knew how these engines worked and how much the 
solution would cost. The directors therefore ordered that this option should be investigated 
by sending a delegation to Bristol to look at various steam engines that were employed in 
local mines.
69
 As in the case of York Buildings Waterworks, it is likely that the personal 
knowledge and business interests of the company’s directors played a role in this decision. 
The decision to go to Bristol is an indication of this, as John LaRoche, who was the 
company’s deputy governor at the time, owned lands and had investments in the West 
Country.
70
 The delegation returned with a positive report, and later the same year it was 
decided to purchase a steam engine for “the Preservation of the Company’s rents”.
71
 Once 
again, while there was a structural component of an ever expanding customer base, 
technological innovation happened at time of water shortage and thus stress on the 
company.  
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Building and installing the steam engine took some time and did not rectify the problems 
immediately, and complaints about the poor supply continued. As the company needed the 
money to invest in its engine, the directors did not reduce the price charged for water, 
despite customer requests to do so. The insufficiency of supply, as well as customers’ 
complaints, evidently continued during the next few years, since in April 1742 Mr Churchill 
resigned as a collector stating that he no longer wished to deal with people complaining 
they still had to pay even though they received no water.
72
 By June 1743 Chelsea inhabitant 
Alexander Small complained that there had been no water for ten weeks and in the previous 
two years there had rarely been water more than once in every three weeks.
73
 The number 
of complaints reduced considerably soon after the steam engine started working in late 
1743.  
Investing in this new technology had been the answer to the long-standing problem of 
overcoming the difference in elevation between the points of intake and consumption, 
while the catalyst to get the process moving was a drought. Chelsea Waterworks’ decision 
to invest in a steam engine as a strategy to raise more water and thus reach more people 
turned out to be a successful one. At several occasions later in the century, in 1760 and 
again in 1773, its directors considered building additional steam engines. Both times this 




However, as York Buildings had experienced as well, having a steam engine did not come 
cheap. The main costs, after the initial investment, were the price of coal and the higher 
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labour costs of skilled engine workers. This first cost factor was to become the subject of 
many improvements being made by engineers in order to make the engine more efficient 
and use less coal. In 1747, after only a few years’ experience with their purchased engine, 
Chelsea Waterworks’ engineers managed to build a second one, which could raise the same 
water with the same or less coal than the old one.
75
  
More small improvements were made over the century, but the main technological 
improvement was the condensing steam engine made by James Watt, which he and 
Matthew Boulton patented in 1775.
76
 The design reduced the consumption of steam, and 
consequently that of coal, while maintaining power. Because of its efficiency the Boulton-
Watt engine quickly became popular, especially in regions were the coal price was high, 
which included London.
77
 Chelsea Waterworks was one of the first to adopt these 
improvements and instructed Boulton and Watt to construct an engine in October 1776, 
which is depicted at work in figure 5.9.
78
  
Steam technology proved useful for the companies, as their technological demands were 
very similar to those in mining, the original purpose for which the engines had been 
designed, but London’s position at a distance from cheap coal supplies meant that they only 
became a good investment once the designs had become more efficient. York Buildings 
Waterworks had been at a disadvantage by making the investment too early. However, 
topography and location of the company meant that the need to raise water remained the 
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key constraint on its business and eventually it invested in a (newer) steam engine, which 




Figure 5. 9. Chelsea Waterworks, 1782. 
 
Engraving by Jefferyes Hamett O’Neale. Source: © Trustees of the British Museum. 
 
In 1757 the secretary of York Building’s Waterworks approached Chelsea Waterworks to 
apply together to Parliament for duty relief on coals for their steam engine. The other 
company that joined them at this time was Shadwell Waterworks, which suggests that only 
these companies had a Newcomen engine.
80
 Once the Boulton-Watt improvements had 
been made, more companies made the move to steam technology. The New River 
Company, Shadwell, and London Bridge Waterworks all installed Boulton-Watt engines in 
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The New River Company had been able to avoid experimenting with early steam 
technology as it could make use of gravity for much of its distribution. The only place where 
it required the water to be raised was from the New River Head to the upper reservoir that 
had been constructed in 1708 to supply the West End, and was 33 feet higher. Initially a 
windmill had been used for this, but soon it was replaced with horsepower.
82
 As demand for 
New River water in the West End increased, the company employed John Smeaton to advise 
about water-raising technologies, and in 1768 it installed a steam engine.
83
 This engine, built 
by Smeaton, turned out to have very high running costs and Robert Mylne, the New River 
Company’s engineer, had a waterwheel constructed sometime in the 1770s, which probably 
worked alongside the steam engine to raise water to the upper reservoir.
84
  
Raising more water to the high pond allowed the company to increase its water supply to 
the West End. In 1767, before the engine was operative, the New River Company had four 
mains that fed into the West End: the Soho main, which was on for 21 hours a week, the 
Grosvenor main, on for 24 hours a week, the Oxford main, which supplied 15 hours a week, 
and the Portland main, on for six hours a week.
85
 Once the engine was operative, it was able 
to almost double these hours, going from a total of 66 hours to 117 hours, and by 1773 to 
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 The increased water supply allowed the company to continually extend its 
services in the West End, and in 1775 it constructed an additional main to Marylebone.
87
 
Over the next few years a large number of new customers applied to be connected to this 
main.
88
 By 1780 the company supplied for almost 230 hours a week to the West End, which 
mainly reflected an increase of customers rather than an increase in hours per customer.
89
   
London Bridge Waterworks also switched to steam technology at a later date. It had dealt 
with its increasing customer base by adding new waterwheels under more arches, and by 
the mid-eighteenth century it ran five waterwheels under three arches. The decision to 
move to steam technology in 1762 was a complex one. It was partly undertaken to 
overcome its dependence on the tides, and partly because as the middle arches of the 
bridge were joined in 1759, the flow of water had become less forceful. Around the same 
time the company started supplying south of London Bridge, eventually building an engine 
there as well. This was possibly done as the directors realised that the company would not 
be able to compete against the New River Company in the City. London Bridge Waterworks 
had to give up supplying Grubb Street and Moor Lane in the northern parts of the City in 
1786, as it was no longer profitable to supply these customers uphill.
90
 In March 1794 its bi-
annual stock dividends had to be lowered from 30s to 20s.
91
 In November of that year the 
directors decided that there would be no possibility of increasing custom in the City due to 
the superior power of the New River Company, as well as the conversion of many dwelling 
houses into warehouses, and they recommended focusing on Southwark to make their 
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While the introduction of steam technology had allowed the companies to satisfy their 
increasing customer demand, and had enabled them to cope with droughts, it had 
implications for the rest of the network. The wooden pipes had always been the weak part 
of the network and did not cope well with water pressure. They were already generally 
leaky under the pressure required to transport the water, but at increased pressures they 
could burst.
94
 With each strike of the steam engine, the water was raised more forcefully 
than the horse and water engines had ever achieved. The first time Chelsea Waterworks’ 
employees went to see a steam engine they realised that this would create too much 
pressure in the wooden pipes.
95
 They were right: at the trial of the first steam engine in 
December 1742 the mains burst.
96
 The engine therefore had to be switched to lifting less 
water so as not to fracture the mains, and eventually the company made iron pipes from the 
engine to the reservoir.
97
 For this reason, steam engines were mainly used to raise the 
water into a higher reservoir or water-tower rather than directly supply the mains. 
Neither did steam technology completely replace earlier technologies. Horse, water, and 
wind power still continued to play an important role and ran parallel to the steam engine, or 
were even introduced after the establishment of a steam engine. In 1775, after the 
company had been using steam power for three decades, the directors of Chelsea 
Waterworks considered building a windmill, like the New River Company had done, but 
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decided against it on grounds of the unreliability of the wind.
98
 In 1784, however, they 
changed their minds and decided to install a windmill, both because it would save the 
expense of working the steam engine but also as it could be put to work independently of 
the tides, and so could take over from the waterwheels and maintain supply even during the 
lowest tides.
99
 It was working by November 1785, and even allowed the company to expand 
its service.
100
 While cost issues were likely to have played a role here, the water companies 
obviously found that different engines had certain advantages over steam technology as 
well. 
The different technological choices that the companies made, or were forced to make as 
a result of the geography of their intakes and customers, shaped the water market 
significantly. Their early forays in steam technology had been disastrous for York Buildings 
Waterworks, while the New River Company had been able to expand without having to risk 
investing in water-raising engines. While geography and technology differentiated the 
companies and determined the areas which they were able to supply, the next task in the 
water supply process, distribution, posed very similar challenges to all companies. As they 
were only able to raise a limited amount, they had to manage their supply in a way that 
balanced, on one hand, the customers’ demands, and on the other hand, the companies’ 
desire to supply as many people as possible. The next section looks at how the companies 
dealt with this. 
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5.5. Managing water: distribution, pricing, and balancing demands. 
 
Because of the expenses related to raising or transporting water to the distribution 
towers and reservoirs, its availability was limited. As their networks and number of 
customers expanded, the companies had to save water in some places of the network so it 
could be spread out to reach as many people as possible. Different parts of the network had 
different requirements. For example, supplying uphill or to the end of a main required as 
much pressure as possible to force the water into the furthest service pipes. Customers had 
different requirements as well: there were variations in the amounts required, as well as 
areas that had seasonal fluctuations in demand.  
There were several ways in which the companies could regulate their water. Firstly, they 
could adjust their schedule of supply; secondly, they could transfer customers onto other 
services; and lastly, they could compel the consumer either to use less water, or pay more 
for the water they received. The easiest way to save water was to cut down the hours of 
supply. In 1729 Chelsea Waterworks decided to switch on its services to certain areas three 
hours a day for six days a week, rather than seven hours a day for three days a week. This 
provided a weekly total of 18 hours of water rather than 21, meaning that the company had 
three hours in which the water could be redirected into another service.
101
 There were no 
complaints about this change on record, and it seems to have worked well for the company, 
as when it was under pressure to regulate its water better as a result of drought in the 
1730s, the directors repeated the practice. Chelsea Waterworks reduced the supply to these 
areas to only four days a week, but added an extra hour each day to make it four hours. This 
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meant it was supplying only 16 hours per week on that service, and saved another two 
hours, which were used to supply customers on another main who had been complaining 
about a poor supply.
102
 By changing the frequency of supply, the company was thus able to 
spread out the available water over its expanding customer base.   
Another way of saving water was to move people off the main and put them onto 
services. As each main fed into several services, the main was charged with water for the 
time allocated to all these services, and therefore people connected to a main received 
water more often. The companies preferred to have their customers on the service pipes 
rather than on the mains as it enabled them to regulate the water better and ensured the 
highest possible water pressure on the main itself. When a company extended its supply to 
a new area, however, there was often only one main to which customers had to connect. 
Once the network started to branch out, these people had to be moved onto services, so 
that they only took water during the time their own service was on, while the main was left 
to supply other customers. This happened in the 1780s to the New River Company’s new 
main into Marylebone, and the company set up a special committee to move customers to 
new services.
103
 Similarly, it moved customers on the Bloombury main to a separate service 
when there were complaints of deficient water pressure from Mr Stephenson’s brewhouse, 
at the end of the main.
104
  
The last way of regulating water was being stricter on wastage. During a drought in the 
early 1730s Chelsea Waterworks imposed several water saving measures.
105
 Firstly, its 
directors decided to cut off customers that were in arrears with their bills, and stopped 
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supplying to uninhabited houses, even if the landlord had paid for supply.
106
 In addition, 
they started cutting off people in areas in which the company was having too many 
problems supplying, and to which the cost of supply was not covered by the income. This is 
what happened in 1735 to the people at the end of a main near Tyburn Road: the directors 
of Chelsea Waterworks judged that it would be to the detriment of the company to supply 
them, since it required a lot of water to reach a sufficient pressure, which could easily be 
supplied somewhere else.
107
 Similarly, the company cut off an inhabitant of Vine Street, as 
he was the only customer taking Chelsea water while the rest of the street was with the 
New River Company and did not want to change.
108
 
In addition, the company’s directors became stricter on customers that let other people 
share their water. This practice was possible as the companies did not charge for their water 
based on quantity, but made estimations of usage according to the size of buildings, 
amenities such as water closets or fountains, and any water-using trades being practiced in 
a house. Larger consumers, such as brewers or those who paid for the supply of their 
stables, often had an open cistern or well in their stable yard, from which they let other 
people take water. Chelsea Waterworks’ directors tried to stop this practice, with the 
intention that either less water would be used, or that the people that took the water would 
apply to become paying customers themselves. In the 1730s the company ordered its 
collectors to give notice to stable yard owners and brewers who shared their water that 
they had to lock their cisterns away, or pay an extra charge for the people they allowed to 
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 As none of the companies could monitor the quantity of their supply, and water 
was provided during the time that the service was on, the brewer or stable yard owner 
could still take the same amount of water from the company. These measures were 
therefore unlikely to have saved water, though they would probably have resulted in more 
income for the company. 
When managing their water, the companies also had to take into account the various 
demands of the users. Firstly, there were certain groups of customers that needed more 
water than others. Secondly, there were seasonal fluctuations in demand, as well as certain 
times when supply was needed. Lastly, there were concerns about the quality of supply. The 
larger consumers were usually those who needed water for their trade. In order to satisfy 
demand and not to waste water, the companies had to adjust their infrastructure in order 
to only supply these people with extra water. Directing extra water to these buildings could 
be achieved in three ways. The first option was to supply them via a larger pipe, which 
provided more water once the service was on. The second option was to switch on their 
service for a longer time. The drawback of this solution was that the other customers on 
that service would receive extra water as well, without having to pay the extra charge for it. 
The last option was to supply them directly from the mains, which were charged with water 
more often, and which would require only some additional pipe infrastructure. 
The last option seemed to have been the preferred one. When Mr Rea, a brewer of 
Knightsbridge, applied for an additional day of water service from Chelsea Waterworks, the 
company’s directors replied that this could not be done without also supplying the 20 
neighbours on the same service. Supplying these domestic customers with extra water was 
                                                           
109
 LMA/ACC/2558/CH/1/6 Chelsea Waterworks, minutes, 5 Dec. 1734 and 27 Aug. 1735; 
LMA/ACC/2558/CH/1/7 Chelsea Waterworks, minutes, 7 March 1737. 
 161 
 
considered to be ‘a waste’ by the company, and therefore Rea had to pay towards the 
construction of an extra pipe from the main. The company also increased his rent by £5 per 
year, but agreed that this would keep him supplied every time that this main was on, which 
was three times a week.
110
 When Mr Smith, a brewer of Tyburn Lane, used a larger pipe to 
increase his supply but took so much water that it disadvantaged the other customers on 
that service, Chelsea Waterworks made him pay for a separate pipe towards the main to 
remedy this, which freed up the water on that service for the other consumers.
111
  
There was also the issue of how supply to these larger consumers should be priced. 
Customers that were supplied with more water had to pay a higher price, but as the 
companies could not measure how much water they supplied, it was difficult to determine 
how much they should pay. These difficulties were encountered by Chelsea Waterworks in 
1731, when it had only been in business for a few years. The company had received an 
application to supply a large brewery, and had tried to estimate the amount of water it 
needed by measuring its ‘liquor back’ where the water would be stored. As the directors 
were unsure how to determine the price, they approached the New River Company to 
enquire how they handled the provision of ‘large brewhouses’.
112
 The response indicated 
that breweries supplied by the New River Company were charged based on the number of 
barrels of beer they brewed. For example, a brewery that brewed 30,000 barrels would pay 
£30.
113
 As their annual output could be measured, this was what the companies based their 
prices on. Lambeth Waterworks, on one occasion, sent an employee to the excise office to 
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Another way of measuring water use was charging sugarbakers based on the amount of 
pans they used. However, there were many other industries for which there was no easy 
way to measure the approximate use of water, and contracts often seem to have been 
negotiated on an ad hoc basis. The collectors of the New River Company were instructed to 
look for distillers, soap boilers, taverns, fishmongers, and dyers in their district, as these 
were high water users.
115
 Chelsea Waterworks identified breweries, washerwomen, and 
public houses as using a lot of water.
116
 Dye-houses, tanners, and sugarhouses as well as a 
parchment maker were among other industries that had separate contracts and thus bought 
a lot of water.
117
  
Apart from customers needing more water, the companies also had to manage seasonal 
fluctuations in demand. Less water was taken up in summer, due to the fact that there were 
fewer people in town. The reason for this was that the wealthy, who were more likely to 
have water supplied to their houses, would spend time in the countryside. Grand Junction 
Waterworks, which mainly supplied the West End, estimated in 1821 that 300 to 400 of its 
customers were out of town during the summer months.
118
 This was enough to influence 
the companies’ water management: when Chelsea Waterworks had to release the water 
from one of its reservoirs in order to make repairs its directors decided to postpone the 
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works until summer, when less water would be required.
119
 In spring, on the other hand, 
demand rose as the wealthy would spend more time in the capital. For this reason, the New 
River Company laid on an additional hour three times a week on the Portland main in March 
1776.
120
 Again in 1796, this company supplied extra water in several West End mains on 
Sundays from February until June — a measure which was repeated the following year.
121
  
The timing of the supply also mattered to consumers: in 1732 some Chelsea customers 
complained that the water was delivered too late in the day for them.
122
 Timing was an even 
more pressing issue for industrial customers, whose trade depended on the water 
companies’ hours of supply. Mr Rea, the Knightsbridge brewer, was so unhappy with the 
irregularity of Chelsea Waterworks’ supply, which meant that he could not work fixed hours, 
that he threatened to quit his custom.
123
 Another set of Chelsea customers complained in 
1743 about the irregularity of their supply, which the company thought of as a reasonable 
complaint, and in response it committed to supply on certain days. However, as these 
customers were supplied directly from the canals, their supply depended on the tide, and a 
more regular supply could only be achieved if the tide permitted.
124
  
Judging from this company’s response, the timing of the supply was judged as a 
reasonable cause for complaint that should be fixed. In response to other complaints about 
poor timings, Chelsea Waterworks briefly considered putting the tenants in control of the 
turncocks so they could determine their own water supply, but eventually decided against 
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 In order to manage their water supply the companies needed to keep control over how 
many people were on a service. When in 1735 a group of people illegally managed to get 
hold of the turncock keys in order to supply themselves whenever they wished, this 
occasioned an investigation and the directors looked into ways of punishing those who were 
liable. This group included brewers and innholders, people who depended on water for their 
trade.
126
 Regularity and timing of service was taken seriously and was something on which 
water companies competed: in 1757 Chelsea Waterworks lost customers to the York 
Buildings Company as this company could provide Charles Street more often.
127
 Chelsea’s 
customers around Sloan Street complained about only receiving water twice a week, and 




The final cause for complaint was the quality of supply. As customers had different uses 
for the water, some cared more about this than others. For example, brewers were greatly 
concerned about the quality of their water as it was of considerable importance for the 
quality of the beer they brewed. Generally, water from wells and springs was better than 
that from the Thames, and most brewers preferred water from wells or took New River 
water, although Thrale of the Southwark Anchor Brewery used river water.
129
 Hampstead 
spring water was considered very wholesome and well suited for brewing.
130
 Chelsea 
Waterworks’ water, which came from the Thames, was only used to brew dark beers. Some 
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of Chelsea’s customers who also brewed pale beers explicitly stated they used water from a 
well for this, rather than the company’s water.
131
  
There is not much evidence about whether company water was habitually drunk or not, 
but there were indications that occasionally it was. Water from Hampstead springs was 
brought fresh every morning to several places in town, such as coffee houses at Temple Bar, 
Charing Cross, and the Stock Exchange, as well as a distillery at Holborn Bars, which was 
advertised.
132
 In a discussion between Alexander Geekie and John Locke, the latter of whom 
was an advocate of water drinking, Geekie thanked him for his advice on water drinking and 
asked him where he received his water from. He added: “mine is New River water. How is it 
to be setled pray Sir without a stone strainer. Will chalk or oat meal doe?”
133
 This indicates 
that the water needed to be filtered before it could safely be drunk. Practices as these, as 
well as some of the words people used to describe the quality of water, such as ‘thick’ and 
‘corrupted’, imply that there were solid elements in the water.  
The companies took complaints about the quality of their water seriously, and, if correct, 
tried to remedy the matter. One of these remedies was filtering the water. When Chelsea 
Waterworks’ customers complained in 1734 that the water kept in the new reservoir in 
Hyde Park was green and foul, the company spread a haircloth over the entrance of the 
pipes in order to filter out impurities.
134
 This was not effective for long, as in 1748 customers 
again complained about the “Foulness, Colour, Taste & Smell of the Water” originating from 
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the same reservoir, which was then ordered to be cleaned.
135
 As a result of persistent 
complaints, in 1775 the company decided to clean the Green Park reservoir, as the directors 
believed the foulness of the water was caused by weeds growing in the water.
136
  
The fact that the reservoirs were often used for other activities did not help to improve 
quality. Deer had been drinking from Chelsea’s ponds, which caused the company to fence 
these off.
137
 Similarly, in 1783, 42 inhabitants of Battle Bridge petitioned the New River 
Company that the water they received from the high pond was “thick and unclean” as 
people were bathing in there, and they could not use it without prejudicing their health. 
Following this petition, the New River Company fenced off that pond, which was in the 
middle of a field.
138
 As the water was sitting in companies’ reservoirs and later in customers’ 
cisterns, it festered in higher temperatures, and so there was a seasonality to quality 
complaints: most of them were made in summer.
139
 Flowing water was therefore preferred 
over water that had been kept in a reservoir: recipients of New River water from the high 
pond described the water as “bad and putrid and corrupted” in July 1785, and demanded 
“wholesome running water” rather than water that had been allowed to sit in the 
reservoir.
140
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5.6. Extending the network. 
 
A final issue that constrained the expansion of a company was the cost of its 
infrastructure. The wooden pipes were expensive — 5s 2d per yard in 1810 — and the water 
companies had to weigh up the cost of extending the network into a new street against the 
profit that it would generate.
141
 A water company needed to be sure that it would have a 
minimum number of new customers that would make the investment in pipes worthwhile. 
For example, Lambeth Waterworks would only extend its network to a street near 
Blackfriars if the company could be assured that there would be at least 12 to 20 houses 
there taking up its water.
142
 Customers that asked for the water network to be extended to 
their neighbourhood were also aware of the expenses a company incurred when it had to 
lay new pipes. In 1771, a petition for supply by a group of inhabitants of Cross Street, 
Islington, to the directors of the New River Company emphasised that there were enough of 
them who would “be glad to become your Tennants” and ensured the company that “we 
shall make it worth your Expences, as there is many new houses fitting up for Tennants”.
143
  
When builders or estate developers applied to have their new buildings supplied with 
water, the water companies often asked them to contribute to the costs of laying the pipes, 
as this new infrastructure would be of benefit to both. Having their new houses supplied 
with water was an advantage for the owner, who could then use it to advertise the 
premises.
144
 By the end of the century there were areas in which water supply was expected 
to be available in a new house, and this placed the water companies in a strong position to 
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negotiate a contribution from the developers.
145
 For example, when the proprietor of six 
houses near Old Palace Yard, Westminster, asked Chelsea Waterworks to supply these from 
their main in College Street, the company’s directors decided that this would mainly be for 
the benefit of the owner, and not for the company. Consequently, the proprietor had to pay 
for the construction of a new service pipe from College Street to Old Palace Yard.
146
  
By contrast, when the earning potential of a new area was large enough, the companies 
were more willing to make the investment. When the developer of houses in Mount Street 
and adjacent streets applied for Chelsea water, the company considered that this would 
benefit the company because the potential water-rent was more than the cost of the pipes, 
and accordingly the applicant was not asked to make a contribution. Still, the company tried 
to re-use old pipes where possible in order to lower the costs.
147
 In 1760, Chelsea 
Waterworks decided to extend its infrastructure north through the West End on its own 




If the earning potential of an area was high enough, developers were able to play 
multiple companies against each other. Mr Mallors, who was building houses in Great 
George Street, initially chose to take York Buildings water over Chelsea water as the former 
company had offered to contribute more towards the laying of the pipes. However, as 
Chelsea’s directors had estimated that this street would have a £100 per annum rent 
potential they sent a representative who was known to have some influence over Mallors to 
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 This seemed to have been a successful move: in 1761 Mr Mallors’ houses in 
Great George Street were mentioned as being supplied with Chelsea water, and he was 
negotiating with the company about supplying the rest of the street.
150
 An initial 
investment, therefore, could pay off as more tenants were expected as the area continued 
to expand.   
The main factors that companies took into consideration when deciding whether to 
invest in pipes included the distance from other available water sources as well as the likely 
affluence of the inhabitants. Both these issues were considered by Lambeth Waterworks 
when it started up business in 1782. At an initial meeting, the men who were to become the 
company’s directors weighed up the potential for commercial supply in south London by 
compiling two lists of streets. One contained the streets that were in want of water and 
included inhabitants that would be able to afford paying for it. The other one contained 
places that were so far away from the company that the inhabitants’ estimated contribution 
towards the cost of the infrastructure was so high that the company doubted they would 
agree to it. It also included streets that were so close to the river that people were likely to 
prefer to fetch their own supply.
151
 
This last issue played an important role in the companies’ decisions to extend the 
network or not: when alternative sources were available there was less reason to take up a 
commercial supply. When in 1794 Chelsea Waterworks looked into supplying the New Town 
near Queens Elm Turnpike (present Fulham), it was found that most people were supplied 
with rain and pumpwater, and in dry seasons they used the river. The directors calculated 
that only one in ten inhabitants would be willing to pay for Chelsea water, and this would 
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On a basic infrastructural level the water supply companies were very similar: they all 
used the same sort of pipes, had the same system of intermittent supply, and all had to 
manage their customer demands in terms of quantity, frequency, and quality. On a larger 
scale, however, there were significant differences between the companies. The trajectories 
they took were dependent on the complex interaction of several factors, including their 
spatial configurations, technological choices, and the motivations of specific individuals. The 
elevation of a company’s water intake point vis-a-vis its customer base determined the 
power the company had to generate in order to maintain sufficient pressure in the pipes to 
supply their customers. The way this power was generated depended on the options 
available to a company, but also on the decisions taken by its directors. 
Technological choices, and the timing of investment in innovations, proved vital for the 
companies. Those that supplied a customer base significantly higher than their intake points 
were the first to investigate new technologies, while others had been able to leave it until 
innovation made the investment in steam technology more cost-effective. But geographical 
constraint was not the only factor: an insufficient water supply became particularly evident 
in times of shortage, and periodic droughts in the early eighteenth century pushed the 
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companies, and others, to increase water supply in the West End, either by establishing new 
companies or through enlarging storage facilities. Similarly, climatic events proved the 
catalyst for Chelsea Waterworks to invest in steam technology in order to deal with its 
expanding customer base.  
Technological choices, and the spatial configurations they were based on, played an 
important part in the shaping of London’s water market. The New River Company, due to its 
favourable geographic location, was able to expand without having to risk investing in a 
water-raising engine, and this particularly advantageous position allowed them to become 
the city’s largest supplier. Other companies, such as York Buildings and London Bridge 
Waterworks, were forced to use the Thames and could not compete with the New River 
Company, as they would have to supply customers uphill. These companies had to find 
solutions to extend their networks, either by expanding across the river, as London Bridge 
Waterworks did, or by competing against their rivals. 
But even the companies that could expand towards London’s growing outskirts, such as 
Chelsea and Lambeth Waterworks, and the New River Company, had to make decisions 
whether to extend their network or not. The infrastructure of each of the companies, 
including their engines and pipes, was expensive, and directors had to decide if it was 
worthwhile to invest in an area, and whether the expenditure for the pipes was viable. The 
fact that the companies had to lay out physical networks before they could earn money 




Chapter 6. The water market: expansion, structure, and debate. 
 
The supply of urban utilities, such as water or gas, require large and costly grid-based 
systems of delivery.
1
 In the case of the water companies that supplied eighteenth-century 
London, these costs were substantial: the construction and maintenance of a system of 
reservoirs, pipes, and engines required raising a considerable capital to cover the initial 
outlays of their infrastructure. This capital represented a ‘sunk cost’: because of the nature 
of the undertaking, once resources had been spent on infrastructure they could not be 
recovered.
2
 Although piped water supply has the characteristics of a natural monopoly, 
throughout the eighteenth century many parts of London were supplied by several 
companies and the threat of competition was ever-present.
3
 For this reason, the companies 
sought to protect their investments by trying to limit the amount of competition that each 
faced within their own main area of supply. 
In order to limit competition, the water companies colluded in arrangements that 
prohibited them from undercutting each other in price, which had the result of keeping the 
price charged for water artificially high. This market structure influenced the relationship 
between suppliers and customers and, in addition, exposed the companies to political 
criticism.
4
 With the growing emphasis on market relations and the emergence of the public 
sphere in the second half of the eighteenth century, the question of monopoly versus 
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market pricing came to the fore and debate arose about the market structure, pricing, and 
quality of London’s water supply. The aim of this chapter is to explore these debates and to 
understand better the relationships between customers and the water companies. 
The reason why these issues became an important topic for public debate relate to the 
expansion of the commercial water market during the eighteenth century. With the decline 
of other sources of supply an increasing number of people became dependent on 
purchasing water from the water companies. As this chapter shows, by the end of the 
eighteenth century there were some parts of London in which over 80 per cent of houses 
were connected to a piped supply of water. For many, the decision to connect to the pipe 
network was a choice made from necessity, as the costs of obtaining water in other ways 
had risen over and above that charged by the water companies. Some of the opinions 
expressed in the public press articulated the concern that people were forced to pay what 
they could not actually afford, which focused attention on the price that the companies 
charged and the way the market was structured, a pertinent subject of discussion. 
This chapter explores the issues raised in the public sphere about the operation of the 
private companies. In order to do so, it firstly introduces the market forces that structured 
the eighteenth-century water market; secondly, it examines in closer detail the comments 
that this structure elicited. Next, to assess how many people were affected by the issues 
under discussion, the chapter sets out to establish the quantitative importance of the water 
market, both in term of numbers of customers as well as the price of water itself. Finally, it 
explores the changes the water market underwent as a result of the concerns raised and 




6.1. Buying water: the household economy and the water market. 
 
Access to certain resources, such as shelter, food, and fresh water, is a necessity for 
survival. However, the form in which these resources are provided depends on 
circumstances.
5
 As long as water could still be accessed in other ways, a commercial supply 
was a commodity rather than a necessity, and as such subject to economic decision making 
processes. There were several alternatives to purchasing water from commercial suppliers 
in eighteenth-century London. Those who lived close to the Thames or its tributaries could 
fetch water themselves, although access to the river was not always straightforward.
6
 
Rainwater could also be collected but depended on sufficient precipitation and was 
therefore an unreliable alternative source for a large population. Most parishes provided 
pumps where water, either provided by the companies or sourced from a spring or deep 
well, was freely available and supplied to local inhabitants as well as passers-by.
7
 However, 
these public supplies would have been insufficient to provide for everyone in the parish and 
fetching water from these sources often necessitated queuing for hours to obtain a supply.
8
  
Whether a household was willing to spend this time and effort on fetching water rather 
than buying it can be broken down as an economic decision. All households need to balance 
their allocation of productive resources, in other words, the time of its members. Whenever 
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possible, a household will forfeit money-income in order to obtain additional utility and 
subsequently can spend the time and resources gained by this expenditure on either labour 
(to gain additional income) or leisure activities.
9
 This transaction would only be favourable 
to the household if the time and effort to earn the part of money income that is spent on a 
service (in this case buying water) was less than the utility gained by the hours and industry 
not spent on producing it within the household (in this case fetching water). Therefore, in 
household economics, the decision to spend money on a service is dependent on several 
factors, including the household’s budget constraints, the price of the service, and the utility 
gained by the re-allocation of time and resources.
10
  
Whether utility can be gained by buying water or fetching it changes according to the 
wealth of the household and the price of a commercial water supply. Figure 6.1 shows a 
simple PQ diagram of the water market, in which P (price) represents the price charged for 
water, and Q (quantity) represents the number of households buying water. Demand curves 
A and B represent the level of demand at a certain price. Consider demand curve A: at the 
top end of the curve, with a high price, only a few households will decide that buying water 
is worth the luxury for them, while households with a lower income would be more likely to 
invest some of their time and effort in collecting water rather than forfeit precious money 
income. However, if the price of the water was to drop, there would be a point at which 
buying water would become more economical for them, and more households would 
decide to buy water.  
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Figure 6. 1. PQ diagram for the London 
Source: Stiglitz and Walsh (2006)
 
Alternatively, if the time and effort 
money to buy a water supply instead would free up those resources for the household to 
allocate to more productive uses. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the dual 
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companies gained more customers, and people were more willing to invest part of their 
income for a water supply.  
The decision to spend money income on water did not mean that the household could 
easily afford this, but rather, that it could afford even less to spend time to fetch water. For 
poorer households, the decision to buy water was only made if there was no real alternative 
to obtain it for free.
12
 For wealthier households, on the other hand, the decision to purchase 
water was more easily made, as they were giving up proportionally less of their income. 
Those at the higher end of the curve, who would have bought water even if it was very 
expensive, still bought it at the reduced price. The utility that they gained from this is 
represented by the consumer surplus — the area between the demand curve (the price at 
which consumers were willing to buy) and Px (the actual price). This surplus is higher for 
those near the top of the curve, as the difference between willingness and actual price is 
larger, while for those for whom buying water is only just affordable, the consumer surplus 
is very low — meaning that a small change in either price, income, or circumstances could 
lead a household to switch their supply.  
So how was the price level determined? Figure 6.2 depicts a simplified model of the 
water market. MC (marginal costs) depicts the cost for a company to provide a water 
supply. These costs start at a high level, as the companies had a large investment in their 
infrastructure, and then rise slowly as more households are added. The costs of adding extra 
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customers were relatively low, as the most expensive infrastructure (canals, reservoirs, 
water-raising technology) and the company’s running overheads (salaries of managers, 
collectors, and turncocks) would have been already in place. Ad
therefore cost the company only the expenses of the pipes to the new 
investment and, after this, raising slightly more water
here in a straight line.
13





Figure 6. 2. Market model. 
Source: Stiglitz and Walsh (2006)
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, therefore, provided 
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In a perfectly competitive market, the price of water to one household would equal the 
marginal production costs, in other words, this household’s share in paying-off the initial 
outlay (infrastructure, maintenance, and managerial overheads) plus the cost of supplying 
the household itself. This meant that the company would be reimbursed for the costs of 
supplying water, would pay all of its employees a salary, but would not run a profit. This is 
the cheapest price at which a water supply could be produced without the company making 
a loss, and in a perfectly competitive market, the price can be driven down to this level. In 
figure 6.2, this price level is represented by Pcomp.  
In a non-competitive market however, companies can establish a higher price, in figure 
6.2 depicted as Pmon.
15
 This higher price has several consequences. Firstly, the company 
makes a profit from the price difference between Pcomp and Pmon. Secondly, a part of the 
population that bought water at the lower Pcomp will no longer find it affordable to buy 
water at Pmon, and move to fetching water (the difference between Qmon and Qcomp). 
Thirdly, the consumer surplus for those that still buy water at Pmon decreases accordingly: 
while at Pcomp level the consumer surplus is the whole shaded area ABC, at Pmon the 
consumer surplus decreases to the smaller darker shaded triangle ADE. This implies that the 
whole area DEBC was lost to the water consumers as a result of the higher price. Part of this 
lost area, the square DEBF, is converted straight into profits for the company.
16
 It represents 
a profit solely due to a company’s power to set a monopoly price, without having to 
produce anything extra, and therefore means a loss to the water consumers, as they paid 
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the company for its profits without gaining any extra utility. The public’s interest was to 
ensure that the water price approximated the producer’s cost of supply, which would 
increase the consumer surplus.
17
 For a company to earn profits without an increase in 
benefit for the consumers (and indeed a loss, as for some the water had become 
unaffordable) was seen as unfair and unearned, and as a result, the Pmon was seen as an 
unfair price, as opposed to the lower Pcomp that allowed the companies just compensation 
for their work. As a result, it was this area, represented by DEBF, that came to be contested 
by people who agitated against the market structure that enabled the higher prices to be 
charged.  
A high price like the Pmon could not be kept up under competitive market circumstances, 
as competitors could undercut each other in order to gain new customers, which would 
eventually drive down the price to Pcomp. Monopolistic or oligopolistic market conditions 
were required to keep the price at a higher level. That this price was kept up (at close to the 
Pmon level) for most of the eighteenth century, is evident from the actions of the water 
companies. 
There were several strategies to ensure that high prices prevailed. Firstly, companies 
could collude to set the price together. This appeared to have been a common strategy in 
the eighteenth century, much in evidence in the coal trade where the ‘Limitation of the 
Vend’ operated, but evident in other activities as well.
18
 Arrangements of this nature drew 
comment from Adam Smith, who remarked that “people of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy 
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against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices”.
19
 Secondly, companies could act 
to prevent new entrants to the market by temporarily lowering prices in order to retain 
their market share. In this situation, unless backed by considerable reserves of capital, the 
high initial outlay on creating a new waterworks meant that newcomers would have found it 
difficult to make sufficient profits to make it worthwhile the risk and were discouraged from 
entering the market. Finally, companies could anticipate the actions of their rivals, and 
counter them with similar price increases and decreases, which would equally benefit all 
companies involved.
20
 At various times, the existing companies used all of these tactics to 
counter the threat of competition, both from new entrants to the market as well as from 
each other.   
The competitive pressures were greatest in those areas where multiple companies had 
pipes and where there was always the possibility of competition.
21
 One of the largest areas 
where this situation prevailed was the City of London, which was supplied both by the 
London Bridge Waterworks as well as the New River Company. In 1738 an agreement 
between the two noted that “it was judged highly proper and convenient and for the mutual 
advantage of each society” to avoid taking each other’s customers. This agreement also 
included a promise not to sabotage each other (“not to take ferules out of other mains or 
pipes and remove them”), not to take on customers until they had settled their arrears with 
the other company, nor to employ “false pretenses or clandestine means to be used to gain 
or persuade any to become tenants by underletting or otherwise”.
22
 While a customer could 
switch as long as they had paid their arrears, the agreement effectively prevented each 
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company from lowering its price as a way of enticing more customers to take up a supply. 
This contract was taken seriously and was binding. When in 1781 the managers of London 
Bridge Waterworks realised that a collector of the New River Company was taking over 
London Bridge customers by undercutting them in price, the contract was called in. In 
response, the New River Company’s directors instructed their collector not to offer lower 




Given the opportunity, customers in a position to switch suppliers could always apply to 
do so. However, when this occurred, the companies usually checked with their previous 
supplier, partly to ensure that the customer was not in arrears, in which case their custom 
would pose a risk to the new company, but also to prevent taking customers from each 
other without good reason. When in the early 1790s customers of York Buildings 
Waterworks applied to switch to the New River Company because they were unhappy with 
their water service in the Strand, rather than taking these on, the directors of the New River 
Company informed York Buildings of this issue.
24
 A year later it was reported back that York 
Buildings had improved their service and that customers on the Strand were now happy to 
remain there.
25
 In the same way, West Ham Waterworks warned the New River Company 
when some of its customers in Whitechapel had applied to switch to their supply.
26
 
This practice allowed companies to rectify causes for complaints, and the collaboration 
protected them against the loss of customers arising from unforeseen circumstances. When 
London Bridge Waterworks was damaged by a fire in 1779, the New River Company 
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informed its rival’s managers that it had received lots of applications from people wanting 
their water. As the New River Company’s directors, whose headquarters had burnt down a 
decade previously, were “by no means desirous of taking any advantage of the Misfortune 
that has happened to the work”, they enquired how to proceed with these applications.
27
 
London Bridge’s managers were grateful and sent them a list of customers who would have 
been affected by the fire. The New River Company did not take these people on, and 
London Bridge’s water supply was up and running again within a few weeks.
28
 A similar 
situation arose with the Shadwell Waterworks when London Bridge Waterworks’ pipes were 
frozen and the company could not supply sugar bakers in Well Close Square. Rather than 
taking over the customers, the Shadwell company supplied them until London Bridge 
Waterworks could do so again.
29
 Short term gain, in both cases, was set aside in favour of 
longer term arrangements that were considered to have been more important in preserving 
profits. 
In 1789, the New River Company decided to take on customers that came from another 
water company, but the reaction it received suggested that this action ran counter to the 
unwritten rules.
30
 The managers of Hampstead Waterworks, the previous supplier of the 
contested customers, complained to the New River Company as they believed that these 
customers had had no reason to abandon their Hampstead supply, but only wanted to move 
supplier because one of the landlords had been in a conflict with the company. The 
directors of the New River Company refused to let the new customers go and emphasised 
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 LMA/ACC/2558/LB/1/4 London Bridge Waterworks, minutes, 20 Feb. 1795. 
30
 There is no evidence of a contract between the New River Company and Hampstead Waterworks.     
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that they were paying the same price as they had previously paid to Hampstead.
31
 This 
implies that while the switching of these customers would have been a dubious practice in 
light of the companies’ good relations with each other, competing on price would have 
definitely gone against the nature of these relations.  
Whilst cooperation was a means of protecting profits, there were times when companies 
needed to raise prices, in which case they had to persuade their rivals to do likewise or face 
the prospect of competing with each other on price. This situation arose in 1783 between 
London Bridge Waterworks and the New River Company. London Bridge Waterworks 
decided to raise the water-rent of a sugarbaker in Queen Street from £10 to £14 per annum, 
as it believed they worked more pans and thus consumed more water than initially 
calculated. In response, however, the customer switched to the New River Company, which 
offered them an annual rent of £12. The justification the New River Company used for 
taking on the new customer was that because the company was actually offering a price 
above what the customer had previously paid for water, its actions could not be construed 
as undercutting London Bridge Waterworks.
32
 If there was no agreement between the 
companies, the potential for competition was far higher and profit margins became less 
secure as a result. On other occasions, therefore, companies raised prices together when 
one had the need to increase its charges. This situation arose in 1799 when the Borough 
Waterworks wanted to increase its rents in south London, but needed London Bridge 
Waterworks to do the same, and London Bridge’s managers decided to oblige in order to 
maintain the “harmony between the companies”.
33
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Under oligopolistic conditions, such as those discussed above, even though the cartel 
price was higher than a competitive price would be and companies could, if they wished, 
have lowered their prices and still make a profit, it was not in their interests to do so. 
However, whenever a new entrant to the market appeared, the situation could alter and 
competition could ensue. New entrants, keen to carve out a customer base from those 
supplied by the older companies, could benefit by acting competitively to attract new 
tenants.
34
 For example, when Chelsea Waterworks entered the West End market, its main 
competitor was the New River Company.
35
 During the late 1720s and 1730s these two 
companies competed to divide the West End market between them.  
It was not unusual for more than one company to operate in the same streets: in 1727 
the New River Company complained that the new Chelsea company was laying pipes over 
theirs.
36
 This gave consumers the option of playing off both companies against each other. 
In 1726, residents of St James Square were negotiating with both the New River Company as 
well as Chelsea Waterworks for cheaper rents. The Commission for Embellishing St James 
Square was planning a basin in the square, and Chelsea Waterworks negotiated to meet any 
deal they had with the New River Company and threw in the filling of the basin for free.
37
 
Eventually both companies supplied houses in this square and several years later, a resident 
named John Heathcote made a case to refuse to pay Chelsea Waterworks more than £4 per 
year as that was the price which the New River Company’s customers paid, and this had 
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encouraged some customers to switch. The Chelsea’s directors accepted that their 
customers could pay the same as their neighbours were charged by other companies, and 
lowered Heathcote’s price.
38
 Similarly, when Mr Jesse of Piccadilly had his rent doubled by 




After the 1730s, by which time the Chelsea Waterworks had managed to establish itself, 
examples of competition such as those mentioned above no longer appeared in the 
directors’ minutes, even though the company still supplied the same areas as the New River 
Company. While there is no evidence that a formal contract was made between the two 
companies, the directors of both realised that competing on price was not beneficial for 
business. However, in 1748 the York Buildings Company had recovered from its earlier 
financial troubles and, having no other way to expand, it started to encroach on streets in 
Westminster which had been supplied by Chelsea Waterworks, offering a price of four 
shillings in the pound less than its competitor. At a meeting of Chelsea Waterworks’ 
directors, it was reported that many people were switching suppliers, a situation that 
caused some alarm, as it was estimated that the company had already lost an income of 
£140 as a result. In response, the directors thought it prudent to lower their price rather 
than risk losing customers and decided to charge the same as York Buildings Waterworks.
40
 
By doing this, neither company gained any significant number of new customers, and both 
decreased their profit margin. This case shows how competition could be beneficial for the 
customers, as they were charged the lower Pcomp, which came at a cost to the companies. 
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As a result, this period of competition was relatively short-lived and in 1760 York 
Buildings informed Chelsea that it was reverting its charges back to the original price. 
Perhaps with some relief, the Chelsea directors followed suit saying they “won’t charge 
houses any less rent” than their competitors.
41
 While the competition might have allowed 
customers to reduce their expenses for a while, competing on price was in neither of the 
companies’ interest and by 1776 there was talk between the companies of making a similar 




The introduction of other new companies in the 1740s elsewhere in the city created 
similar kinds of disruption to the existing arrangements. In east London, the newly formed 
West Ham Waterworks, established in 1743, encroached on the area supplied by Shadwell 
Waterworks, the directors of which had sought to prevent the newcomer from becoming 
established. However, once formed, both companies realised that it was in neither’s benefit 
to compete and, eventually, they agreed to demarcate areas of supply.
43
 The deed that 
settled this arrangement dates from 1785, although it stated that the agreement had been 
in place for a while. In the deed, Shadwell Waterworks agreed to buy all West Ham’s pipes 
in the lower district over a period of five years, and for at least the first year it had to 
reimburse West Ham Waterworks for the expenses of coals and the turncock used for the 
supply of this area. As there was no similar arrangement north of the demarcation line, the 
deed suggests that Shadwell simply bought out West Ham Waterworks in the lower district 
in order to become the monopoly supplier in the area.
44
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Similar sets of concerns motivated arrangements south of the river, where there was 
opposition to the Lambeth Waterworks which started up in 1785. London Bridge 
Waterworks managed to get a clause in the new company’s Act of Parliament that 
prevented it from laying pipes in paved streets in the borough of Southwark, which 
essentially were those streets that London Bridge Waterworks already supplied.
45
 Both in 
the east as well as in the south, therefore, by the end of the eighteenth century effective 
spatial monopolies had been set up, in which companies could set a higher price than would 
otherwise have been the case under more competitive arrangements. In the early 
nineteenth century the rest of London would follow this pattern as well. 
For most of the eighteenth century, however, even in the areas where multiple 
companies supplied, the price was artificially kept high in an oligopoly price, through 
agreements and collaboration between the companies. These practices meant that for long 
periods during the eighteenth century the consumer surplus was reduced, and part of what 
customers paid were straight profits for the companies. This situation, in turn, stimulated a 
growing volume of public debate about what was a fair price, what should be the water 
market structure and what was the position of the companies.  
 
 
6.2. Published opinions on the water market. 
 
In 1790 John Robins, an inhabitant of Ratcliffe, published the pamphlet ‘A bone to pick - 
recommended to the several water Companies of this metropolis; or a check to Avarice, 
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 His argument was especially directed towards the proprietors of 
Shadwell Waterworks who, as he claimed, had exhibited “arbitrary and insolent behaviour 
to their customers (...) enforcing compliance to their unreasonable and unjustifiable 
demands”.
47
 By means of a “Diabolical Combination” this company had been able to make 
their customers pay whichever price it imposed on them, which Robins objected to.
48
 He 
presented his own case as an example: as a customer of Shadwell Waterworks, he had been 
subjected to several price increases for his water; in 1772 he paid 10s per year, which in 
1777 went up to 14s, and by midsummer 1778 to 15s.
49
 Robins attributed these increases to 
the understanding between Shadwell and West Ham Waterworks, noting: “this is the 
blessed effect of monopoly”.
50
  
Robins paid the increased price without complaints. However, in 1785 the company 
raised his water-rent again, to 18s, which the company justified on account of “Expenses & 
Losses”.
51
 This time, Robins refused to pay the new and higher price and decided to 
continue paying at the level of his old rate.
52
 In response, Shadwell Waterworks summonsed 
him for non-payment. The reasons that Robins stated in court for his refusal to pay, as well 
as in the pamphlet, reveal his concerns about the water companies’ monopoly. He explained 
that though he thought it reasonable that the proprietors could derive an income from their 
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works, not only to pay their employees and keep the infrastructure in good repair but also 
as an interest for their investment, it seemed to him that their income exceeded this.
53
 He 
refused to pay the new increased price, as he thought it was “arbitrary” and would add too 
much to the company’s profits, which he considered “very excessive”.
54
 He decided to 




The court, however, ordered Robins to pay the full price. As he still refused, the company 
cut off his supply in 1788, after which Robins had to rely on fetching water from the 
Thames.
56
 The decreased customer surplus under monopoly pricing is exemplified by John 
Robins’ decision to fetch water from the Thames rather than pay the increased charge. 
While he had been happy to invest household money in a water supply up to a certain point, 
as its price increased while utility gained from the service remained the same, he had 
reached the point at which he would rather fetch water from the Thames than pay over the 
production price to Shadwell Waterworks. 
While John Robins lived near the Thames and fetching water did not mean too much of a 
loss of household resources, not everyone had this opportunity. Two authors who published 
letters in the Morning Post sixteen years previously addressed the effects the market 
structure had on areas where people had no alternative to paying whatever the companies 
charged. In December 1775 a letter appeared in the Morning Post written by ‘Curtius’, who 
addressed the water supply of Westminster.
57
 He questioned “what other alternative the 
poor or rich on the upper side of Westminster-bridge have, than that of paying whatever 
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[Chelsea Waterworks] chuse arbitrarily to fix, or else be necessitated to go to the Thames at 
high water for their supply”.
58
 While people could still go to the river for a supply, there 
were few other options: “Are not the greatest part of the common pumps destroyed, which 
renders the oppression on the poor effectual? (...) how many poor people are compelled to 
pay, whose back and bellies cannot spare it without being pinched?”
 59
 Because the lack of 
other ways to source water, a company supply had become a necessity rather than a luxury, 
which made the market structure’s effects on the poorer households especially a cause for 
concern. 
Another author, signed ‘Aquae Vindex’, wrote to the same paper setting out similar 
concerns about the price that the poor were forced to pay, as there was not enough water 
freely available.
60
 This writer saw the commercial water supply solely as a luxury and 
believed that no one should be compelled to pay for water except “the conveniency of 
having it conveyed into their houses”.
61
 As he recognised that this provision entailed 
expense, he was happy for the companies to exist and even run at a profit, but he also 
insisted that “water ought to be free to all, who will take the pain to fetch it! — None ought 
to be compelled to have the water laid in”.
62
 In other words, whilst the conveyance of water 
to homes was considered a legitimate service that consumers could choose to purchase, the 
actual supply of water at its source should remain freely available, leaving households to 
choose whether or not to invest their resources in fetching it or having it brought to their 
homes through the piped network.  
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 Aquae Vindex, letter in Morning Post and Daily Advertiser, 14 Dec. 1775. 
61





Both Aquae Vindex and Curtius attacked the companies because the way they managed 
their water gave them the power to decide who was able to access it. Aquae Vindex called 
the directors of these companies “covetous, mercenary men”, who monopolised and 
dominated the inhabitants through the prices they set, and cut off those who could not 
pay.
63
 He accused the companies of withholding their water, as they “lock the water at 
every corner of the street”, and prosecuted people who shared their (bought) water with 
the poor.
64
 Curtius described the supply of lower Westminster as a “matter of acquatic 
tyranny” and complained that “the managers of the Chelsea water-works, or their agents, 
sensible that there is no alternative, upon the least altercation relative to charges, will tell 





6.3. London’s water market: extent. 
 
The concerns expressed by Aquae Vindex and Curtius reflected the fact that people were 
increasingly forced to buy water only because there were no adequate alternatives. 
Considering the size of the water market by the end of the eighteenth century, this seems to 
have been a valid concern. An assessment of the number of people and the kind of houses 
supplied by the companies suggest that a piped water supply was not just a luxury for the 
wealthy, but a common occurrence for large numbers of houses and inhabitants in 
eighteenth-century London. 
                                                           
63
 Aquae Vindex, letter in Morning Post and Daily Advertiser, 14 Dec. 1775. 
64
 Ibid. This is likely to be a reference to the practice of making tenants lock up access to their cisterns, so they 
could not share with others, as discussed in chapter 5. 
65
 Curtius, letter in Morning Post and Daily Advertiser, 15 Dec. 1775. 
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Estimating the size of the eighteenth-century London water market is difficult because 
many of the companies’ early customer records have not survived. However, piecing 
together information from a variety of sources, it is possible to make an approximate 
estimate of the extent to which a commercial water supply was provided to the population. 
At the start of the century most of the waterworks were still rather small concerns, with a 
few thousand local customers at the most. For some companies lists of tenants have 
survived. In the western part of the metropolis, Hyde Park Waterworks supplied 
approximately 500 houses in 1678, while Millbank Waterworks supplied 1,250 in 1715.
66
 In 
the east, Shadwell Waterworks had around 1,300 customers in 1720.
67
 Audits of the New 
River Company, which by then still mainly supplied the City, suggested that in 1684 it had 
roughly 3,000 tenants.
68
 Only rough estimates can be made for the remaining companies, 
York Buildings, Marchant’s, and London Bridge Waterworks, but they were unlikely to have 
supplied more than a couple of thousand of houses each. Tax records from 1677 indicate 
that market penetration in the City of London, which was supplied by London Bridge, 
Broken Wharf, and the New River Company combined, varied between 30 per cent of 
houses in the poorer wards to no more than 60 per cent in the more affluent wards.
69
  
A very different picture emerges at the end of the eighteenth century. In a 1821 
Parliamentary enquiry on London’s water supply, the companies north of the river had been 
asked to submit to a Select Committee, amongst other records, the number of houses they 
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supplied at various points in time.
70
 The furthest back this information went was 1804. In 
that year, the New River Company supplied 54,681 houses, York Buildings Waterworks 
2,089 buildings, while Chelsea Waterworks supplied a total of 8,330 dwellings, and 94 ‘other 
buildings’.
71
 The size of the other companies at the turn of the century has to be estimated 
as only later figures are available. London Bridge Waterworks reported that over 10,000 
houses were supplied in 1810, 60 per cent of which were north of the river Thames.
72
 The 
company’s expansion strategy at the time had been focused on the south, and assuming 
that it had indeed been expanding between 1804 and 1810, the number of customers in the 
City can be roughly estimated at about 5,000.
73
   
Farther east, the East London Waterworks bought both Shadwell and West Ham 
Waterworks in 1808, at which time Shadwell supplied 8,000 houses and an unquantified 
number of industries, while West Ham supplied 2,250 houses.
74
 It has been suggested that 
between 1804 and 1809 about 1,500 customers were displaced by the construction of the 
London Docks, which would have especially affected Shadwell Waterworks.
75
 However, East 
London Waterworks’ engineer reported in 1808 that Shadwell Waterworks was supplying at 
the full capacity of its powers and could not expand, so it is not clear how it could have 
supplied an extra 1,500 houses only four years previously.
76
 While for table 6.1 and the 
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following calculations the 8,000 number has been accepted, it should be noted that there is 
a possibility that the number of houses supplied in east London was even greater.  
 
Table 6. 1. Estimation of houses supplied in 1804. 
Company Estimated houses supplied in 1804
New River Company 54,681
Chelsea Waterworks 8,330
York Buildings Waterworks 2,089
London Bridge Waterworks 5,000
Shadwell Waterworks 8,000
West Ham Waterworks 2,250
Total 80,350  
Source: Select Committee, PP 1821 (706); East London Waterworks minutes, 
LMA/ACC/2558/EL/A/1/2, 17 March 1808. 
 
Adding up these numbers makes a grand total of over 80,000 houses north of the river 
supplied with commercial water at the start of the nineteenth century (see table 6.1).
77
 This 
was quite a large proportion: an estimate of the number of houses in 1804 based on the 
1801 and 1811 censuses shows that (including uninhabited houses) there were about 
105,000 houses in the area that these companies could have covered.
78
 Thus, overall, 
approximately three-quarters of houses in this area received commercial water by the end 
of the eighteenth century.  
These numbers mean that over the course of the eighteenth century the companies 
dramatically expanded their supply. Further evidence for this can be found in the records of 
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the New River Company, for which detailed customer information is available based on half-
yearly water-rents paid in 1769.
79
 Over 26,000 people paid rent to the company in that year, 
but this did not equal the number of houses supplied. Landlords ‘farmed out’ water-rents by 
paying the company for multiple houses whether these were inhabited or not, and then 
charging the tenants for water, usually included in the rent. This was a common practice 
across all companies.
80
 It is therefore difficult to ascertain the number of houses that the 
New River Company supplied in 1769 but, fortunately, the number of tenants in 1804 is 
available: 38,403 (see table 6.2). In terms of water-tenants the company’s growth between 
1769 and 1804 is therefore clear: over 12,000 tenants were added in these 35 years. 
Compared with the 3,000 customers the company had supplied 100 years previously, these 
numbers indicate that during the eighteenth century the New River Company had been 
constantly and steadily expanding its market.  
In terms of geography, the New River Company’s reach in 1769 is shown in figure 6.3.  
The map depicts the area that the company supplied, with each circle representing a street 
in which the company’s tenants lived. This figure has been based on the addresses of those 
who paid for the water, and in certain areas this differed from those who actually received 
it. As the 1804 data in table 6.2 show, the number of houses per tenant varied distinctively 
between the collection districts.
81
 Most water-tenants in the western districts, for example 
the Portland and Marylebone collections, only paid for their own house, while those in the 
east of the capital averaged two or more houses as a result of the farming out of water-
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 LMA/ACC/2558/NR/12/1 New River Company, rent book, 1769. 
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 While the number of houses per tenant is not available for 1769, it can be assumed 
that similar ratios occurred. This has implications for the map shown in figure 6.3: while the 
western part accurately represents the streets in which the New River Company not only 
had tenants, but also actually supplied, in the eastern part of the map, the streets in which 
the company supplied is under-represented, as the data only shows those users who paid 
directly to the company.    
 
Table 6. 2. New River Company number of tenants and houses, 1769 and 1804.  
1769 1804
Districts Tenants Districts Tenants Houses Houses/tenant
Berwick Street 2,053 Portland 2,940 3,030 1.03
Marylebone 2,227 Marylebone 3,675 3,723 1.01
Pall Mall 2,228 St James 2,464 2,576 1.05
Maiden Lane 2,156 Covent Garden 2,242 2,612 1.17
Soho 2,386 2,591 1.09
Drake Street 1,925 Bloomsbury 3,292 3,768 1.14
Holborn 1,612 Holborn 2,011 3,241 1.61
Fleet Street 2,273 Fleet Street 1,918 2,170 1.13
Red Lyon 2,337 Clerkenwell 2,461 4,312 1.75
Ludgate 1,644 St Pauls 1,903 2,278 1.20
Moorgate 1 1,451 Islington 3,090 4,727 1.53
Moorgate 2 1,090 Moorfields 2,436 5,160 2.12
Leadenhall 1,759 Cornhill 2,302 2,954 1.28
Spitalfields 1,806 Shoreditch 2,768 5,545 2.00
Whitechapel 1,635 Whitechapel 2,366 5,890 2.49
River Bank 149 104 0.70
Total 26,197 38,403 54,681 1.42  
Source: Select Committee, PP 1821 (706), p. 207; New River Company, 1769 rent book, 
LMA/ACC/2558/NR/12/1. 
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Figure 6. 3. Distribution of New River Company’s tenants in 1769. 
       
Source: New River Company, 1769 rent book, LMA/ACC/2558/NR/12/1. Base-map is the Stockdale map of 1797. 
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Still, the figure shows that the New River Company had an enormous spread over north 
London, at quite a distance from the reservoir at the New River Head from where the water 
was pumped into the mains. The network also reached into the areas that other waterworks 
supplied: there were New River customers in streets near the Thames in the City, supplied 
by London Bridge Waterworks, as well as near the intake of York Buildings and the 
reservoirs of Chelsea Waterworks.  
For Chelsea Waterworks, more detailed information is available as well. This company 
recorded its number of customers on a parish level and these can be compared against the 
census. The company’s market penetration of the parishes it supplied is shown in table 6.3 
and figure 6.4. As the census only counted residential property, this table is based on the 
number of domestic customers only.  
 
Table 6. 3. Buildings supplied by Chelsea Waterworks in 1804.  
Parish Dwelling houses supplied Estimated number of houses† % supplied
St Margaret and St John 3,021 3,711 81
St George Hanover 3,134 4,416 71
St Luke Chelsea 764 1,873 41
St Mary Kensington 386 1,394 28
St James 398 3,366 12
St Marylebone 564 7,469 8
St Martin in the Fields 63 2,796 2
Total 8,330 25,024 33
 
† Estimated number of houses in 1804 is based on the 1801 census + 3/10ths of the difference between the 
1801 and 1811 censuses. 
 
Sources: Select Committee, PP 1821 (706), p. 215; Census enumeration abstracts for 




Figure 6. 4. Percentage of buildings supplied by Chelsea Waterworks in 1804.  
 
Sources: as table 6.3. Base-map is Stockdale. 
 
While Chelsea Waterworks supplied over one-third of all houses in the area in which it 
had pipes, its market penetration varied greatly by parish. Those parishes closest to the 
company’s reservoirs, which were St Margaret and St John, and St George Hanover Square, 
showed the highest percentages of houses taking up Chelsea water. Three-quarters of the 
company’s customers could be found in these parishes and the company supplied over 70 
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per cent of all houses there. Lower percentages occurred in parishes farther away, such as 
Marylebone, which was mainly supplied by the New River Company at the time, and St 
Martin-in-the-Fields, which it shared with both the New River Company as well as York 
Buildings Waterworks. While in Chelsea and Kensington Chelsea Waterworks was the only 
commercial water supplier at this time, the lower percentages there are explained by the 
fact that these parishes were quite large, and the network had yet to extend across the 
entire locality.  
The market penetration of St Margaret and St John parish (81 per cent) shows the large 
proportion of people purchasing commercial water there. It is very likely that a similar 
percentage would have received a commercial supply in St George Hanover Square, as the 
New River Company supplied there as well (compare figures 6.3 and 6.4). Based on the New 
River Company’s 1769 customer numbers, there were another 831 tenants supplied in this 
parish (660 from the Marylebone district, and 171 from the Pall Mall district). Assuming that 
this level of supply stayed constant in the intervening 35 years — it is more likely to have 
gone up — a total of 3,965 houses were supplied in St George Hanover Square by Chelsea 
Waterworks and the New River Company combined, meaning that almost 90 per cent of 
houses in this area received a commercial water supply.
83
  
Written accounts corroborate the extent to which London was supplied with 
commercially sourced water. An anonymous author in the Gazetteer and New Daily 
Advertiser in 1772 emphasised the spread of the supply, claiming that there was “no part of 
Westminster and its liberties, but is, or can be served by the Chelsea Water-works, or the 
                                                           
83
 Unfortunately, a similar analysis for the Marylebone, St James, and St Martin parishes is unreliable as a 
result of the expansion of buildings in Marylebone between 1769 and 1804 and the presence of York Buildings 
Waterworks in the St James and St Martin parishes. 
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York-building Water-works, or the New-river Company.”
84
 The City of London was described 
to be “well supplied” by the New River Company and London Bridge Waterworks, “which 
together serve the city, and as far Eastward beyond the liberties thereof, as (...) the London-
hospital, in Whitechapel road.”
85
 The houses east of this road “are or may be well supplied 
with water” by West Ham Waterworks, while Shadwell Waterworks supplied “from 
Limehouse-bridge in the East, through Ratcliff, Shadwell, Wapping, Hermitage, Ratcliff-
highway, East Smithfield, and Rosemary-lane.”
86
 Tobias Smolett’s 1771 novel The Expedition 
of Humphry Clinker also mentions the city’s commercial water supply, although its main 
character, Matthew Bramble, was not very complimentary of the quality of the water, 
describing the New River Company’s supply as “maukish”, and Thames water as 
“impregnated with all the filth of London and Westminster”.
87
  
Contemporary travel writers also pointed out how well the city was supplied with water. 
As early as 1726 the Swiss visitor César de Saussure was shocked by the amount of water 
supplied and used by London households, although he expressed surprise that not many 
people, including the poor, drank it.
88
 Two separate visitor accounts around 1770 
mentioned that “all the houses in London” were supplied with water from either the 
Thames or the New River.
89
 In similar fashion, J.W. von Archenholz wrote in 1797 that 
“every house in that immense city” was provided with water.
90
 While evidently not every 
single house was supplied with water, it seems that the more affluent houses, which these 
visitors were more likely to frequent, tended to have a commercial water supply.  
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South London, meanwhile, was markedly less well supplied. At an internal board 
meeting, Lambeth Waterworks reported in 1797 that its mains supplied more than 3,000 
houses dispersed over two miles in length and one-and-a-half miles in breadth, roughly 
from Vauxhall to Maiden Lane in Southwark, and between Walworth and Kent Road. 
According to their estimates, not more than half the houses that the mains passed by were 
supplied with water.
91
 London Bridge Waterworks had another estimated 4,000 customers 
in Southwark, where the smaller Borough Waterworks supplied as well. Unfortunately there 
are no further details available for these companies around this time as the 1821 Select 
Committee did not examine the water companies south of the Thames. 
 
  
6.4. London’s water market: price. 
 
The evidence outlined above, as well as written accounts by visitors to the city, testify 
that over the course of the eighteenth century London’s water market had expanded to 
supply the majority of houses in the capital. This begs the question of how so many people, 
including those lower down the economic hierarchy, could afford to purchase piped water. 
Estimating the prices paid for piped water in London relies on piecing together evidence 
from a diverse range of sources. However, it appears that the cost remained relatively 
constant over the course of the eighteenth century. One of the earliest sources available is 
Edward Hatton’s 1708 account of London, in which he reported that the city’s various 
companies supplied at an average annual price of around 20s.
92
 There were variations 
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between the companies: the New River Company was slightly more expensive and sold 
water at no less than 22s 8d per year, while others, such as Millbank Waterworks, supplied 
customers from 10s and upwards.
93
 A century later, prices had risen only slightly: figures for 
1804 suggest an average of 23s for New River customers, while Chelsea Waterworks’ water 
cost on average 24s per year for domestic houses.
94
 Rates in east London were cheaper at 
an average 18s per year.
95
  
Often, accounts of London’s water market have mainly been concerned with the average 
price a company charged.
96
 However, prices varied considerably and therefore averages can 
be misleading. Generally, the water-rent was not determined by usage but was calculated as 
a fixed rate, which was largely a pragmatic response to the fact that the companies had no 
way of monitoring the flow of water other than the amount of time the mains were 
switched on. Charges were therefore based on an estimation of water usage, which 
depended on the size of a house as well as the water-consuming activities that took place in 
a building, including trades, water closets, fountains, and watering of animals. 
The highest paying customers were all industrial users. Table 6.4 shows all customers 
who paid over £30 a year to the New River Company in 1769, and of those that could be 
identified, all but one were the owners of breweries. There were only a few of these high-
charge payers, but as a group they significantly affected the overall average water price. 
Figure 6.5 shows a Lorenz curve based on all the New River Company’s customers in 1769. 
This curve is sharply skewed at the upper end, which represents this small group of 
customers that contributed disproportionally to the company’s income from water-rents. 
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Twenty per cent of the New River Company’s water-rent income that year was generated by 
only five per cent of customers — most of whom were probably industrial users.   
 
Table 6. 4. Highest-paying customers of the New River Company in 1769.  
Annual water-rent in £ District Street Customer Business
90 Maiden Lane Castle Street Gyfford & Co Brewer
84 Moorgate 1 Chiswell Samuel Whitbread Brewer
84 Whitechapel Brick Lane Truman & Baker Brewer
80 Moorgate Red Cross Calvert & Co Brewer
55 Drake Street Hyde Street Robert Hucks Brewer
38 Red Lyon St John Street Wilks & Raw Not known
38 Spitalfields White Lyon Street Thornton Brewer
37 Red Lyon Smithsfield St Bart's Hospital Hospital
35 Moorgate 2 Old Street Cokar & Co Brewer
32 Maiden Lane St Giles Mason & Co Not known
30 Moorgate 2 Golden Lane Dickinson & Co Brewer
30 Red Lyon Long Lane Sam Hawkins Brewer
30 Red Lyon St John Street Dickinson Brewer
30 Whitechapel Nightingale Allen & Ambrose Brewer
Source: New River Company, 1769 rent book, LMA/ACC/2558/NR/12/1. 
 
Figure 6. 5. Lorenz curve for New River Company’s 1769 income from water-rents. 
 
Source: New River Company, 1769 rent book, LMA/ACC/2558/NR/12/1. 
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A similar income structure can be found for the other companies. Chelsea Waterworks 
provided the 1821 Select Committee with its 1804 income breakdown in three categories of 
customers: domestic, public buildings and trades/manufacturing. Assuming that ‘dwelling 
houses’ equalled domestic water and ‘other buildings’ included both the public buildings 
and industries, table 6.5 shows that 94 buildings, which constituted only one per cent of 
their total customers, provided eleven per cent of Chelsea Waterworks’ income from water-
rents that year.
97
 The evidence therefore suggests that a company’s overall average charge 
overestimates what most domestic customers would have paid.  
 
Table 6. 5. Chelsea Waterworks' income and customer breakdown, 1804.  
Income from £ Customers % all customers
Domestic water 10,028 8,330 dwelling houses 99
Public buildings 908 8
Trades/manufacturers 284 3
Total 1,192 8,424 100





Source: Select Committee, PP 1821 (706), pp. 215, 220. 
 
Given these differences, how were domestic prices calculated? Chelsea Waterworks 
initially based its water price on the amount of the poor-rate, but also stated that it was 
open to negotiation.
98
 By 1810 the company had a systematic price plan for several classes 
of houses: the cheapest class was houses (“or sheds”) with one to three rooms, which were 
charged 8s (for one room) to 12s (three rooms) per year.
99
 Larger houses were based on 
surface area. The second class of houses for example, which contained those which had 250 
to 400 superficial feet, were charged at ⅔d per square foot. Ten per cent was added or 
deducted if the house was more or less than three storeys, or, intriguingly, in a “good or 
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inferior neighbourhood”. If the customer needed water for their garden another 2s to 5s 
were added to the price.
100
 The larger the house, the higher was the water-rent: the eighth 
class of houses, which were those with a ground plan of over 1,900 square feet, were 
charged 1d per square foot. Extras, such as coach-houses or stables, came at an additional 
8s to 12s a year.
101
 The other companies probably had similar pricing structures; while such 
detailed information is not available for the New River Company, this company’s engineer 
testified in 1821 that their rates were generally calculated based on the size of the house.
102
 
The variety of factors involved in determining the annual price — rooms, surface, storeys, 
neighbourhood, extras — resulted in a huge variety of prices, even within the same street. A 
breakdown of Chelsea Waterworks’ rents from 1804, and New River Company rents from 
1769, as shown in table 6.6, demonstrates how diverse the price and therefore the 
customer base really was.
103
 While the largest category of customers of both companies 
paid between 20 and 29s, there were also significant numbers that paid less. Indeed, ten per 
cent of Chelsea’s customers paid 10s or less a year, which, based on the 1810 classification, 
means that they lived in small houses with one or two rooms. The New River Company also 
had customers paying only 8s or even 6s a year, mostly in the poorer collection districts of 
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Table 6. 6. Price breakdown for Chelsea Waterworks (1804) and New River Company (1769).  
Annual rent (shilling/year) N % N %
<10 156 1 832 10
10-19 4,145 16 2,082 25
20-29 16,493 63 3,507 42
30-59 3,818 14 1,299 16
>60 1,585 6 610 7
Total 26,197 100 8,330 100
New River Company 1769 Chelsea Waterworks 1804
 
N = number of tenants (New River Company) or houses (Chelsea Waterworks), % = 
percentage of total. Source: Select Committee, PP 1821 (706), p. 215; New River Company, 
1769 rent book, LMA/ACC/2558/NR/12/1. 
 
Figure 6. 6. Chelsea Waterworks' 1804 water-rents for dwelling houses, breakdown by 
parish, in shilling per year.  
 
Source: Select Committee, PP 1821 (706), p. 215. 
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Figure 6.6 shows a water-rent breakdown by parish for Chelsea Waterworks’ 1804 
customers. Focusing on the parishes with the highest supply, the difference in price 
structure is striking. The parish of St George Hanover Square contained almost 400 
customers who paid over 60s for their water. This area formed part of the wealthy West End 
and contained some of the most expensive houses in town at this time, with those on St 
James Square costing between £200-350 to rent annually.
104
 The parishes of St Margaret 
and St John on the other hand, a poorer area with lower quality housing, included many 
more houses with cheap rents.
105
 Over half the people paying for water in these parishes 
paid less than 20s per year, with 608 people paying less than 10s.    
Variations like these occurred across the capital, and the New River Company’s 1769 
water-rent book allows for a London-wide analysis of water prices.
106
 Table 6.7 shows the 
difference tenants paid in east London (based on the Spitalfields and Whitechapel collection 
districts) and in west London (based on Marylebone and Berwick). Almost half of the 
company’s customers in the eastern collections districts paid less than 20s, as opposed to 
only seven per cent in west London. Tenants in the western districts fell mostly in the 20s to 
60s range. But these numbers do not tell the whole story, as they represent what the 
company received from its tenants, rather than what was charged per house. As rents in 
east London were often farmed out, some of the more expensive rents paid in the east 
would have been subdivided in cheaper rents for the actual users of the water, meaning 
that, in reality, the number of people paying less than 20s would have been larger.  
In addition to the larger number of cheap water-rents, the east London districts also 
showed a larger proportion of the most expensive rents: over 60s a year. This is a result of a 
                                                           
104
 Rudé, G., Hanoverian London, 1714-1808 (London, Secker and Warburg, 1971), pp. 45-6. 
105
 Guillery, P., The small house in eighteenth-century London (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004), p. 26. 
106
 LMA/ACC/2558/NR/12/1 New River Company, rent book, 1769. 
 210 
 
greater number of industrial water consumers in this area, such as the Truman Brewery, 
which paid £84 a year. These high-rent payers skewed the average charge so much that 
while the average water-rent in both areas was 29s, in the eastern districts the median rent 
was 20s, while in the western ones it was 24s.  
 
Table 6. 7. Breakdown of the New River Company’s prices in the west and east, in shilling per 
year, 1769.  
Shilling/year N % N %
< 10 7 0 70 2
10-19 292 7 1,491 43
20-29 2,698 63 1,149 34
30-59 1,020 24 417 12
>60 263 6 314 9
Total 4,280 100 3,441 100
West East
 
N = number of tenants, % = percentage of total. West is based on Marylebone and Berwick 
Street collection districts. East is based on Spitalfields and Whitechapel collection districts. 
Source: New River Company, 1769 rent book, LMA/ACC/2558/NR/12/1.  
 
As a result of this variation in rents, using the median rather than the average water-rent 
provides a better picture of the geography of the New River Company’s water pricing in the 
city.  Figure 6.7 shows the median annual price people paid by street in three tiers: 10-19s, 
20-29s, and over 30s per year. The overall median rent for the whole company was 24s, and 
most streets throughout London fell in the 20-29s range. Higher median annual rents 
occurred mainly in the West End and Bloomsbury area, while cheaper water, for less than 
20s a year, could mainly be found in the east, suggesting a correlation between water prices 
and the overall prosperity of the area.
107
 There were notable exceptions to this: a 
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concentration of higher rents near Spitalfields reflects a mixture of the remaining Huguenot 
weavers, industrial customers, as well as builders who paid for a large number of houses 
and farmed them out. Streets with cheap rents could also be found dotted throughout the 
West End. These were often yards, passages, or courts located off the squares and stately 
streets. The dependency of West End’s wealthier inhabitants on an army of labourers, 
servants, grooms, washerwomen, and craftsmen was so great that even in the most 
fashionable neighbourhoods there were buildings designed for the ‘lower classes’, with 




Figure 6. 7. New River Company median water price by street, 1769.  
 
Source: New River Company, 1769 rent book, LMA/ACC/2558/NR/12/1. Base-map is 
Stockdale. 
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Figure 6.7 shows that the water-rent distribution was predominantly decided on house 
price: richer areas had higher median rents, and the poorer areas lower. While at the 1821 
Select Committee hearings the officials of several companies stated that the price was partly 
based on the length of pipes and level of the ground — which means, essentially, the cost of 
supplying — it was also noted that this was applied very haphazardly.
109
 This is brought out 
by the evidence: figure 6.7 shows areas nearest to the New River Head with average rather 
than low prices, while areas where some of the cheapest prices could be found were at a 
similar distance to some of the highest ones on the other side of town. Most importantly, 
proximity to other waterworks did not lower the price either. In fact, some of the areas 
where the highest prices were charged were also covered by Chelsea and York Buildings 
Waterworks, and the water-rents in the collection district of Leadenhall, which covered the 
City and thus the main area that London Bridge Waterworks supplied, were similar as to 
those around Clerkenwell, where the New River Company was the only supplier. This lack of 
variation in price where other suppliers were present is indicative of a market oligopoly, in 
which prices could be set at a higher level than it could have been if the companies 
competed. The pricing structure, therefore, was determined less by market forces than by 
the combinations made by the companies in order to reduce competition.  
The proportion of people supplied with water, as well as the spread in prices, makes it 
clear that piped water was not just a luxury for the wealthy, but was also provided for other, 
less affluent groups in the city.  The people of St Margaret and St John who were supplied by 
Chelsea Waterworks for 10s a year lived in one- or two-room houses. Even the slightly more 
expensive rents were for houses measuring 250 to 400 square feet, which would have 
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equalled the living space for an artisan family.
110
 This was the area that Curtius referred to 
as he expressed his concerns for the poor whose bellies could not be spared to buy water.  
 
 
6.5. New entrants and support for competition. 
 
The way in which prices were determined, and the market was organised, was a 
pertinent topic especially because of this broad segment of the population that mainly 
depended on the companies for their supply. The proposed solutions that customers could 
turn to in order to break the power of the companies and provide a cheaper supply for the 
poor differed. Aquae Vindex favoured a public, municipal supply, so that water would be 
freely available to be fetched, leaving the companies to supply only those who desired the 
additional luxury of having it conveyed to their houses.
111
 This would solve the problem of 
the lack of alternative sources that forced the poor to buy their supply from the companies. 
Curtius and John Robins, on the other hand, sought a solution from within the market: both 
aimed to break the companies’ monopolistic power by having multiple competing water 
companies supply the city. John Robins called on wealthy people to make the investment in 
a new water company, which would break east London’s spatial monopoly after the 
Shadwell/West Ham agreement, while Curtius wished “there were twenty more water-
works, and that all by a reasonable charge might prosper.”
112
   
This preference for a competitive market for water was more widely expressed when 
there was the possibility of an additional company, such as during the time of the Colne 
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proposals. When this potential company was being promoted and discussed in Parliament in 
late 1766 and early 1767, several letters appeared in the public press promoting the plans 
for a new company in order to prevent “a monopoly of a most valuable element” in the 
West End.
113
 The identity of those who wrote the letters is unclear — all wrote under a 
pseudonym — and it is feasible that they might have had a financial interest in this venture 
rather than merely expressing concerns about an unfair market structure.
114
 Still, through 
their discourse the public came to be educated and informed about the way London’s water 
market operated, and how competition would make a difference. For instance, an author 
who signed his letter ‘D.L.’ explained to the readers the difference in price a competitive 
rather than a monopolistic market structure would mean:  
“When we have but one shop to go to, we must take the commodity at the seller’s own 
price; and in many parts of Westminster, where the water is alone supplied from the 
New River, individuals have suffered great inconveniences. But it is to be hoped the 
parliament will, by opening fresh shops, prevent an almost absolute monopoly.”
115
  
These sentiments were echoed by ‘An Anti-Monopolist’, whose letter was published on 27 
February 1767.
116
 He also described the New River Company as the only shop for many 
parts of the West End, and the Colne company would be another shop, which would 
“prevent a monopoly in such places.”
117
  
But price was not the only reason why “it is in the interest of this metropolis to oppose 
every growing monopoly of one of the most valuable and necessary articles of life, 
                                                           
113
 Words used by L.S., letter in Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, 10 Feb. 1767. 
114
 However, none of the initials of the authors matched any of the known Colne investors. 
115
 D.L., letter in Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, 23 Feb. 1767. 
116







 Someone opposed to the establishing of the new Colne company had, at a 
meeting to notify the public about the plans, interrupted to inform the people there that 
the New River Company was capable of supplying the West End on its own, and had called 
on a “respectable engineer” present to “confirm the abundance they have always had in 
that river”.
119
 While D.L., in his letter, disputed this fact, he wrote that even if the New River 
Company would have been able to supply the West End on its own, the “inclination of 
distributing a sufficient quantity, may, perhaps, be doubted.”
120
  
What D.L. pointed out here, was that a company in a monopolist position did not have 
the incentive to produce at maximum demand, as scarcity would tend to keep the price high 
(this is the deadweight loss as represented in figure 6.2 by triangle EFC). In this context, D.L. 
compared the New River Company with the Dutch East India Company, which destroyed a 
part of their spices so that the remainder could be sold at a higher price. Similarly, D.L. 
wrote, it was not in the New River Company’s interest to supply as plentiful an amount of 
water as it was able to for precisely the same reason. If the company limited the amount it 
distributed, it could demand a higher price.
121
 The same comparison was drawn 14 years 
later on the other side of town by John Robins, who compared Shadwell Waterworks’ 
monopoly to that of the Dutch over eastern spices.
122
 Another reason presented to the 
reading public about the need to break the monopoly therefore was that additional 
companies would not only charge a lower price, but also result in a more plentiful supply for 
the metropolis. 
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 Robins, Bone to pick, p. 71. 
  
While the plans to estab
Parliament, in the early 1800s 
initiating a period of fierce competition in the water industry. 
London Waterworks (est. 1807) took over West Ham and Shadwell Waterworks, before 
eventually constructing its own reservoirs and infrastructure.
companies, the West Middlesex Company (
1811) were set up to supply new neighbourhoods that had as yet no water supply, but 
eventually encroached on the territory of the incumbent companies
the approximate locations of the new companies, and the areas they contested.
 
Figure 6. 8. The water companies, 
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, pp. 26-51.  There was also South London Waterworks (est. 1805), 












Again, the supporters of the new companies expressed the desirability of competition 
and breaking up the existing monopoly. For instance, in 1810 the West Middlesex Company 
issued a note to the public that attributed the current high price people paid for water as a 
result of the old companies failing to keep up with the rising demand for water in the 
expanding metropolis. The company’s note claimed:  
“It is doubtless on this account that parliament has of late thought fit to incorporate so 
many new water companies; by whose competition, as the supply must of course 




Indeed, the entry of the new companies had this desired effect: during the short period of 
intense competition that followed, especially over the expanding West End market, water 
charges dropped significantly.  
The new companies attracted customers with their lower prices, and also with promises 
of a constant rather than intermittent supply. In order to prevent losing their market share, 
the old companies were forced to drop their prices.
126
 This is evident from the data shown 
in figure 6.9, which compares the prices that Chelsea Waterworks and its direct competitor 
Grand Junction Waterworks charged during this time. Between 1809 (when only Chelsea 
supplied) and 1814 (when both companies competed) Chelsea Waterworks’ charges went 
down as a result of Grand Junction’s entry.
127
 While the company still gained almost 400 
customers in this period (possibly before competition started) changes between water-rent 
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bands indicate a movement towards cheaper rents: the more expensive bands of ‘40s and 
over’ and ‘30s-40s’ lost customers, while the cheapest bands ‘under 10s’ and ‘10s-20s’ 
together contained over 700 more customers by 1814.    
 
Figure 6. 9. The effects of competition on Chelsea and Grand Junction Waterworks. 
 










































Customers:   1,558 7,180
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As we have already seen, in an oligopolistic situation, any attempt by new companies to 
reduce the price of water was unlikely to be sustained since it was neither necessary to do 
so once the new companies had gained a market share nor advantageous for the companies 
themselves in the long run. Between 1815 and 1818, new non-competition agreements 
were made between all companies, in which the capital was divided into districts, each to 
be supplied by one company.
128
 This meant that, effectively, all companies (except London 
Bridge Waterworks and the New River Company in the City) had their own spatial 
monopolies and, as a result, they could raise their prices. As evidenced by the data shown in 
figure 6.9, between 1814 (competition) and 1819 (new agreements) Chelsea Waterworks 
had raised its prices to slightly higher levels than before the competition started, while 
Grand Junction Waterworks’ charges even exceeded those of its former rival.  
The price rises following the new arrangements of the late 1810s sparked new protests 
against the way the companies controlled the market structure of London’s water supply. In 
various parishes consumers grouped together to agitate for lower charges for their supply. 
The most visible group was in the parish of Marylebone, which was one of the most 
contested areas during the period of competition and which had benefited from much lower 
prices during this time. In 1819 the Anti-Water Monopoly Association was established there 
by James Weale, which was an organised attempt to resist the price rise, and to continue 
paying the lower prices at competition level.
129
 Like John Robins had experienced earlier, 
this practice was not very successful: in a monopolistic market structure the companies had 
the power to either force people to pay or cut their water off as they had no other company 
to go to. As a result, the Anti-Water Monopoly Association moved to challenge the market 
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structure, first through court actions, and then by instigating the Parliamentary enquiry into 
the supply of water.
130
 
Weale’s main claim was that the companies had raised the price in order to enrich 
themselves. He argued for charges that were no higher than necessary to reimburse the 
cost of supply, so water would be available cheaply for the poor.
131
 The discussion, that 
Weale ignited and that the Select Committee aimed to address, is essentially represented by 
the square DEBF of figure 6.2, and represents the profits a company made from raising the 
price from a competition price to a monopoly (or oligopoly) price. This is illustrated by the 
evidence of one of the witnesses Weale called up for the Select Committee: Thomas Hope, 
of Upper Seymour Street in Marylebone, had allegedly asked his Grand Junction collector on 
which grounds his water-rent had been raised. The reply he received was that the company 
could not afford to supply for less money, and while the old rent covered the waterworks, 
paid the salary of employees, and the whole expense of the establishment, “if the 
proprietors do not get something more, to enable them to share a satisfactory dividend, 
they would not be content”.
132
 Hope concluded from this that the Grand Junction Company 
merely wanted to raise the rents in order to increase their profits. 
The water companies denied that the higher charges were solely for their own benefit, 
and defended their raising of the prices on the grounds that these reflected the 
improvements in water supply made during the first decades of the nineteenth century. It 
was claimed by the old and the new companies alike that more water was being supplied, 
the reliability of services had increased, and some of the mains were kept full of water at all 
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times, resulting in a better protection in cases of fire. This had come attached with 
additional expenses, as it had meant an increase in use of coals, since more water needed to 
be raised, as well as an investment in infrastructure as the companies moved from wooden 
to iron pipes.
133
 In other words, all companies believed that the higher prices reflected the 
higher costs for a better supply, and not an unfair rise as a result of the market structure to 
benefit investors in the companies. 
Obviously, the expectation of making money was one of the reasons why people invested 
in the water companies. The profits of the New River Company in particular were taken as 
an inspiration by those who founded new companies.
134
 Indeed, by the eighteenth century 
the example of this company had shown that money could be made as a water company 
shareholder: New River Company shares came attached with a yearly dividend of £265 
averaged over the eighteenth century — an income that would place a shareholder in the 
top three per cent of London’s population.
135
 
Figure 6.10 shows the evolution of New River Company’s dividends from 1633, when the 
first modest dividend was turned out, to 1823, after the impact of the competition. The 
company showed a consistent rise in profits, although there were several fluctuations 
related to investments, periods of expansion, and market influences. The most dramatic and 
visible of these was the period of competition in the 1810s. The deep impact this had on the 
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company’s dividends, and the quick recovery once the new agreements were made, confirm 




Figure 6. 10. New River Company’s dividends. 
 
Source: Rudden (1985), appendix pp. 306-8. 
 
The New River Company tried to downplay their profits in the committee hearings, 
however, and claimed that the company had not made profits “above six-and-a-quarter per 
cent, and for many years past not five per cent on their capital”.
137
 These claims seem 
extremely unlikely considering the steep rise in profits over the century, but the directors 
apparently were able to get away with it as no-one exactly knew how much the capital of 
the New River Company was: contemporary estimations ranged from £500,000 to 
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 More recent calculations have put the figure much lower: the original New 
River Company shares had only cost an initial £100 down-payment, with a commitment to 
subsequent call-ups, and it has been estimated that the original shareholders never paid 
more than £289 for their stake in the company.
139
 This meant that a few shareholders had 
made enormous gains on their investments — at the cost of customers paying inflated 
charges. 
The New River Company was an exception, however, as other waterworks’ shares were 
not as profitable. Chelsea Waterworks, for instance, only started declaring a dividend of 
eight shillings per share in 1737, fifteen years after its shareholders had first made their 
investments of £20 a share.
140
 The investors only received this income for four years, 
however, as the company did not make any profits during the 1740s while it focused on 
investing in their steam engine. From 1754 onwards dividends became more regular and 
gradually increased over the remainder of the century from six to ten shillings a year per 
share.
141
 On an average holding of 25 shares this meant that by the latter half of the 
century, Chelsea’s shareholders earned on average £10 a year from an initial investment of 
£500, a huge difference from New River Company shareholders who received dividends in 
the £100s.
142
   
London Bridge Waterworks issued similar dividends to its investors. In 1793 ten of its 
shares were offered for sale, and were advertised as having a £30 annual income 
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 While its shares had had a nominal value of £100 at the start of the century, 
from 1789 onwards they were generally traded for £70, and returned a dividend of £2 to £3 
per share.
144
 These rates were comparable with consols, which also returned three per cent, 
and provided a much safer investment. Many of the other water companies, including York 
Buildings, Shadwell, and Lambeth Waterworks, did not return any dividends at all for long 
periods. While the proprietors of waterworks expected a return on their investments — 
West Middlesex directors considered their shareholders to be entitled to receive five per 
cent on their investment, while Chelsea Waterworks claimed theirs were happy with two to 
three per cent dividends — few of the companies returned profits that were considered a 
burden on their paying public.
145
 
This was also the conclusion reached by the 1821 Select Committee.
146
 Despite being 
chaired by William Fremantle, who had been a member of the Anti-Water Monopoly 
Association, in its conclusions the committee report acknowledged the “peculiar nature” of 
the water companies’ task and their high capital outlay, which made unrestricted 
competition unmanageable. In its view, prices were not unreasonably high, and did not 
unfairly oppress the public.
147
 As a West Middlesex Company spokesperson said during the 
hearings, they had as a new company attacked the old companies for charging high prices, 
but once in business they came to realise that the old companies were not charging these 
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prices because of “false practices”, but because they were needed to cover their expenses. 
With a sense of irony, he felt that now his company had come under similar attacks as it had 





6.6. Discussion: public opinion, proliferation, and needs. 
 
Although there were periods of competition in specific parts of the city, customers in 
large parts of London often had no choice of supplier and were therefore subject to a 
monopolistic market structure. In this situation, the company could set a price that 
customers were obliged to pay, and it was this set of arrangements that drew the most 
adverse commentary. The extent of public opinion, or even readership of news articles at 
the current time is difficult to ascertain, and for the eighteenth century the press was even 
more complex.
149
 Indications that this was a significant debate can be found in the fact that 
Aquae Vindex’ first letter was cut out of the newspaper by Robert Mylne, the engineer and 
surveyor of the New River Company, who put it in his scrapbook.
150
 This shows a level of 
interest in this opinion, or at least what the public thought about the company in general. 
Many of the letters relating to the Colne initiative were responses to letters sent in by 
readers, which indicates that these had been read, at the very least, and had incited a 
response.
151
 This strongly suggests that London’s water market was being discussed in the 
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public realm in relation to structure and price. The fact that the Anti-Water Monopoly 
Association managed to obtain a public enquiry suggests that it was a topic that affected 
enough people, or at least those with the right connections, to warrant Parliamentary 
interest. More likely, however, the reason for so much interest was the fact that so many 
Londoners were supplied with water on a commercial basis. A well watered city, therefore, 
had a potentially large audience interested in and willing to seek some form of investigation 
and redress in Parliament.  
 227 
 
Chapter 7. Private companies and public service. 
 
The previous chapter treated the water companies in terms of their core business: 
providing a domestic and industrial supply in exchange for money. But there were also 
occasions when the companies supplied their water free of charge, most notably relating to 
fire fighting and during periods of acute droughts. In these instances, the water companies 
performed an important public function for which they received no remuneration. Such 
corporate responsibility from institutions whose prime aim was to make money raises 
questions about the way in which public goods were provided by private interests. This 
chapter, therefore, considers the companies, including their management, infrastructure, 
and public image, through the lens of their role as the providers of a public service, namely 
the emergency supply of water in times of acute shortage, such as severe frost, or in case of 
fire. The main question is why, in a market economy, the companies’ directors decided to 
provide their water for free on these occasions.  
There are several reasons why a company would seek to give away its goods without 
remuneration. Firstly, it could do so because it was compelled by law or political pressure. 
This is the case nowadays: water companies have to allow “any person to take water for 
extinguishing fires from any of the mains or other pipes on which a fire-hydrant is fixed”, for 
which they are not allowed to charge.
1
 Secondly, the companies could have supplied 
because they felt it was the ‘right’ thing to do. Whether a result of moral, religious, or 
charitable reasons, supplying water for free in emergencies like these constituted a 
contribution to society which they made from a sense of social responsibility.  
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Thirdly, there could have been an element of self-interest in this contribution. Corporate 
social responsibility is partly about the publicity arising from performing a public function, 
and the companies’ actions raised their profile in a positive way. The press as it emerged 
over the eighteenth century created a platform that allowed the companies to try to 
influence public opinion. Positive publicity about their ability to fight fires free of charge was 
useful for the companies as it demonstrated their capacity to supply water and the 
excellence of their networks, and could therefore help to attract customers. But it was also 
beneficial for the directors, as the publicity established them as ‘good’ and ‘moral’ people, 
caring for the public over their own personal interests. Especially in the light of the negative 
comments that the water companies elicited — as discussed in the previous chapter — this 
might have been an image they coveted, both for their company as well as for themselves. 
An emphasis on public service helped to legitimate the dividends directors earned from 
supplying water.
2
 The eighteenth-century business world revolved largely around people’s 
reputations, and charitable actions such as supplying free water to those in need could 
bolster the directors’ social status. Finally, the decision to supply could have included an 
element of material self-interest on the part of the directors, several of whom often lived in 
the locality served by their company. Improvement of the local area by the supply of water 
and the safeguarding against fire would benefit the locality in general, but also the directors’ 
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7.1. Fire and ice: the provision of free water in eighteenth-century London. 
 
The most common situation in which the companies provided their water free of charge 
was to aid fire fighting. Fires were a frequent and destructive occurrence in the early 
modern town: a gazetteer of urban fires compiled by Jones, Porter, and Turner counted 76 
fires that destroyed at least ten houses over the course of the eighteenth century in 
London.
3
 To understand the way in which this hazard was managed, we need to go back to 
the Great Fire of 1666 and its aftermath. This conflagration, which had originated at the 
house of a Pudding Lane baker, had burned for four days and destroyed 60 per cent of the 
City of London. While direct fatalities as a result of the fire have always been recorded as 
very low — contemporary accounts have counted as few as six people — the indirect effects 
of the destruction of the capital were far-reaching. Over 13,200 buildings went up in flames, 
including the Royal Exchange, the Guildhall, and many of the City’s livery companies.
4
  
The fire’s location, at the heart of the City, meant that many merchants’ houses as well 
as warehouses full of valuable goods were destroyed. The traditional way of compensating 
victims, a charitable subscription for the affected, proved inadequate for those ruined in this 
event.
5
 In order to prevent similar losses in the future, a system of private fire insurance 
companies was established to mitigate the impact of eventual future fires by reimbursing 
(part of) personal losses. The first of these companies was founded in 1667 by Nicholas 
Barbon. His ‘insurance office for buildings’ was soon joined by other companies and fire 
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insurance grew to be widespread by the middle of the eighteenth century. Having one’s 
house insured against fire extended well beyond the upper and middle classes, and it is 
likely that only a small proportion of the residential capital remained uninsured by the end 
of the eighteenth century.
6
   
In order to minimise the amount of money they had to pay out, the insurance companies 
had an interest in the prevention of fire and were willing to invest in this. For example, in 
1765 all six London fire insurance companies grouped together to share the cost of 
prosecuting arsonists.
7
 The most significant action they took, however, was the 
establishment of their own fire brigades. Barbon’s was the first company to offer the service 
of his own group of men who were made available to extinguish fires as an addition to his 
policies. Its clients were given the addresses of nearby firemen who they were to alert when 
there was a fire.
8
 Barbon’s competitors followed suit, and by the start of the eighteenth 




These fire brigades had equipment to fight fires, such as fire-hooks (to pull thatch off the 
roof), squirts, buckets, ladders, and early fire engines. At the site of the fire, the brigade’s 
engines had to be supplied with water. Usually, people formed bucket-chains from the 
nearest water source and threw it either directly on the fire or into the engine, and where 
there was water available in sewers and gutters it was shovelled towards the engines as 
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 However, the amount of water that could be produced using these methods was 
limited and the process took time, especially as distances between available sources and the 
fire increased. Over time therefore, the network of the companies became the main source 
of emergency water supply, and the engines were either connected via a hose to fireplugs 
or, alternatively, water was left to pool in the street and people would use buckets to supply 
the engine. In Hogarth’s engraving of a Union Office crew extinguishing a fire in 1762, shown 
in figure 7.1, both practices are depicted. 
 
Figure 7. 1. Eighteenth-century fire-fighting scene. 
   
Engraving by William Hogarth. Source: © Trustees of the British Museum. 
 
Supplying water at the site of a fire was not just a passive task in which the companies let 
the insurance crews take water from the pipes. Because the service pipes were empty when 
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they were not scheduled to supply, providing an emergency water supply required active 
management on the part of the companies, and incurred considerable expense. Whenever a 
fire was discovered residents had to report this to their local turncock, whose address was 
written on the receipts for water supply, and it was his task to actively redirect water 
towards the location of the fire. Once there was water in the pipes, the fireplugs near the 
fire had to be drawn in order to supply the engines. Again, a turncock had to be present for 
this, as they possessed the special key through which means the fireplugs could be opened.  
The fire insurance companies’ brigades were thus dependent on the water companies’ 
turncocks, and their quick response. When there was no water available on the scene, it was 
the fire insurance companies that were the ones likely to incur greater losses as a result of 
the damage that ensued. This was reflected in a gift from the Phoenix Fire Office, which sent 
three guineas as a Christmas box for the turncocks of the New River Company in 1786. The 
company, however, returned this money saying they expected their employees to do their 
duties without such emolument.
11
 
However, the fire insurance companies also held the water companies responsible for 
the provision of water at the scene of a fire and complained about their management 
whenever there was a delay in supplying water. In 1785, the Westminster Fire Office 
complained to the New River Company that it had taken four hours until there was a 
sufficient water supply at the site of a fire around Compton and Greek Street. According to 
the directors of the New River Company, however, there had been an earlier water supply, 
as their first turncock on the scene had drawn a plug and provided water within less than a 
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quarter of an hour of the fire being discovered.
12
 Unfortunately, a person unacquainted with 
the company’s infrastructure had then drawn additional plugs on the pipes farther down, 
which meant that the water flowed out on the lower ground and not where it was needed.
13
 
In another case in May 1786 there had been complaints that the New River Company’s 
turncock had turned off the water at a fire in Portman Square. It turned out that the 
problem was in fact that the staff at the New River Head had not realised there was a fire 
and had switched the mains as per the usual schedule.
14
 The turncock therefore had had to 
go to Islington to get the main to Portman Square switched back on again. In response, in 
1792 the New River Company ordered that when any fire was discovered at night, when the 
mains were generally dry, the night workman was to turn on the main in the general 
direction of the fire.
15
 Both these cases demonstrate the importance of the active 
involvement of water company employees and the correct management of their 
infrastructure in the provision of water at fires. This was by no means an easy task and 
required coordination between employees across the entire network.      
Apart from the managerial effort, providing this service also meant a considerable 
expense by the companies, for which they received no remuneration. In September 1772, 
an author who called himself ‘Hydraulogos’ addressed this issue in a letter in the 
Gazetteer.
16
 He considered Shadwell Waterworks as an example of a company that relied 
solely on a steam engine to raise water. This engine was turned off at ten o’clock every night 
in order to save on the cost of coals, and was not switched on again until the next morning, 
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when “the domestic necessities of their tenants oblige them”.
17
 Hydraulogos recognised 
that if the engine was kept running constantly to ensure a steady supply of water in case of 
fire, this would mean “very extraordinary expenses to the Company, without the least 
means of reimbursements”.
18
 Indeed, overrunning the engines without additional payment 
came at a considerate cost to the owners of Shadwell Waterworks, and, as they reminded 
the directors of several fire insurance companies in 1794, they covered these costs 
“selflessly” even though the company was in debt and had not returned any profits for 25 
years.
19
    
Hydraulogos also considered the pipe network of the New River Company, which relied 
mainly on gravity. While this company would not need to go to the expense of raising extra 
water, Hydraulogos believed that it could not quickly supply a large quantity at the location 
of a fire “without distressing their [paying customers], which it is their duty not to do”.
20
 
Similarly, Hydraulogos believed that while West Ham Waterworks, which relied on a fire 
engine but also had a reservoir for an immediate supply, was best equipped to provide 
water quickly, it could not be expected of the company to have a turncock always on stand-
by at the reservoir.
21
 In each of these cases Hydraulogos drew attention to companies 
having to go to considerable expense to make water freely available to fight fires, while 
receiving nothing in return.  
Still, the companies showed a willingness to provide an emergency supply in face of these 
expenses. The directors of Lambeth Waterworks, for instance, intended to construct 
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 LMA/ACC/3077/12 Shadwell Waterworks, memorial to fire offices, 2 Jan. 1794. Around this time, the 
company was seeking support against the London Dock Company. 
20





infrastructure specifically to help in fire fighting by building a reservoir. However, the 
problem was that this would come at too high an expense for the company’s directors, as 
the reservoir was estimated to cost £2,000, and the company was only just starting up and 
had a capital of only £3,200.
22
 In order to raise money, they proposed to open a subscription 
for local inhabitants, and also contacted the directors of both the Sun Fire and Phoenix Fire 
Offices, as they were likely to have an interest in having a source of readily available water 
as well.
23
 Nothing seems to have come out of this offer, and so a year later they decided on 
another way to provide an emergency supply. This time, Lambeth’s directors asked several 
fire insurance companies whether they would be interested in making a contribution to 
keeping the company’s steam engine ready to run at all times, which meant that there could 
always be an immediate supply of water in case of fire. This could be done for around £150 
to £200 per year, but this was still too large an investment for Lambeth Waterworks to 
make on its own.
24
 However, the Phoenix Fire Office declined, and none of the other 
insurance companies that were approached replied.  
Despite this lack of cooperation, Lambeth Waterworks intended to do whatever was in 
their power to provide water in case of fire, as the directors perceived it as their “duty to 
make such provision for the safety of the Public as the Nature of their undertaking would 
admit but that the Circumstances of the Company would not permit”.
25
 It was mentioned at 
the same time that the company had already lent its assistance in helping to extinguish a 
fire near Blackfriars Bridge, and all its employees were ordered to procure water as soon as 
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possible in case of fire.
26
 It is clear, therefore, that the directors of at least this company saw 
providing water for free in case of fire as a public service that was part and parcel of being a 
water company. 
Another occasion, albeit less frequent, in which the companies provided a free supply of 
water was during periods of acute shortages, such as severe frost. On several occasions over 
the eighteenth century cold spells resulted in the freezing over of available sources of water, 
and in certain years even the Thames froze over. For example, in January 1776, a 
particularly cold winter, it was reported that water had never been scarcer and that in many 
places there were difficulties securing a supply.
27
 This scarcity of water was reflected in its 
price: during a cold spell in January 1789, people at Windsor and Camberwell complained 
that water had become so limited that they had to pay increased prices to waterbearers.
28
 
Several newspapers reminded the public to be vigilant with fire, as there was no access to 
water to deal with a conflagration.
29
 In fact, at a fire in 1795 there was no water available as 
all the pipes were frozen, and the water had to be carried from half a mile away via carts.
30
 
With this acute scarcity of water the companies tried their best to keep supplying water, 
first and foremost to their own customers but also to the general public, even though they 
also encountered their own difficulties. Frost affected the supply network in various ways: 
water in the pipes would freeze, and the turncocks could not be opened, and so the 
companies could not keep their supply the usual way. Generally, they established 
standpipes in the streets, and in these cases it was emphasised that this was not just a 
substitute for the water supply to their own customers, but also for all other people who 
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were without access to water. For example, in 1763 York Buildings Waterworks announced 
in the Public Advertiser that it had “ordered a great Number of Stand Pipes to be placed in 
the Streets for the Convenience of their Tenants; and after they are served, they have also 
ordered, that all other Persons, whether belonging to the New River Water Works or others, 
be also served.”
31
 The same sentiment was shown by the New River Company later in the 
century, when during a frost in February 1784 the directors expressed their willingness to 
accommodate not only their own tenants but also the general public in times of frost.
32
 The 
company also set up standpipes to provide for the public during a severe frost in January 
1795.
33
 Similarly, the managers of London Bridge Waterworks gave “express orders (...) to 
permit every person to take water from our standpipes without the least discrimination 
whether they are a tenant to [the New River Company] or ours”, because of the “present 




In order to maintain this supply, the companies had to keep their engines running, which 
again carried an extra cost they could not hope to retrieve.
35
 As in their provision against 
fire, the companies bore this expense and kept on supplying the public, including those who 
were not their paying customers. So what were the motivations of the directors for doing 
this? The following sections examine, firstly, whether they were compelled by law to do so, 
and then explores other reasons.    
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7.2. Laws and leases. 
  
The aftermath of the Great Fire had, in addition to stimulating the introduction of a new 
system of fire insurance, also provided the impetus for new laws that addressed the fire 
hazards inherent in early modern cities. These laws focused on the urban built environment, 
fire-fighting equipment, and finally, by the early eighteenth century, the supply of water. 
The 1667 Rebuilding Act regulated the material with which new houses could be built, as 
well as determining the width of the streets.
36
 New houses were to be made of brick or 
stone instead of timber, with strict regulations of height, number of storeys, and party walls. 
In addition, houses were no longer allowed to project out over the street to ensure an 
adequate fire gap.
37
    
In the same year, the Corporation of London passed an act “for Preventing and 
Suppressing of Fires”, which addressed the lack of fire-fighting materials.
38
 This act ordered 
that the City be divided in four quarters, each with their own supply of buckets, ladders, 
fire-hooks, and squirts. The City’s twelve main livery companies were required to provide an 
engine each, in addition to keeping their own supply of buckets and ladders.
39
 The act also 
made provisions for domestic houses, and each householder was required to prepare a 
secure place in their property to place hot ashes.
40
 While the 1667 act only referred to the 
administrative City of London and not the whole metropolis, a later act of 1708 “for better 
preventing mischiefs that may happen by fire” (the Parish Pump Act) made similar 
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legislation for the whole of London.
41
 Under these new regulations every parish, both inside 
as well as outside the City, was required to provide fire-fighting equipment, including an 
engine, the cost of which would be borne by taxes.
42
 
The 1708 Parish Pump Act also addressed the supply of water in case of fire, and 
implicitly made this a responsibility of the water supply companies, by legislating that water 
could be taken from the pipes in the streets. The act’s focus was on quick access to water: it 
made parish officers responsible for providing fireplugs in the supply pipes and placing 
notices on the houses in front of which these plugs were located, so water could be 
accessed quickly.
43
 It also encouraged company employees to act swiftly: the first turncock 
on the scene was to be paid ten shillings for opening the plugs in the streets that were 
connected to the fire engine.
44
 At this time, the annual salary of the turncocks was £20, and 
so the extra ten shillings would have been a sizable incentive to work quickly and try to 
claim the prize.
45
 The companies themselves, however, were not mentioned in the act, even 
thought it effectively meant that their water was being taken, and there is no evidence to 
suggest that they opposed the measures. The free use of their water therefore seems to 
have been accepted by the time this act was passed.   
In fact, the water companies had been supplying water at fires from the very beginning of 
a commercial water supply. Peter Morris, the founder of London Bridge Waterworks, had 
needed to obtain a lease from the City Corporation in order to be allowed to construct 
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waterwheels under London Bridge and sell water. As part of this lease, there was a clause 
that stipulated the provision of free water in case of fire. This clause was initially very 
minimal: London Bridge Waterworks, “for the service of the City”, had to provide water to a 
few central locations where it could then be used freely to fight fires. In the event that 
people used this water when there was no fire, the company had the right to quit this part 
of the agreement all together and remove these pipes.
46
 However, over time, the 
arrangements for providing an emergency supply became more extensive. In 1604, as 
Broken Wharf Waterworks requested an additional lease from the City, the clause with 
regards to providing free water had expanded to allowing the City the right to break open its 
pipes whenever there was a fire and obtain water straight from there.
47
  
As new companies required access to public space in order to set up and lay out their 
infrastructure, the legislative powers, whether belonging to the City Corporation or 
Parliament, could negotiate something in return. A requirement to provide part of their 
supply to the public in case of emergencies could therefore be used to ensure that 
companies’ use of public space was more than just a necessary commercial transaction. 
Indeed, much of the rhetoric surrounding the start-up of new companies focused on the 
public good that they could do, notably fire prevention. For instance, the original Chelsea 
Waterworks proposal stated that in the company’s reservoirs there would always be water 
“not only to supply the ordinary Occasions of the Inhabitants, but will also answer all other 
Calls in Case of Fire, the Pestilence, or any Exigency whatsoever.”
48
 In addition, the company 
was allowed to construct their higher reservoirs in the royal parks because these would, 
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apart from serving an ornamental function, be useful in case of fire.
49
 Moreover, William 
Capell, the Earl of Essex, allowed the company to make improvements to the basins because 
the company’s “Works which are of Publick Benefit”.
50
 
Similarly, in their attempts to obtain permission from Parliament, the Colne instigators 
emphasised the company’s usefulness in case of fire, and Lambeth Waterworks’ founders, in 
order to obtain the Act of Parliament necessary for their establishment, organised a petition 
for local residents to sign, asking for Lambeth to be supplied “with water for domestic uses 
and in cases of fire”.
51
 While not required by law, the willingness and intention to provide an 
emergency supply was aimed at gaining permission to set up as a company. While this 
arrangement to sweeten the deal for the public helps explain why they provided water in 
case of fire, it does not account for their efforts in times of frost, as this was never 
mentioned in the leases, and neither does it fully explain the efforts that the companies, as 
evidenced by Lambeth Waterworks’ example, were willing to go to. There were therefore 





While the water companies were not paid for providing an emergency supply, they did 
get something in return: their activities helped to generate positive publicity. The efforts of 
quickly managing to supply water at a fire were frequently praised in the public press. 
Chelsea Waterworks, for example, was commended in a report in the London Evening Post 
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as its turncocks had acted swiftly in supplying water to a fire in the cotton library in 
Westminster in 1731.
52
 Similarly, York Buildings was praised for its help at a January 1767 
fire on the Strand, and the New River Company for its assistance at a 1799 fire in Islington.
53
 
Occasions when companies went above and beyond their general call of duty were 
especially subject to public praise. When in April 1765 a fire broke out near Bancroft’s 
Almshouses, it was discovered that the parish officers had neglected their duty to provide 
fireplugs in the main that ran through the street, and the fire had threatened to burn down 
the whole row. The foreman of West Ham Waterworks “generously ran, with his Gang of 
Labouring-men to their Assistance, where they (...) with their Axes cut open the Main, by 
which means there was immediately Water enough”.
54
 
While it is difficult to ascertain exactly how these messages were generated — there 
were no professional journalists, and it could be that the directors submitted the praise for 
their companies themselves — it is clear that publicity surrounding an emergency supply 
was important to the companies. When in the late 1740s there had been suggestions that 
London Bridge Waterworks had not acted swiftly enough to supply water to fight a fire in 
the City, the company’s secretary responded by writing an open letter “to acquaint the 
Publick, that nothing was wanting on their Parts”.
55
 The letter emphasised the extent to 
which the company had gone to ensure a sufficient supply: all other mains had been shut 
for the duration, and three mains that ran close to the fire had all been opened via fireplugs 
as well as by cutting them open, and so “the Supply (...) must have been far more than 
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sufficient for the Service required”.
56
 The secretary then took the opportunity to advertise 
the power of the company by adding: “for it is very well known, that no Mains belonging to 




Another occasion in which the secretary of a water company felt compelled to ensure 
that the publicity surrounding emergency supply was correct occurred in 1759 in east 
London. West Ham Waterworks had been commended in the press for its efforts in 
providing water to extinguish a fire in Ratcliff that had destroyed several houses. It was 
mentioned in the Gazetteer that most of Queen Street would have been destroyed if it were 
not for the West Ham company, which provided the only water available and that supplied 
the engines all night and most of the next day.
58
 On reading this, the clerk of Shadwell 
Waterworks issued a letter to Lloyd’s Evening Post, which had also carried the notice, to 
“acquaint the Public” that there was never a fire in Queen Street. In fact, the fire had been 




Both these incidents involving the erroneous reports of water supplied for fire fighting 
show how important the publicity generated was to the companies. In the case of London 
Bridge Waterworks, there had been insinuations that the company had been unable to 
supply water at the fire, an implication that the company wanted to dispel. The inability to 
provide water at a fire would suggest that the company was not fully up to the task of 
supplying water. It was an opportunity to demonstrate in public their capacity to produce 
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water, and the ensuing publicity provided a free advertisement for the company that could 
potentially attract new customers.  
Another result of the publicity was that it showed that the company in question could 
help protect houses from fire if there was a service pipe in the street. It was thus a 
beneficial thing to have in that respect, apart from the question of whether a household 
wanted a supply laid in their houses. Protection against fire was a selling point: as West Ham 
Waterworks was starting up, its directors had placed an advertisement in the Public 
Advertiser aimed at the inhabitants of the area where they had laid their mains, to inform 
them that “they have made Provision to supply them with a sufficient Quantity of Water to 
answer all Purposes for Family Use, and to assist them gratis, in the Times of any future 
Calamity, that may happen by Fire.”
60
 While there is no evidence of customers’ motivation 
to choose a company based on fire protection, the fact that the public altercation between 
West Ham and Shadwell Waterworks took place at a time of rivalry between these 
companies is an indication that their role in fire protection might have played a part in the 
competition for a share of the east London water market. 
As in the case of supply at fires, publicity was also generated by the companies’ efforts to 
supply during severe frost. When newspaper reports in January 1763 suggested that the 
waterwheels under London Bridge were entirely stopped by the frost and water in general 
was very scarce, the Gazetteer announced that most of the water still supplied in the city 
came from the New River Company, as all other waterworks were frozen.
61
 The newspaper 
praised the directors of this company as they had “particularly exerted themselves in 
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furnishing several parts with water, by setting up wooden cocks”.
62
 A few days later, the 
proprietors of York Buildings Waterworks published an advertisement in the Public 
Advertiser to rectify this. They thought it was “incumbent on them to advertise the Public, 
that their Works are not, nor can be stopp’d, whilst any Water runs in the Thames, as they 
work by Fire Engines”.
63
 The same day, London Bridge Waterworks was praised in the 
Gazetteer as they had gone to a very great expense of keeping their steam engine running 
day and night to take over the task of the waterwheels.
64
 Again, it was important for the 
companies that the public knew they still supplied, and that they went to great efforts to do 
so even under adverse circumstances.  
The publicity also provided an opportunity for the companies to advertise themselves as 
superior to their rivals, which is what the invocation of technological prowess, as shown 
especially by the York Buildings Waterworks, seems to imply. While York Buildings and 
London Bridge Waterworks did not compete on price with the New River Company, showing 
themselves as superior in the provision of water during an acute shortage had the potential 
to attract customers, and provides a reason why it was so important to manage their public 
image carefully.   
However, other evidence suggests that it was not considered good behaviour to attract 
new customers based on disaster situations such as frost. As in the situation described in 
chapter six, when one company burned down or was incapacitated by any other reason, it 
was considered unseemly to profit from such misfortune. In December 1788, during a 
severe frost, both the New River Company as well as London Bridge Waterworks had set up 
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standpipes to supply the City. When several London Bridge tenants had gone to a New River 
standpipe to fetch water they had been told that they would only be supplied if they 
became New River tenants after the frost broke. On finding out about this, the secretary to 
London Bridge Waterworks, Richard Till, wrote a letter to the New River Company’s 
directors to accuse them of profiteering from the public’s distress at this time. Till thought 
that this was “illiberal behaviour” and emphasised that London Bridge Waterworks would 
“pursue the same liberal plan of accommodating the public at large without the smallest 
idea of interest”.
65
 While providing a supply in emergencies can be seen as a way of self-
interest for the companies, as it had the potential to attract new customers, the wording of 
Richard Till’s letter suggests that, at least for London Bridge Waterworks, other 
considerations played a role as well. The term ‘liberal’, at this time, before it gained its 
economic and political connotations, mainly meant ‘generous’ and ‘magnanimous’, as well 
as carrying the suggestion of the characteristics of a worthy or noble person.
66
 Both these 
meanings are significant for the examination of the directors’ decisions to supply water for 
free. It places the practice of providing an emergency supply in the context of eighteenth-
century philanthropy, and touches on both its charitable aspects, as well as the civic aspect 
of being involved in institutional charity — a reminder that even in a commercial market 
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7.4. Philanthropy, projecting, and a zeitgeist of improvement. 
 
Philanthropy in the eighteenth century was a multi-faceted activity. On one side, it fitted 
in a longer tradition of giving. Charity played a central role in religious life, and was 
considered to be a necessary activity of all good Christians.
67
 In this light, the water 
companies supplied free water in emergencies because it was the good and moral thing to 
do, satisfying the directors’ religious and ethical obligations to the greater good, as well as 
providing a sense of self-satisfaction. But benevolence was not just voluntary; early modern 
morality made it an almost mandatory activity — a form of noblesse oblige.
68
 As the wealthy 
were provided with power, prosperity, and leisure time by the possession of their estates, 
they were expected to use these assets towards the promotion of the public good in 
return.
69
 Charity, therefore, was as much a result of social obligation as of a benevolent 
spirit. 
But charity and philanthropy were also social practices, and reflected on those who took 
part in it. This needs to be understood in the context of views about ‘projecting’ and the 
eighteenth-century business world more generally. Late seventeenth and eighteenth-
century entrepreneurs often combined ideals of improvement with financial schemes.
70
 The 
word ‘projects’, as these came to be called, had many meanings, but they always had a 
mixture of improvement, public benefit, and money-making about them.
71
 They included 
social welfare schemes, land improvements such as drainage, reclamation, and irrigation, 
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and involved investments in pumping technology and mine draining.
72
 Commercial 
waterworks fit into this definition as well: there was the public benefit of neighbourhoods 
being supplied with water, but, as the previous chapter has shown, there was an 
opportunity to make money as well.    
 While enthusiasm for projects seem to have spanned the long eighteenth century, they 
carried negative connotations as well, as a result of their association with unscrupulous 
schemes for making money. Often, people were accused of pretending to promote the 
public good for their own self-enrichment. Daniel Defoe, writing in the 1690s, noted that 
there had been attempts at the transformation of the meaning of the word: he saw 
projectors as a positive force who found new ideas to address the difficulties of the time.
73
 
Over the course of the eighteenth century, from Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees 
(1714) to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776), the notion that profiting was always 
opposed to the public good was challenged.
74
    
As seen in the previous chapter, there were certainly some who questioned the morality 
of making profits from the provision of water, and there was a concern that the companies 
would be seen in a negative light. For instance, such sentiment was expressed in a letter in 
Lloyd’s Evening Post by ‘B.Y.Z.’ on W. Efford’s Colne proposals.
75
 He wrote: “upon the whole, 
this bears the face of a private job (...) calculated to serve private purposes, notwithstanding 
the good of the Publick is pretended.”
76
 Similarly, during the 1821 Select Committee 
hearings of the investigation into London’s water supply, James Weale of the Anti-Water 
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Monopoly Association, accused the owners of the West Middlesex Company of being “a set 
of city speculators” who were involved in the companies “without any permanent regard to 
the public benefit, but merely to promote (...) speculation in the shares of the companies”.
77
 
Weale claimed that the new companies had only been established for their directors to 
enrich themselves. He believed that, if west London’s water supply had really been as bad as 
to warrant additional companies, some local wealthy inhabitants would have been the 
investors, as had been the case in other situations where improvements were needed: for 
the construction of docks and canals, it had been those who were most inconvenienced who 
had made the first move to invest.
78
  
These accusations were strongly denied by the company, whose spokesperson asserted 
that its shareholders “were men of fortune, living in the district, and builders and people of 
that description, and not city speculators, for there are only thirteen that live in the city.”
79
 
More supporting evidence put forward against the notion was that between 1810 and 1820 
many of the shareholders who had sold had done so at a loss, and not made any profit.
80
 
However, an earlier incident from 1808, when two directors had sold shares at a 50 per cent 
premium in order to enrich themselves, was carefully kept silent at the Select Committee 
hearings.
81
 The other directors, who had not wanted their shares sold at the open market to 
avoid a bubble-effect, had made them repay the profits they had made to the company and 
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they had to resign from their positions.
82
 Obviously, there had been speculators involved 
with the new waterworks, but the companies were keen to rid themselves of these 
associations. 
The water companies clearly wanted to project an image of public service, and 
disassociate themselves from connotations of speculation and self-enrichment. A way to do 
this was to act, as the London Bridge Waterworks secretary put it, as ‘liberal men’. In the 
late seventeenth and eighteenth century, businesses and careers were built on credit and 
trust, and the ability to utilise this stood or fell with the individual’s, or the company’s, 
reputation. Entrepreneurs therefore needed to guard and actively manage their image as 
trustworthy and reliable individuals, and did this by sending out signals that they belonged 
to a class of respectable and dependable citizens.
83
 Such signals to show that one was a 
reliable and trustworthy gentleman included having a house at a good address, such as the 
West End or even a country estate, manners in dress, language, and etiquette. Dedicating 
part of one’s money and time to the public good formed part of this as well.
84
  
For those who had made their fortune through trade or financial speculation, spending 
part of their time and money on ventures that benefitted the public could assuage the 
negative cultural notions of ‘immorality’ that were attached to wealth acquired this way.
85
 
This led to a myriad of clubs, associations, and societies that were dedicated to the 
improvement of science, knowledge, or the support of the needy, but which also functioned 
as a way for gentleman-entrepreneurs to meet, form networks, and establish their 
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 Over the course of the eighteenth century, philanthropy increasingly gained 
practical values as well.
87
 Benevolent charity was coupled with utilitarianism in order to find 
solutions for pressing problems, and answer the manpower needs of the state to address 
these.
88
 Especially in London, this kind of practical philanthropy was evident in the 
establishment of institutional charities that had specific aims, most notably the several 
hospitals catering for the poor, abandoned, or sick.
89
  
Charitable societies and voluntary organisations, whether resulting from social obligation 
or as a vehicle to establish social capital, in addition to projects, played an important role in 
the production of public goods through collective action, for which elsewhere in Europe the 
state or the church had a large role to play. The building of roads, bridges, lighthouses, and 
canals was largely financed by private subscription, as were social amenities such as 
hospitals, schools, and orphanages. While in some cases there was hope of making a profit, 
and in the case of improving local trade and employment there was certainly a level of self-
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While motives are always difficult to ascribe, an evaluation of the background of the 
companies’ directors can provide some indications whether cultural values as described 
above played a role in their decision to provide water for free. What was the social class of 
those at the helm of the water companies? How had they gained their wealth? Where did 
they live? Would they want to improve their reputations? The following section aims to find 
an answer to the motivation of the directors by considering the background of those who 
made the important decisions for the water companies. Who they were, and what their 
station was in life, provides an indication of whether they would be motivated by 
reputation, or if they would have had other incentives for the free provision of an 
emergency supply.  
For this analysis, the names of all those who attended board meetings over the course of 
one year per decade have been taken down.
92
 Data was available for Chelsea Waterworks 
(from their start-up in 1720s through to 1800), the New River Company (1769-1800), 
London Bridge Waterworks (1776-1800), and Lambeth Waterworks (from their start-up in 
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the 1780s to 1800).
93
 For the companies that started up during the eighteenth century, the 
first group of directors has been included in the analysis as well. Complete lists of directors 
for each company, including their active years, occupation, and address, are included in the 
appendix.  
The companies all displayed a great continuity of directors over the century, with many 
of them staying on over two, or even three, decades. For instance, Peter Holford was the 
New River Company’s governor for the entire period under study, with several other Holford 
family members in regular attendance over the decades. Richard Clark was a manager of 
London Bridge Waterworks in 1780, 1790, and 1800, and Peter Calmel a director of Chelsea 
Waterworks between 1760 and 1790, during which time he was chosen to serve as the 
company’s governor. In the case of the companies that had elected managers, this indicates 
that the shareholders were overall happy with their company’s management. It also 
suggests that the directors themselves saw their role in the company as a job that required 
constant attention, and were involved with the direction their company was taking.  
It is difficult to categorise social status in a meaningful way, as the line between old and 
new money became increasingly blurred over the course of the eighteenth century, and for 
many of the directors there was not enough data available to securely assign them to a 
social strata. Nevertheless, based on the information that could be gathered about them, it 
is possible to draw out some similarities as well as differences between the directors of the 
companies. The New River Company was dominated by ‘new moneyed men’. Of the 50 
directors that attended meetings over the years examined, 26 have been identified with 
some certainty. Many of these were new money: people or families who had made their 
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wealth as merchants, bankers, and through investments in the East India and South Sea 
companies. George Colebrooke, for example, deputy governor in 1770, was a banker and 
speculator in various companies, including the East India Company, of which he was 
governor.
94
 He had inherited his share from his father James Colebrooke, a prosperous 
London mercer and banker, who had bought shares in 1732.
95
 Other examples include Aime 
Garnault, who was the son of a Huguenot merchant, Isaac Walker, a linen merchant, and 
John Darker, a hop merchant.
96
  
Since by the start of the eighteenth century a New River Company share provided a 
decent income (see figure 6.10), those who had inherited shares were often able to live off 
their wealth.
97
 Members of the Holford family, for example, had initially been barristers and 
lower gentry with some landed estates, but by the early nineteenth century George Peter 
Holford was able to renovate and rebuilt the Weston Bird estate as a result of the family’s 
combined New River Company and South Sea Company wealth.
98
 The Berners, who 
provided two deputy governors as well as a treasurer during the period studied, were from 
a merchant family. In the mid-seventeenth century a Berners had invested in four New River 
shares, which proved to be lucrative. Over time the family intermarried into other merchant 
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wealth: Henry Berners’ mother, for example, was the daughter of Robert Raworth, a 
prominent East India merchant who was also a director of the Bank of England.
99
 Their 
wealth earned in trade enabled them to move to Woolverstone Hall in Suffolk. Similarly, 
Isaac Walker had bought Arnos Grove on a fortune made through his trade.
100
 While not 
solely the result of investment in New River shares, these landed estates were bought 
largely on City wealth.  
Although a few New River Company directors held knighthoods or baronetcies, these 
were rarely an indication of old money: the Hulse baronetcy was only in the family for its 
second generation, and earned on merit — their father had been a physician to King George 
I and II.
101
 George Colebrooke became a baronet, but only because his older brother James 
died without issue.
102
 Noel Edwards had married into a title: the baronetcy had been 
created for his father in law, who gained it through his work in the Navy.
103
 While these 
were titled people, the titles were newly created, and often earned by merit or service 
rather than inherited through generations. 
London Bridge Waterworks was similar to the New River Company in the sense that its 
managers came from a similar background. They included several merchants and bankers, 
although these seem to have been less wealthy than the New River shareholders: there is 
no evidence that they owned country estates. While some of this company’s managers 
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could be considered old money, these showed a history of not being adverse to involvement 
in the financial world: James Winter Lake, while from an old landowning family, had a 
grandfather who had been the governor of the Africa Company, and was involved in the 
Hudson Bay Company himself. Other managers included Peter Cazalet, who was also a 
director of the Bank of England, as well as two aldermen. One of them, Richard Clark, noted 
earlier, became Lord Mayor of London.
104
  
Both these companies had been in continuous existence for almost two centuries before 
the directors identified above became involved, but for two other companies data are 
available about those that were involved during their start-up year: Chelsea Waterworks 
and Lambeth Waterworks. The latter company’s directors had a similar profile as London 
Bridge Waterworks, although there were also some significant differences. Of the 14 people 
involved in the company’s start-up in 1785, four were merchants. More specifically, three of 
them were coal merchants. As Lambeth Waterworks ran a steam engine from the very start, 
these people had an obvious link with the practical side of running the company, as well as 
an additional interest in its success. Other directors included a smith, an ironfounder, a 
pipeborer, an engineer, and a bricklayer; all professions which were directly related to 
practical tasks in the construction of the company’s infrastructure. Indeed, the directors 
actively worked for the company: Thomas Simpson, their engineer, was said to have been 
responsible for the set-up of the engine, but also of its maintenance, attending to it on 
average twice a week.
105
 While each of these directors must have been rich enough to 
invest in the £100 shares (most of them held more than one share), they were essentially 
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people who had a trade, and although some were merchants, they traded in goods that had 
an active link with the work the company undertook.   
Chelsea Waterworks had a director of similar social status in its early years: John Rowley, 
who had made the waterwheels for the company.
106
 However, most of the people involved 
in this company showed a quite different profile from the previously mentioned companies. 
The Chelsea Waterworks’ directors were from diverse backgrounds: they were a mix of 
West End landowners, military and naval officers, public office holders, and some 
clergymen, with only a few merchants and bankers. Of the 23 directors that managed the 
company in its start-up years (mid to late 1720s), at least nine had had a career in the army 




 These were careers in which one could show loyal service to the Crown.
108
 Eighteenth-
century army commissions were purchased, and allowed wealthy, non-landed individuals 
access to the aristocracy: by assuring the Crown of a trustworthy performance one could 
gain cultural acceptance and respectability, and even, if one excelled in battle, obtain a 
title.
109
 Military commissions were untainted by the negative connotations of ‘new money’, 
although they held the opportunity to make prize-money, and offered the possibility of 
power and glory. Offices in the King’s household, or careers in the clergy, provided similar 
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opportunities to forge a respected career and establish social capital.
110
 In addition, two 
peers were involved in this company’s start-up, Viscount Molesworth and Lord Grosvenor, 
but both only inherited their titles after the period that they were active in the company; 
they had been younger sons, who came into their titles after an older brother’s demise.
111 
Later directors included the occasional landowner, and some bankers, with more people 
having other trade connections. However, the military and public office presence remained 
strong throughout the century. 
Many of those involved in the companies also engaged in charitable work: Richard Clark, 
manager of London Bridge Waterworks, was also a treasurer of the Brideswell Royal 
Hospital, and several of the New River directors were described as philanthropists.
112
 
Chelsea Waterworks’ directors were evidently involved in charities as well: when the 
Westminster Infirmary for the Poor, Sick, and Lame asked for a reduction on their water-
rent the company refused to allow this as they needed to cover their expenses, but the 
directors were keen to point out that many of them were already involved with the hospital 
and contributed in other ways.
113
 Similarly, in 1798 the company was publicly listed as 
contributing £500 for the defence of the country.
114
 This linked their company with charity, 
and with patriotic endeavour, both of which reflected well on their reputation.  
However, the directors’ philanthropy did not have to be motivated solely by their public 
image: the case of Isaac Walker, a New River Company director, hints at religious reasons. 
Walker, a Quaker who made his wealth as a linen merchant, was known as a philanthropist 
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and it was mentioned in his obituary (probably written by his son John, also a director) that 
he retired early from his drapery business and spent the rest of his life in “well-directed 
benevolence”.
115
 He had also been on record in connection with another charitable scheme 
during the severe winter of 1767: during this winter, as food was scarce, Walker and fellow 
Quakers Samuel Hoare and David and John Barclay, had bought food wholesale and sold it 
cheaply to the poor.
116
 While this took place before he became involved with the New River 
Company, it shows a similar concern as did the emergency supply of water during scarcity in 
cold winters. 
However, another factor in the background of all directors is also evident: many of them 
were local to the area that their company supplied. Of the 23 London Bridge Waterworks 
managers, at least eleven had an address where they could (and probably would) have had 
access to their company’s water. In addition, the aldermen and mayor on the board would 
have had a political and local interest in the protection of the City of London. Similarly, of 72 
Chelsea directors over the course of the century, all but eight could be traced to a location. 
Of the 66 addresses available, at least 42 were located in the area supplied by the Chelsea 
Waterworks, as depicted in figure 7.2.
117
 For the Lambeth directors only a smaller sample is 
available, but even here, out of 18 men, six lived in or near Lambeth. Finally, local links for 
the New River Company directors were less evident: only few addresses have been found 
and many of these were country estates. This is likely a result of the social status of these 
directors: at a certain level of wealth the possession of a country estate was expected. It is 
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however very likely that they would have inhabited houses in London as well, not least 
because of the frequency of the directors’ meetings — which generally took place once 
every two weeks.  
 
Figure 7. 2. Known locations of Chelsea Waterworks’ directors, 1725-1800. 
 
Source: Chelsea Waterworks’ register of wills, 1731-1765, LMA/ACC/2558/CH/1/626A, and 
1763-1871, LMA/ACC/2558/CH/1/626B. Base-map is Stockdale. 
 
While the local link might seem obvious, as all directors had to attend meetings in 
London, it also gave the directors a level of self-interest in their company’s works, both in 
terms of water supply but also as a protection against fire for their own area. There is 
evidence that the local interest played a role in directors’ decision regarding company 
policy. When Richard Lyttleton was the Chelsea Waterworks’ governor, the company often 
held its meetings at his house on Cavendish Square. During one meeting in 1760 the 
directors decided that as there were new houses being constructed in the vicinity of the 
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square, it would be good for the company to lay pipes there, as well as improve the water 
supply to the neighbourhood, even though they had not received applications yet.
118
 Local 
knowledge therefore played a role in the decision making process. In the same vein, the 
local interest would have welcomed the addition of a better emergency water supply in the 
directors’ own streets.  
Clearly, James Weale’s claim that the waterworks’ directors had been speculators and 
not those inconvenienced by an inferior water supply was wrong. While some might have 
been involved for financial advantage, the fact that many also benefitted themselves from 
their company’s actions points to a level of self-interest and neighbourhood improvement. 
In fact, on a list of people backing the 1767 Colne proposal, both Lord Grosvenor as well as 
Lord Portland were listed.
119
 As in the case of the Duke of Chandos, who had been 
instrumental in York Buildings’ decision to expand towards his estate around Cavendish 
Square, involvement in a water company was both a business as well as a personal interest, 
as the supply of water and the better protection for fire improved their own property. 
 
 
7.6. The free provision of water: motives.  
 
Assigning motives is always difficult, and the reasons why the directors decided to supply 
for free were probably complex. Some of their actions were attributable to legal 
requirements: they were obliged to make their water available for everyone to take in case 
of fire. However, this does not explain the whole story. The companies cooperated beyond 
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their legal requirements, destroying their pipes by axing them open, as the West Ham 
Waterworks foreman did, or considering building pipes and reservoirs specifically to aid fire 
fighting, as was the case with Lambeth Waterworks. In addition, the fact that they also 
supplied free water in another kind of emergency — frost — for which there was no legal 
requirement, points to the existence of other motives. 
The rise of the press offered a platform for a growing public debate on the water market, 
as shown in chapter six. The positive publicity the companies’ actions generated could sway 
this opinion towards a particular water company. Some directors were conscious of this 
fact, as evidenced by their actions, which could have provided an incentive to supply for 
free. There were several reasons why a positive public opinion was important. Firstly, the 
publicity was a free form of advertising: it showed the company could supply well and 
emphasised its technological prowess. In addition, it showed that having pipes in a street 
would be advantageous not only for a water supply but also to be protected against fire. 
Public helpfulness therefore had a marketing potential as a way of demonstrating one’s 
superiority in times of emergency. 
However, the publicity generated a range of additional advantages. Favourable 
comments on the water companies lent prestige to otherwise untoward ventures.
120
 As the 
previous chapter has shown, critics accused the companies of making a profit on an 
essential good. As Aquae Vindex had accused the companies of ‘locking the water away’ 
from free access, giving it back to the public in times of need could be construed as 
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deflecting this criticism. Partaking in philanthropy reflected well on a director’s reputation 
as a good citizen, and by extension, on their business ventures.
121
 
Finally, there was also an element of self interest: the technology and infrastructure of 
the companies were expensive, and fire was an ever-present and very real danger. It was in 
the companies’ own interest to help ensure that their own buildings and the houses and 
properties of their customers did not burn down. While in theory the fire insurance 
companies’ brigades could source water for their engines from all available supplies, in 
practice, as there was no adequate public emergency water supply and access to open 
water dwindled, they mainly depended on the various water companies, which had pipes in 
most of London’s streets.  
The water companies’ directors therefore had a variety of reasons for providing this 
service. In particular, cultural notions of providing for the public good and Enlightenment 
ideals of improvement played a role, and as the waterworks were the only ones in the 
position to provide water in case of emergency, they took this role on for the public good. 
Providing water against fire became the charitable side of a profit making company, and 
those setting up new water companies in the eighteenth century emphasised both their 
potential for fire fighting as well as supplying the population with water. As profit-making 
companies, public service made their dividends appear more virtuous. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion. 
 
This thesis has explored how London’s expansion during the eighteenth century affected 
drainage of its surface area and the supply of water to its inhabitants and industries. It has 
shown how access to open water diminished, both as a result of the spread of the built-up 
area and as an outcome of expanded drainage networks that channelled water 
underground.  This separation between the city’s population and open water was bridged 
by water companies and sewer commissions. These institutions grew progressively more 
important during the eighteenth century as their infrastructural systems increasingly 
became the vessels through which access to water was mediated. The study of the 
expansion of these large and technological advanced networks of drainage and supply, and 
of their growing influence in the distribution and management of water, has provided a 
unique lens through which to view the organisational changes, economic transformations, 
technological innovations, as well as conflicts and discussions about access and control that 
took place in eighteenth-century London. 
London’s growth during the eighteenth century posed challenges both for drainage and 
water supply. The water companies as well as the sewer commissions sought to extend their 
networks in parallel with urban growth and this involved creating an extended network of 
pipes and sewers that covered a larger area often at higher elevation and which served an 
ever increasing number of customers. The institutions’ ability to deal with this expansion 
depended on several factors, and how the networks were built and managed reflected a 
complex set of relationships, in which environmental and social changes often co-
determined each other. The creation of the physical systems that increasingly determined 
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access to water revolved around socio-economic changes, technological knowledge and 
innovation, ideological views regarding the market, and power relations. In particular, the 
ability to extend both water and sewerage networks rested on identifying not just what was 
of benefit to the private consumer but also how a public good, such as drainage or water 
with which to fight fires, could be provided to the general population. 
The construction and growth of large infrastructure systems is underpinned by 
technological ability, institutional structures, legislative powers, and economic conditions.
1
 
Technological knowledge helps to explain the kinds of networks that were created, although 
this differed for supply as opposed to drainage. For drainage networks, technological ability 
formed no barrier to their expansion or functioning: the sewer system relied mainly on 
gravity and no major innovations occurred during the century that would have increased the 
efficiency of the system. For supply, on the other hand, the quality and expansion of service 
was heavily dependent on the availability of machinery to raise water to higher elevations. 
The main challenge for most of the companies that supplied eighteenth-century London was 
to raise their water high enough to be distributed through the entire network, often across 
considerable distance from the source, both in terms of length as well as elevation. The 
amount of water a company was able to raise was often the factor that limited its 
expansion, and for this reason, the companies invested heavily in the technology necessary 
to extend their networks across larger areas and at higher elevations.  
London’s geography played a crucial role in the technological choices open to the 
companies. The location of their intakes determined the choice between constructing a 
water-tower or a reservoir, as well as whether a waterwheel was a feasible option. Another 
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important factor was the spatial pattern of a company’s customers, which determined the 
extent to which water had to be raised. Technological choices were also a reflection of 
knowledge about innovations in complementary fields: the early adopters of steam engines 
were all aware of its potential uses through their other ventures, mainly in mining. A 
company’s geography, its particular needs, and the success of its technological forays played 
out in the way water supply networks developed and the different degrees of success 
achieved by each company. The New River Company, for example, was able to become the 
largest and most powerful water supplier partly because it had no need to experiment with 
expensive new technologies, and was able to adopt steam power only when it had become 
more efficient. Other companies, such as York Buildings Waterworks, which relied from an 
early stage on new steam technology to provide an adequate supply to its customers, were 
less fortunate and grew more slowly, if at all. 
Physical factors also influenced the institutional structure of London’s water system. 
Water follows gravity which means that households cannot be excluded from drainage in 
the same way that they can be from the supply of water. The result of this was that drainage 
remained in the hands of public authorities, whereas water supply, which was often 
conducted against gravitational forces and could as such easily exclude houses, offered 
possibilities for private business. Getting rid of excess water was therefore always seen as a 
public good whereas the provision of water was increasingly viewed as a private act of 
consumption. The institutional arrangements that managed water in eighteenth-century 
London were therefore very different. 
The institutions’ legislative frameworks had a decisive impact on the shape taken by the 
water systems. Parliamentary consent was required for new companies seeking to establish 
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a foothold in the capital. Some potential companies — most notably those related to the 
various attempts to use the river Colne — failed at this stage, but once promoters had 
gained permission to start operations, their main constraints were financial and 
technological. The commissioners of sewers, on the other hand, faced a larger challenge, 
especially regarding expansion of the network. Because Tudor statutes prevented them 
from constructing new sewers, they depended on private builders and developers to extend 
the drainage system to new neighbourhoods. The commissioners, however, retained the 
power to manage and tax these private sewers, as well as the ability to set certain 
regulations regarding size and building material. In addition, the sewer commissions could 
force people within their jurisdiction to contribute, and through public/private collaboration 
new houses were connected to the network as the city expanded. 
While physical factors and technological capacity influenced the way that water supply 
networks were constructed, broader political and economic processes that prioritised 
market relations allowed companies to be established as the main means of supply. 
Constructing the infrastructure to supply water to private houses required a huge financial 
outlay, much more so than a network that supplied only a few public pumps. Economic as 
well as institutional changes that accompanied the Financial Revolution of the eighteenth 
century made possible the financing of the water companies, both in relation to the 
availability of much larger flows of money, as well as changes in the legal framework relating 
to private property, which facilitated a greater security in long-term financial investments. 
Moneyed individuals were able to set up and invest in water companies because they had 
reason to believe they could expect a return for their money in the long term. In addition, 
Enlightenment concepts of improvement and progress provided the opportunity to present 
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water companies as socially acceptable investment projects: improvement of the city 
through means of a better water supply as well as protection for fire was emphasised as 
much as the personal benefit a shareholder might gain from investing.  
However, they still had to make their investments in infrastructure worthwhile. As a 
result of this, the expansion of the supply network was heavily influenced by London’s social 
geography. As calculations by the managers of the waterworks show, expansion into an area 
was dependent on the proportion of households likely to take up a supply. Deciding factors 
to the expansion of the supply network were wealth, and distance from the source of 
supply, since this dictated the cost. Affluent households were more willing to pay for a 
private supply and, as chapters five and six have shown, the richer West End attracted 
several companies that sought to extend their reach into this area. 
But this was not the whole story: as the high percentages of houses supplied with water 
in some neighbourhoods show, it was not only the wealthy who laid on a supply. A decisive 
factor as to whether or not people took up a commercial water supply was their distance 
from other sources, which would have necessitated a household having to allocate more 
resources to fetching a water supply rather than to buy it. The fact that distance to 
alternative sources was one of the factors taken into account by both the directors of the 
Lambeth as well as of the Chelsea Waterworks as they deliberated on whether to extend to 
certain neighbourhoods points out the importance of distance to water in shaping the 
growth of the water network. 
Technological knowledge, topography, legislation, as well as economic factors therefore 
had a profound impact on the structure and functioning of eighteenth-century London’s 
water system. As such it can be seen as a socio-physical network, which both transformed 
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London’s physical waterscape as well as the social relations inscribed therein.
2
 Access to 
water became increasingly controlled by the institutions in charge of these networks, and 
both the companies as well as the commissioners managed this through physical as well as 
through behavioural means. Some of the physical measures were inherent in the 
infrastructure, such as the commissions’ solution of constructing grates over the sewers to 
filter out solids, while on the supply side it was actively managed through the switching on 
and off of services.  
The behavioural methods the institutions employed were mostly financial. The sewer 
commissions regulated misuse of their networks by issuing fines for illegal practices, and 
also ensured even contributions from all those who benefitted from repairs. The water 
companies essentially kept their water ‘locked up’ in the pipes, and consumers had to pay to 
get access. The price that was charged determined both who was able to access the water, 
as well as how heavily this impacted on a household’s resources. While access to water was 
not a problem as long as there were alternative ways of supply, the gradual disappearance 
of these different sources meant that the companies’ networks increasingly became the 
main ways by which water circulated. As a result, their power over access became a 
pertinent topic of debate.  
Market relations became the primary means by which access to water was obtained, and 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries it was the specific arrangements of this 
market that were questioned. Largely because of the expense of constructing the network 
of pipes, pumps, and reservoirs, and the need to ensure adequate returns on their outlay, 
the companies sought to protect their investments and avoided potentially ruinous 
                                                           
2




competition on the open market. As a result they colluded in non-competitive arrangements 
or even created spatial monopolies, both of which forced consumers to pay a higher price 
than would have been the case if there had been true competition. This situation was a 
cause for serious concern, especially in relation to the poor and working-class population. 
The water companies had expanded their market penetration over the course of the 
eighteenth century, and in some places by the end of the century over 80 per cent of houses 
were connected to the commercial network. Many of these houses were relatively cheap, 
often occupied by artisans and the middling groups who, while not at the bottom of society, 
were equally not particularly wealthy. For these individuals, payment for water, which 
previously had been available from public pumps and streams, as well as the Thames, was a 
significant strain on income and much of the concern about pricing policy revolved around 
the ability of these groups, and the poor, to gain access to water. 
The morality of the market was the subject of public debate that revolved around the 
effects of monopolistic practices on the price, and therefore people’s ability to purchase 
water. In common with debates about the way that the commercial grain market operated, 
and the concerns this generated in relation to the ability of the poor to purchase wheat, the 
key question in relation to water was the extent of regulation the market required in order 
to maintain access to what was, after all, a necessity of life. Many of the commentators 
championed a free market with multiple companies active within one area and advocated 
letting the free market take care of the price mechanism. While free-market price dynamics 
happened locally at certain periods of competition during the eighteenth century, and at an 
especially large scale during the early decades of the nineteenth century, it disadvantaged 
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the companies to such a degree that they eventually resorted to new agreements, reflecting 
the natural monopolistic characteristics of a piped water supply.  
Other commentators thought that the antidote to high prices was to improve the public 
supply. In particular, Aquae Vindex, writing in the 1770s, called on the city to improve its 
free supply for the use of the poor, meaning that the companies should function solely as a 
luxury service for those able and willing to pay for water. In essence, his solution aimed to 
reduce the distance between households and water again, so the effort required in fetching 
it would consume fewer household resources than paying for a commercial supply. This 
would, effectively, have reduced the reliance of the poor on the water companies, and 
therefore on the institutions that mediated distance between the provision and 
consumption of water. 
This thesis has argued that in addition to integrating social, economic, and political 
processes with environmental history, geography needs to be incorporated into the analysis 
of the institutions that emerged to drain London and provide its inhabitants with water.
3
 In 
particular, the thesis has examined how water management was linked to, and influenced 
by, geology and topography, as well as the economic factors, societal values, legal 
frameworks and institutional changes that occurred during the eighteenth century. This 
complex situation did not arise entirely afresh: several of the water companies and the 
commissioners of sewers were inherited from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries — 
and some of the processes that gained momentum during the eighteenth century continued 
into the nineteenth. While changes in the eighteenth century were part of a continuing 
story, in some regards they also reflected a break with the past. The introduction of new 
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technologies, organisational structures, and economic transformations that were particular 
to that period, coupled with urban growth, provided qualitatively new conditions that 
influenced the structure and functioning of the water market.  
The thesis has used the way water was managed, both in relation to supply and drainage, 
as a lens through which to study changes in institutional arrangements. As such it has 
examined the growing role played by private institutions in an expanding city where, in 
relation to the provision of water, mediating the distance between supply and demand 
became the central problem. In doing so it has highlighted the process by which a public 
good became a private commodity. It has also explored the ideological underpinnings of the 
market provision of water and the institutional arrangements that distinguished private 
supply from a public system of drainage. The two were related: the disappearance of 
surface water was of material importance in explaining how access became increasingly 
difficult for a growing number of people. The city’s changing waterscape, therefore, needs 
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Appendix B. Directors of the New River Company, 1770-1800. 
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Appendix C. Managers of London Bridge Waterworks, 1780-1800. 
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Appendix D. Directors of Lambeth Waterworks, 1785-1800. 
 
Source: most of the data in this table has been taken from: LMA/ACC/2558/LA/1/1650 Lambeth Waterworks, share transfers, 1786-1833; 
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